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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis provides an overview and policy options analysis of offsite 
radiological emergency preparedness and response protocols for commercial nuclear 
power plants. This program is developed by the federal government and implemented by 
state and local government emergency management as the Radiological Emergency 
Preparedness Program (REPP). The capabilities built under the separate REPP, if 
integrated within the wider emergency preparedness enterprise, could be properly 
accounted for and included in a community-wide assessment of its aggregate capabilities 
within its existing all-hazards program. The research question for this thesis addresses 
which benefits, shortfalls, and challenges emerge from the integration of the 
hazard-specific emergency preparedness and response program established under REPP 
with the all-hazards core capabilities and the National Preparedness System doctrine. The 
research design utilizes a logic model framework to facilitate the process of evaluating 
different policy options and approaches to an emergency preparedness and response 
program for nuclear power plants in the United States. The conclusion of the research is 
to augment the existing REPP protocol with a robust means to measure capability and 
performance, which is modeled as a policy proposal to use an oversight framework and 
measurable site-specific performance indicators tied to probabilistic risk assessment. 
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This thesis provides an overview and policy options analysis of offsite radiological 
emergency preparedness and response protocols for commercial nuclear power plants. The 
offsite perspective on commercial nuclear power plants, which is concerned with the 
population and community surrounding nuclear plants, is the responsibility of state and 
local government emergency management. This responsibility is interdependent but 
distinct from the onsite perspective, which consists of the federal government and nuclear 
utility owners and operators. All entities must work together to protect public health and 
safety in the unlikely event of an emergency that results in a release of radioactive materials 
from the nuclear power plant.1  
The challenge with nuclear emergency planning is that it was created and remains 
separate and apart from the more generalized emergency preparedness programs now 
implemented in every jurisdiction throughout the country. This separation creates 
increasing difficulties for government in maintaining separate strategies for emergency 
management programs and utilizing emergency planning bases founded upon vastly 
different methodologies for risk assessment. In addition, the nuclear industry operates its 
own emergency planning program based upon a unique framework designed specifically 
for that hazard. The result is that three overlapping and conflicting approaches exist in 
parallel and in coordination with one another: the onsite industry-run program, the two 
components of the offsite program including the nuclear emergency preparedness program, 
and the emergency management enterprise tasked with implementing it. This current 
reality is both inefficient and potentially ineffective to sustain necessary capabilities needed 
for coordinated hazard preparedness and response. 
The purpose of the research into programmatic history and the planning basis for 
emergency response operations for nuclear plants is to provide a modern context for the 
 
1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Federal Emergency Management Agency, Criteria for Preparation 
and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power 
Plants, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1. Rev. 1 (Washington, DC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission and 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1980), 3, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/nuregs/staff/sr0654/r1/. 
xx 
evaluation of policy options to address this hazard today in the United States. Specifically, 
the research question is to address which benefits, shortfalls, and challenges emerge from 
the integration of the historical hazard-specific emergency preparedness and response 
program used with nuclear plants into the current all-hazards emergency planning 
approaches used across the nation. A large but necessary component of the research 
includes the basic historical and modern context of how radiation and nuclear risks have 
been evaluated for the purposes of regulatory rulemaking designed to respond to concerns 
for public health and safety. These scientific assessments performed originally in the 1960s 
and 1970s were not able to benefit from modern tools for hazard analysis and may have 
been greatly overconservative as a result.2  
To evaluate programmatic policy options effectively for nuclear power plant 
emergency planning, preparedness, and response, the research encompasses both scientific 
and regulatory roots of the current federal policy and programs. Additional research was 
performed to outline the modern approach to emergency management risk assessment and 
all-hazards capabilities-based planning. Taken together, both the current federal program 
for nuclear power plants and the modern emergency management program framework 
illustrate the relationship between the two and the contrast in perspective that describes the 
increasing difficulty to sustain nuclear emergency planning in parallel with current doctrine 
used for all other threats and hazards. The research also explores how the regulatory 
framework for nuclear power plants has successfully preserved and isolated the emergency 
planning and preparedness programs from the broader evolutions in the field of emergency 
management.  
To provide some means by which policy and programmatic options may be 
weighed and compared, a logic model structure is introduced to define a set of common 
metrics by which these programs may be compared and evaluated in terms of a consistent 
risk foundation. For nuclear power plant emergency preparedness and response, a set of 
four risk-significant planning standards were identified from existing programmatic 
 
2 Richard Chang et al., State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA), NUREG-1935 
(Washington, DC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2012), xiv, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/nuregs/staff/sr1935/. 
xxi 
guidance.3 These components were chosen based on being common to both onsite and 
offsite programs and as areas having the most impact upon risk outcomes according to the 
federal nuclear regulatory body. For each component, each program is broken down by 
how indicators as metrics for addressing programmatic objectives, inputs, outputs, and 
outcomes are defined. The results provide evidence that can be used in comparative 
analysis of program or policy option effectiveness at addressing the most risk-significant 
factors for the nuclear power plant hazard scenario.  
The results of the research conclude that augmentation of the current program with 
a standardized oversight process that uses site-specific performance indicators is the ideal 
policy option. This model can be applied to both onsite and offsite programs and has the 
advantage of being able to define the capability requirements, set targets, and measure 
performance using indicators. The standardized oversight model ensures that the same 
requirements apply to all nuclear power plant sites and their offsite components for 
consistency, but also that each locale can set and adjust indicators to meet their specific 
needs. The prescriptive nature of the current U.S. regulatory environment and the high 
profile of the nuclear hazard in the public perspective demand a more deterministic 
approach to identifying, assessing, and countering risk than may be necessary with other 
hazards.4  
The research also shows that the components of this policy option already largely 
exist and may be applied more broadly to offsite programs. Further research is necessary 
to address potential nuances of actual program implementation that will require 
rulemaking. While the augmentation option is the ideal choice for the nuclear power plant 
hazard, the other policy options are not without benefits that, with additional research, may 
yield important and viable program approaches in the future. As emergency management 
 
3 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Inspection Manual: Emergency Preparedness Significance 
Determination Process, IMC 0609 Appendix B (Washington, DC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2015), 
B–2, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/manual-chapter/. 
4 Environmental Protection Agency, Risk Assessment Forum White Paper: Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment Methods and Case Studies, EPA/100/R-14/004 (Washington, DC: Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2014), 10, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-12/documents/raf-pra-white-paper-
final.pdf. 
xxii 
doctrine continues to evolve, opportunities exist to incorporate an approach that focuses 
more upon using structured logic models to help support more effective and consistent 
decision making that relies upon evidence and is driven by data rather than intuition. As 
hazards simultaneously become more ubiquitous and complex, a more rigorous approach 
is necessary to yield structured analysis and evaluation of policy options where available 
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This introductory chapter serves as the foundation for this thesis project, entitled 
“A Case for State and Local Integration of the Separate Federal Radiological Emergency 
Preparedness Program.” This thesis uses a format that explores policy options for state and 
local radiological emergency preparedness, and presents a methodology using a logic 
model to measure the performance of these options against a common criterion. This 
section provides a problem statement and research question, and outlines a literature review 
that encompasses regulations and regulatory guidance, emergency preparedness doctrine, 
and the scientific basis for radiation risk. Also included are the overall research design and 
a narrative outline of the remaining chapters.  
A. OVERVIEW 
Since the end of World War II, the United States has chosen to designate the federal 
government as the public entity for overall nuclear matters at all levels of society. Per the 
Atomic Energy Act (AEA), control of nuclear material, including power operations, must 
be licensed through the federal regulator, who controls provisions for access and use 
according to regulatory criteria.1 However, the 10th amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
prevents a direct mandate from the federal government to the states.2 Thus, some aspects 
of regulating nuclear power that depend upon state and local government capacity to 
respond to an emergency event at a licensed facility had to be addressed differently. 
The scientific community in the 1950s and 1960s attempted to model the impact of 
radiation exposure upon human health with the crude methodologies and technology 
available to them at the time. On the one hand, a group focused upon promoting nuclear 
technology for power generation, and healthcare purposes sought to characterize the 
benefits of nuclear for innovations that would contribute to a more advanced society. On 
 
1 Alice L. Buck, A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, DOE/ES-0003/1 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Energy, 1983), 1, ProQuest. 
2 Jared T. Brown, Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the National Preparedness System: Background 
and Issues for Congress, CRS Report Number R42073 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2011), 3, https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc810674/. 
2 
the other hand, another group focused upon the risks and the destructive power of nuclear 
weapons unleashed during World War II, and the further risk from contamination resulting 
from industrial use of nuclear materials that could impact the environment. The dilemma 
would come to characterize the bifurcated nature of the nuclear subject continuing to the 
present day. 
In 1979, the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power station in Pennsylvania 
experienced a tragic accident.3 While severe, the event produced no known catastrophic 
release of radioactive materials into the environment.4 During the emergency and initial 
response to the event, many challenges were identified with the appropriate coordination 
between federal, state, and local government agencies and the nuclear utility itself, which 
was a private entity. Eventually, the President of the United States had to become directly 
involved to restore command and control and reassure the public that their health and safety 
would be protected.  
It would prove to be a pivotal moment in nuclear history. As the President 
commissioned a study on the findings from the incident, the resultant guidance for state 
and local off-site government entities on what to do during such an incident became the de 
jure standard for radiological emergency preparedness and response programs at each 
nuclear power plant.5 Recognizing that state and local governments play a key role in the 
overall capability to respond to a nuclear power plant emergency, the President mandated 
the newly created Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to oversee their 
efforts and ensure they followed this guidance. Eventually, adherence to these guidance 
principles became a licensing requirement for all nuclear power plants, which indirectly 
 
3 President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, Report of the President’s Commission 
on the Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI (Washington, DC: The 
Commission, 1979), 2, https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/007418765. 
4 President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, 12. 
5 Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Federal Emergency Management Agency, Criteria for Preparation 
and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power 
Plants, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 (Washington, DC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission and 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1980), 2, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/nuregs/staff/sr0654/r1/. 
3 
forced state and local agencies to adopt the program to enable their power plants to 
operate.6  
At the time of TMI, little or no precedent for coordination existed between state 
and local governments and the federal enterprise. The resulting program implemented from 
the TMI guidance standards became officially known as the Radiological Emergency 
Preparedness Program (REPP).7 Per the needs that existed at the time, it necessarily was 
highly prescriptive and highly complex to address the capabilities needed for preparedness 
and response. It served the nation well up until 9/11 and a general increase in federal-state-
local coordination that occurred during the terrorism and homeland security era. Over time, 
REPP became increasingly conflicted with the new and more efficient ways of the unified 
response and recovery coordination and emergency preparedness doctrine. 
In 2011, the Fukushima Daichi nuclear power plant in Japan experienced a 
catastrophic meltdown following an earthquake and tsunami that also resulted in a 
significant release of radioactive materials.8 The incident galvanized the industry across 
the globe to address risk factors associated with such beyond-design-basis events or those 
events associated with impacts not necessarily factored into the contingencies of the 
original design and construction.9 The future of emergency planning was tailored to a more 
specific risk basis but was also focused upon the prevention of emergency and accident 
conditions.  
 
6 “Emergency Plans,” 10 C.F.R. § 50.47 (2013), https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/cfr/part050/part050-0047.html.  
“Emergency Plans,” Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Code of Federal Regulations, title 10 § 50.47 
(2013 comp.): sec. (2), https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/part050-0047.html. 





8 International Atomic Energy Agency, The Fukushima Daiichi Accident, STI/PUB/1710 (Vienna, 
Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2015), https://www.iaea.org/publications/10962/the-
fukushima-daiichi-accident. 
9 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements 
for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, EA-12-049 (Washington, DC: Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, 2012), 37, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12054A735.pdf. 
4 
State and local governments responsible for offsite emergency preparedness and 
response still operating under REPP did not experience many of these innovations. Despite 
the lessons learned from the public evacuation and long-term recovery issues emerging 
from the Fukushima incident, REPP remained essentially unchanged from its 1980 
approach. Even as the U.S. domestic preparedness doctrine evolved into an all-hazards 
capabilities-based model, REPP only incorporated some modifications around the edges, 
and these enhancements were also inconsistently applied across different sites and regions 
of the nation.  
An additional difficulty was that REPP was exclusively funded by the nuclear 
industry, and not by government appropriations, and therefore, program changes could not 
ultimately be mandated without industry support.10 Throughout its recent history, the 
incentive of the industry was to keep REPP static and unchanged to reduce the variability 
of costs that increasingly affected thinner and thinner operating margins at U.S. nuclear 
plants. The industry perspective was that REPP was probably unnecessary anyway, due to 
the innovations in prevention activities that reduced the overall risk considerably over the 
decades since TMI, and especially after Fukushima. If REPP is still going to be required, 
it should be minimized and viewed as a necessary cost burden for maintaining a viable 
license for the sake of the regulator.  
The current era represents an opportunity to review these issues against the lessons 
of history but also with a perspective towards options for the future. The research for this 
thesis focuses on the question of future policy around commercial nuclear power plant 
preparedness and response. Specifically, this thesis addresses which benefits, shortfalls, 
and challenges emerge from the integration of the legacy hazard-specific emergency 
preparedness and response program established under REPP with the modern all-hazards 
core capabilities and the National Preparedness System (NPS) doctrine. Three distinct and 
measurable options for a modern policy framework are explored, and a conclusion with 
recommendations is provided.  
 
10 “Fee for Services to Support FEMA’s Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program,” 
Department of Homeland Security, Code of Federal Regulations, title 44 § 354 (2011 comp.), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/CFR-2011-title44-vol1/CFR-2011-title44-vol1-part354. 
5 
The paramount goal of public health and safety deserves to be applied to the nuclear 
power issue with a fresh dose of critical thinking in an era of larger questions about the 
future of nuclear in the United States and across the globe. Concerns surrounding 
environmental impact from traditional power sources using fossil fuels and contributions 
to climate change represent a significant opportunity for nuclear technology to fill a much-
needed role as a stabilizer of reliable power generation in an era of the increasing use of 
renewable sources via solar and wind. The question of public trust and public confidence 
in nuclear power remains front and center, and both industry and government will need to 
find new ways to harness the potential while reassuring local populations of their ability to 
protect public health and safety. Further and ongoing research is needed to determine what 
potential course of action for nuclear power and nuclear technology remains viable in an 
uncertain and changing world. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The federal REPP mandates state and local emergency preparedness and response 
criteria for nuclear power plant incidents.11 The TMI accident prompted the development 
of a structure in 1980 within state and local jurisdictions for a comprehensive emergency 
preparedness and response program to protect public health and safety from potential future 
nuclear power plant incidents.12 At the time, no alternative existed to implement an 
emergency preparedness program within the many separate jurisdictions in which nuclear 
power plants existed. The United States needed a national program to ensure consistency 
in how the state and local jurisdictions incorporated emergency response criteria. 
Today, modern emergency management programs in place across the country 
address the need for emergency preparedness and response within a comprehensive all-
hazards type framework, which makes hazard-specific programs obsolete.13 The specific 
 
11 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Program Manual Radiological Emergency Preparedness, 
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https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/108189. 
12 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 4. 
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planning standards and required capabilities under REPP can be incorporated into modern 
all-hazards frameworks to preserve the integrity of what the standards require without the 
need for a separate all-inclusive program for the specific nuclear power plant hazard. All 
16 of the planning standards outlined under REPP can be expressed in terms of capability 
targets and core capabilities under modern emergency management preparedness 
frameworks set forth in the NPS doctrine. Capability targets represent a level at which a 
community sets a goal to build the capability to respond or recover from an emergency or 
disaster impact. A core capability, by contrast, is a functional area that represents what an 
emergency management program should address at a strategic level.14  
The national all-hazards framework provides broad guidelines to encourage state 
and local governments to focus their emergency preparedness and response programs 
around functional areas aligned with national policy priorities.15 These priorities account 
for the capabilities of the federal enterprise to provide assistance to the states and address 
areas for which federal resources can serve as supplemental support within an extensible 
and scalable model adaptable to the most catastrophic impacts.16 The prevailing public 
perception is that nuclear technology and the risk of radioactive contamination traditionally 
falls within this category as a catastrophic impact.  
Most of the capabilities specified under REPP also fall within the broader core 
capabilities of the NPS and are no longer unique to the specific hazards of a nuclear power 
plant.17 For example, much of the technical capabilities needed for a response to a nuclear 
power plant are already developed and implemented within the modern fire and rescue 
hazardous material technician training programs. This training, sponsored and funded 
through the state-level homeland security grant program, is widely recognized as the 
standard for building an inclusive capability for a hazardous material response. Under the 
core capability framework, jurisdictions already incorporate these training efforts within 
 
14 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1. 
15 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2. 
16 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 21. 
17 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Program Manual, 19. 
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the environmental response/health and safety core capability, which includes radiological 
emergency response and contamination control.18  
The capabilities built under REPP, if integrated within the wider emergency 
preparedness enterprise, could be properly accounted for and included in a community-
wide assessment of its aggregate capabilities within its all-hazards program. This inclusion 
provides a much more accurate picture than if it remained isolated, as it is now, from these 
cross-cutting and integrated preparedness efforts currently implemented across the country.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Which benefits, shortfalls, and challenges emerge from the integration of the 
hazard-specific emergency preparedness and response program established under REPP 
with the all-hazards core capabilities and the NPS doctrine? 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
For this study, the literature outlines at least five main viewpoints on the subject of 
nuclear power plant emergency preparedness that can be explored. The federal government 
is a significant source of information but represents two distinct and separate factions, the 
nuclear and hazardous materials regulatory community versus the generalist emergency 
preparedness community. Currently, the two communities within the federal government 
do not generally mix or coordinate in any meaningful way, and thus represent two distinct 
viewpoints.  
The scientific community of health physicists, nuclear engineers, environmental 
scientists, and toxicology experts represents a small but significant viewpoint on the 
subject. One perspective within this group includes both engineers, and government 
regulatory experts focused on nuclear reactor safety modeling, radiation cancer risk, and 
the use of the linear no-threshold (LNT) dose model. The other viewpoint includes 
environmental scientists who look at the evaluation of hazards to human and animal health 
and the impact of man-made radiation upon the general environment.  
 
18 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Goal, 14. 
8 
A significant opposing view of anti-nuclear activists representing the public falls 
into two main groups, those opposed to nuclear energy and those opposed to all nuclear 
technology, including nuclear weapons. Although the two groups have some overlap, the 
literature review focuses on the anti-nuclear energy activist group. No significant public 
group of pro-nuclear energy advocates could be readily found who were not already 
members of either the federal government or the scientific community. 
1. Federal Government Nuclear and Hazardous Material Regulation 
and Guidance 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the advent of nuclear technology used for power 
generation prompted the need for government, first through the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC), and later through its successor agency, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) to address the issue of nuclear safety.19 In an unusual move, Congress 
vested the responsibility of addressing both nuclear power promotion and nuclear safety in 
a federal agency rather than the states.20 The economic need to drive growth through the 
supply of widely available and cheap electricity produced by nuclear power tempered the 
tone of regulatory documents from this period.  
Both federal policy documents and the pro-nuclear scientific and engineering 
community represented the regulatory view. This pro-nuclear faction of the scientific 
community focused on the comparison between the background radiation from the sky, the 
ground, the air we breathe, and the food we eat.21 Further, this group contrasted these 
natural levels against power reactor emissions, which, in absolute terms, were markedly 
lower. 
The opposing view from the environmental community of scientists became 
concerned over the proliferation of nuclear energy and its potential for environmental 
 
19 Harry Foreman, Nuclear Power and the Public (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970), 
74, Proquest. 
20 Foreman, 74. 
21 Foreman, 18. 
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damage via improper waste storage or operational effects, such as thermal pollution.22 One 
of the key objections from this group was that the regulatory maximum permissible 
concentrations of various radionuclides had been based on unrealistic models.23 This 
group’s intent was to bring greater awareness to their concerns regarding the potential risks 
of nuclear power plants located within or adjacent to populated communities. 
The publicized anti-nuclear activists at this time brought attention to the perceived 
conflict of interest between the promotion and regulation of nuclear power by the AEC, 
and the coalescing anti-nuclear forces made this conflict of interest their first agenda item.24 
Opponents of nuclear power plants believed that the AEC’s dual role as both promoter and 
regulator of nuclear power would undermine efforts to develop alternative energy 
technologies and means to conserve energy. The reorganization of the AEC into the Energy 
Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the NRC in 1974 did not change 
the government’s positive commitment to nuclear power.25  
By the mid-1970s, this policy environment resulted in an effort by the NRC, as the 
primary regulator for commercial nuclear reactors, and the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), to form a task force to address the basis for risk and identify a reasonable 
framework for emergency response planning for U.S. nuclear power plants.26 This 
document, the Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government 
Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants, 
published in 1978, is still the only reference for offsite risk methodology in existence that 
supports the creation of the 10- and 50-mile emergency planning zones around nuclear 
plants. Using the methods and modeling techniques of the time and lacking any data on 
 
22 Victoria Daubert and Sue Ellen Moran, Origins, Goals, and Tactics of the U.S. Anti-Nuclear Protest 
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25 Daubert and Moran, 11. 
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NUREG-0396, EPA-520/1-78-016, 5765828 (Washington, DC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of 
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past nuclear power plant emergencies hampered the task force in its ability to provide a 
rationale for the emergency planning basis. Therefore, the document did not use 
approaches based on risk, probability, or cost-effectiveness.27  
Prior to the TMI incident in 1979, the American public had a growing community 
of anti-nuclear activists who perceived a threat in these relatively new technologies during 
the nuclear power construction boom that occurred throughout the decade. After TMI, the 
handling of the emergency and the confusion that resulted from a lack of coordination 
between the utility and government prompted the federal government to study the issues 
and change the way it addressed the regulation of nuclear power.28 The seminal Report of 
the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: 
The Legacy of TMI was released this same year and provided the basis by which all future 
offsite regulatory guidance would be produced. 
In 1980, a Presidential Executive Order tasked the newly created FEMA to take on 
regulatory oversight responsibilities for state and local government agencies providing 
emergency response capabilities within the jurisdictions surrounding all U.S. nuclear 
power plants.29 The perceived alignment between FEMA’s role in disaster preparedness 
defined by the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 and the need to identify a regulator to provide 
accountability for state and local government put FEMA in a regulatory oversight role for 
state and local emergency preparedness programs.30 At the time, most state and local 
government organizations lacked common protocols and coordination efforts to support a 
comprehensive program for preparedness and response to a catastrophic event. Further, at 
the time, no alternative mechanism existed by which such a preparedness program could 
be consistently supported or sustained at the state and local government levels.  
 
27 Collins, Grimes, and Galpin, I–1. 
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Management Agency, Code of Federal Regulations, title 42 (2016 comp.): 167, 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/15271. 
11 
Based upon the authority transferred to it via the Executive Order, FEMA leveraged 
the recommendations produced from the Presidential study to work with the NRC. The 
purpose of the joint effort was to formulate a steering committee to produce guidance for 
the implementation of a coordinated utility, state, and local government nuclear power 
emergency preparedness and response program. Released in 1980, the Criteria for 
Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness 
in Support of Nuclear Power Plants guided the coordinated regulatory effort by FEMA and 
the NRC and established a set of common protocols (planning and evaluation standards) 
for state and local governments. The purpose of the guidance was to implement an 
emergency preparedness and response program consistently for each nuclear plant across 
the country.31 This document became the basis for the federal REPP. FEMA and the NRC 
had overlapping and sometimes conflicting roles within REPP that have been a source of 
continual tension to the current day. 
Throughout the 1980s, the scientific community continued to base its perspective 
of nuclear power plant risk around the uncertainty of the long-term impact of radiation 
upon human health. On the one hand, the environmentalist scientific community pointed 
to the lack of data providing a firm basis to evaluate the biological effects of radiation 
exposure at very low doses and dose rates. These scientists concluded that no level of 
exposure or “floor” existed below which it could be known with absolute certainty that no 
adverse health effects would occur.32 On the other hand, the pro-industry and government 
regulatory-based scientific community argued that the projection of risk based upon a 
linear projection of dose was not an accurate depiction of impact upon human health if a 
recovery time between successive exposures was necessary.33 In other words, the dose 
effects could not be considered additive if a gap in time existed between exposures that 
would allow for tissue recovery to occur. 
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These arguments about the nature of the health effects of radiation created a 
significant schism within the scientific community that persists to this day. The ongoing 
debate of whether or not biological damage caused by radiation is somatic (particular only 
to the exposed individual) or genetic (affects subsequent generations of the exposed 
individual) became a prominent early focal point of the debate.34 Almost all environmental 
regulations regarding hazardous materials exposure, including radiation, assume a linear 
dose-response for radiation risk rather than a threshold-based response because a National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) genetics panel study, published in 1956, recommended this 
approach. In subsequent years, some evidence suggested the report misrepresented the 
findings of the study and exaggerated the assumed consensus.35 
Over the subsequent years, the regulatory guidance within the federal government 
enterprise expanded several times to address emergent situations. Although the base 
document was never revised or updated, the guidance had to be appended after some state 
and local entities opposed to nuclear power refused to implement the federal program. 
Additional guidance helped standardize the process of taking protective actions within 
communities during incident scenarios involving a potential or actual release of radioactive 
materials. It also became apparent by 2011 that FEMA’s own internal guidelines for what 
constituted state and local compliance needed to be comprehensively codified in a separate 
document specifically for so-called “offsite” government organizations subject to FEMA’s 
oversight and evaluation. Thus, FEMA released its own document, the Program Manual: 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness, separate and apart from its joint guidance effort 
with the NRC, which still had not been comprehensively revised or updated since the 
original inception in 1980.36 
 
34 “Somatic Effects of Radiation,” Nuclear Regulatory Commission, last modified March 21, 2019, 
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Thus, the body of sources is small, relatively old, and applying the rationale from 
the 1960s and 1970s constitutes an ever-growing challenge in today’s public policy 
environment. In almost all cases, instead of returning to the original and revising the base 
concepts, both FEMA and the NRC chose instead to add interpretive guidance to the 
existing body. Over time, this added guidance created a distinct operational strategy for 
nuclear power plants apart from the overarching all-hazards protocol that guided 
preparedness efforts for every other type of event. Also created was a closed community 
of deep experts as practitioners who became somewhat isolated from ongoing innovations 
and doctrinal developments that persisted both in the nuclear industry and eventually in 
emergency management.  
2. Federal Government Emergency Preparedness Doctrine 
The relatively recent phenomenon of federal emergency preparedness doctrine has 
marked a significant break from the traditional approaches of dealing with specific hazards 
and threats individually and more towards a comprehensive “all-hazards” approach.37 The 
modern experience with some of the most recent large-scale catastrophic natural 
disasters—such as Hurricane Katrina, the California wildfires, and the 2017 Atlantic 
hurricane season—have emphasized the need to address the increasing drain and 
dependency upon the federal government via its Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) and direct 
federal support efforts in the state and local jurisdictions during large-scale disasters.  
In 2011, the federal government began to address emergency preparedness in a 
more serious and consistent manner because of Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) 
that defined doctrine and protocol for a comprehensive national preparedness system.38 
Using PPD-8 as a basis for authority to promulgate preparedness doctrine, the DHS and 
FEMA produced the National Preparedness Goal (NPG) to define its approach in terms of 
all-hazards “core” capabilities that should form the basis to define and build state and local 
response and recovery capability via all emergency preparedness efforts.39 Core 
 
37 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Goal, 4. 
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capabilities are broadly defined to allow state and local end users of the doctrine to interpret 
their scope and application within their communities subjectively. 
REPP, by contrast, is a highly prescriptive model subject to the federal 
government’s interpretation only and requires federal evaluation to validate it on a biennial 
basis. In communities with nuclear power plants, the jurisdictional authorities found that 
having both REPP and the all-hazards core capability model operating within the same 
space created conflicts within the same set of responding organizations. These 
organizations increasingly resisted having to demonstrate for federal evaluators in a 
manner inconsistent with their other plans and procedures for all other hazards. 
The NPG was not without its critics after its introduction to state and local 
emergency management practitioners. These critics have raised questions regarding the 
extremely difficult analytic task of developing a set of measurable preparedness national 
capabilities that can adapt to the needs of state and local stakeholders across the whole 
community with different threats and hazards and capabilities. Many have considerable 
doubt as to whether or not each of the 10 FEMA national regions, as well as the 56 states 
and territories, hundreds of metropolitan areas, thousands of cities, and tens of thousands 
of communities would all have the interest, capabilities, and resources to implement such 
an integrated preparedness program.40  
In a limited effort to reconcile this issue for REPP, FEMA began to experiment 
with incorporating elements of its all-hazards doctrine into the emergency preparedness 
program for power plants. One early example was the attempt to use the Homeland Security 
Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) within the nuclear power plant program. 
HSEEP uses the same core capability doctrine that permeates all other federal emergency 
preparedness guidance to make FEMA realize that some kind of crosswalk had to be 
established to build a bridge between HSEEP and the nuclear power plant planning 
standards. 
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FEMA’s efforts to incorporate HSEEP doctrine into REPP have been mixed at best. 
HSEEP’s core capability guidance appears in the latest version of the Program Manual: 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness, but FEMA acknowledges it is not a complete fit, 
and insists that the crosswalk only approximates the relationship between the core 
capabilities and the assessment criteria used for exercises.41 FEMA also points out the 
difficulty of reconciling the contrast between REPP and HSEEP due to the difference in 
how the two approaches adjudicate outcomes from emergency management exercises, 
where HSEEP uses core capabilities, and REPP uses reasonable assurance.42 Due to the 
prescriptive nature of REPP, the two approaches used within the same program create 
challenges in defining the proper interpretation of how the 16 planning standards are 
supposed to be implemented.  
The federal government, through FEMA and the DHS, incentivizes the adoption of 
consistent doctrine defined at the federal level down to all state and local jurisdictions 
across the nation via the use of preparedness grant funding programs.43 The grant funding 
programs, such as the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) and others, 
stipulate the use of FEMA doctrine within emergency management programs as a condition 
of eligibility. FEMA rewards behavior it cannot directly mandate to the state and local 
jurisdictions by facilitating access to funding and assistance through its relief programs 
supported by the DRF.44 This type of approach arises because “the President does not have 
the authority to direct the resources and authorities of state and local governments, the 
private sector…and normal citizens through [these kinds of doctrinal instruments].”45 The 
increasing challenge with programs, such as REPP, arises when the funding that supports 
most preparedness activities requires a different methodological implementation of 
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emergency preparedness that conflicts with the REPP program for nuclear power plants. 
This conflict effectively increases the cost of the nuclear emergency preparedness program 
that must continue to stand on its own without any economy of scale from the larger 
preparedness enterprise.46  
As a result, state and local governments around nuclear power plants face a 
dilemma; follow one prescriptive set of guidance for preparedness and response to their 
nuclear plants, and another, more generalized and sometimes conflicting set of guidelines, 
for all other hazards. The issue lies in the disparity between the prescriptive approach 
compared to the subjective core capability approach that can be scoped and defined by the 
individual jurisdictions using federal guidance only as a framework. The resulting 
segmentation of preparedness programs creates a duplication of effort, resources, and time 
that serves no one, including the state and local governments trying to plan, train, and 
exercise one way for all hazards and another way for nuclear power plant emergencies. 
Most of the documentation for federally defined emergency preparedness is recent 
(within the last 5–10 years), whereas the documentation for nuclear power plant emergency 
preparedness dates back to the late 1970s and early 1980s. Some evidence suggests the 
nuclear power plant emergency preparedness programs influence modern federal 
emergency preparedness doctrine, but represents a significant challenge in maintaining 
both the original and evolutionary versions at the same time for nuclear power plant 
jurisdictions.47  
3. Scientific Community Studies on Radiation Risk and Modeling 
The viewpoint from the scientific community contributes to what is known about 
radiation exposure risk and its impact on human health. It directly affects the basis by which 
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emergency planning and preparedness efforts can be justified in terms of responsibility to 
address a public health risk or threat to a community surrounding a nuclear power plant 
reasonably. 
The most important overall scientific voice in terms of its effect upon planning and 
preparedness comes from the EPA through its PAG Manual: Protective Action Guides and 
Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents. This guide is the only comprehensive 
source of numerical protective action guides (PAGs) to inform public officials of the 
counteractions necessary to protect the public from radiation exposure that may be 
introduced because of a nuclear power plant incident.48  
The EPA claims that the 1960s’ studies conducted to establish limits for the 
ingestion of food products contaminated as a result of nuclear weapons testing formed the 
basis of its methodology.49 The EPA provides its legal basis to address radioactive 
exposure and contamination “directly or indirectly affecting health” as its rationale for 
implementing its methodology but falls short of explaining the basis for risk associated 
with radiation in any of its guidance.50 
As the EPA also acts as a regulator for hazardous materials in addition to 
radioactive contamination, the environmental science community began raising questions 
with regards to the EPA’s methodology in the context of the hazards posed by nuclear 
power plants. Many of these scientists, accustomed to a practice of laboratory measurement 
protocols rather than an emergency response, originally focused on the idea that maximum 
permissible concentration values were inappropriate according to the normal practice of 
environmental science that looks at the entire food chain rather than one specific 
component.51 In 1994, the federal regulations in 10 CFR 20 related to radiation protection 
finally accounted for limits on intake and derived air concentrations rather than the 
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maximum permissible concentrations, to include more long-term potential health effects, 
including genetic mutations. The EPA changed the regulations to offer a more realistic 
approach to measure dose rates and projected stochastic effects on radiation workers as 
compared to the non-occupationally exposed general public in relatively “safe” 
occupations.52 
To understand further the root of the risk assessment for radiation exposure upon 
human health requires delving into the scientific literature. A somewhat different 
perspective on the issue of risk is provided, from which its application in emergency 
preparedness doctrine or legal mandates to develop and implement standards can be better 
understood. A review of the origins of the concept of the LNT dose model provides the 
rationale for how it has been used as the basis for an ionizing radiation regulatory risk 
assessment.53 
The scientific literature on LNT is sparse. An in-depth review, however, reveals an 
important fact; the application of linearity with respect to doses of radiation and 
corresponding impact upon human health came from the convenience of finding a single 
model to address cancer risk assessments from a regulatory standpoint, not science. Among 
the various proposed models, none was determined to be biologically credible, yet LNT 
was chosen out of the need for a consistent regulatory basis for a cancer risk assessment 
for both the EPA and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).54 
Further, more recently discovered evidence suggests that the original NAS Genetic 
Panel technical reports that supported the widely accepted understanding of consensus on 
the linearity recommendation were falsified and fabricated to obscure the true lack of 
agreement among the panel members.55 Therefore, the sources suggest that the entire risk 
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model, and thus, the government implementation of hazardous materials regulations and 
regulatory guidance, is without a truly scientific basis. 
Still, additional evidence points to a similar strategy leveraged by U.S. 
environmental legislation to find a level of acceptable risk that may define a threshold for 
a marginal increase of cancer risk due to a lifetime of exposure to a substance, such as 
radioactive material. During the era of both the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), as well as the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization 
Act (SARA), requirements regarding exposure, reporting, and cleanup for around 400 
different materials classified them as extremely hazardous substances.56 To provide a 
uniform level for the adjudication of acceptable exposure levels, the EPA codified a 
threshold of one in a million (10^-6) in its legislation to be used as “concentration levels 
that represent an excess upper bound lifetime cancer risk to an individual between 10-4 and 
10-6 using information on the relationship between dose and response.”57  
Other evidence suggests, however, that this one-in-a-million threshold originated 
as an arbitrary screening level without any real scientific or regulatory basis.58 The concept 
could be traced to a modification in an FDA amendment to the “Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetics Act of 1938 [which] required manufacturers to prove their products were safe 
before they could sell them.”59 Eventually, this arbitrary threshold became synonymous 
with “a screening level of essentially zero [or] a level of risk considered below regulatory 
concern.”60 The concept of 10^-6 provided a consistent basis from which to promulgate a 
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level considered safe for hazardous material cleanup and mitigation measures that 
Superfund required. 
Since almost all commercial nuclear power plants lie next to a major body of water 
(with the exception of the Palo Verde Generating Station in Arizona), the environmental 
science community has raised concerns regarding the impact on aquatic life. The cooling 
requirements for large nuclear plants are a concern due to the need for constant 
recirculation of water that may be required up to the total streamflow. From a biological 
standpoint, some food organisms would pass through the plant and any associated cooling 
processes and would be subjected to maximum temperatures exceeding those of the stream, 
and potentially kill off the primary source of food for other species in the adjacent water.61 
These scientists also argue that looking at the plants from an engineering standpoint in 
terms of judging the safety of the plant system itself does not account for externalities that 
may increase the risk to the community in other ways beyond simply a systems failure 
model that includes the toxicity of materials exposed to higher temperatures.62 
Within areas of scientific inquiry, efforts have been made to provide a more 
accurate and rational approach to the overall nuclear power plant risk methodology. The 
original studies modeling severe accident scenarios for nuclear power plant accidents were 
based upon what is known as the original siting study: Technical Guidance for Siting 
Criteria Development issued in 1982. The limited modeling ability available at the time 
assumed a severe accident “represents severe core damage, loss of all installed safety 
systems, and severe direct breach of containment.”63 Due to the “substantial uncertainties 
of the ratios” between the impact of a radioactive release and public health effects, the 
original siting study argued that the results were “not representative of nuclear power 
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risk.”64 Regardless, all power plant licensees had to provide a safety analysis comparing 
the projected impacts from a radioactive release with the engineered safety systems they 
proposed to implement against the benchmark from the original siting study and the defined 
planning basis of the emergency planning zones (EPZs).65 
In 2012, the NRC’s Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research published the State of 
the Art Reactor Consequence Analysis (SOARCA) report to re-address the modeling of 
severe accident scenarios using updated technology and methodology. The report found 
that using a long-term station blackout (external power loss) scenario with two 
representative plants from within the U.S. fleet resulted in a core damage sequence 
beginning in 9–16 hours with containment failure after approximately 20 hours.66 In 
addition, the radiological release concentrations proved significantly smaller than those 
assumed from the 1982 siting study. The core inventory release of radioisotopes of concern 
for impacts upon human health, such as Iodine-131 and Cesium-137, were projected to be 
in the range of 2–16 percent rather than the original estimates from the 1982 siting study 
that assumed 45–67 percent releases.67 These significant margins highlight the impact of 
better modeling and accountability for safety systems and mitigating procedures, including 
security and safety redundancy equipment installed after 9/11, in response to heightened 
concern over terrorist activities.68 
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Overall, these viewpoints form a comprehensive understanding of the history and 
development of the nuclear regulatory view, the emergency preparedness community view, 
and the scientific view that led to an informed perspective of the current state of nuclear 
emergency preparedness in the United States. Building upon this body of knowledge from 
all three viewpoints, a unified perspective may be proposed as a point of departure for a 
new approach to nuclear emergency preparedness and its regulatory framework. 
The issue of federal oversight and a joint approach to regulating onsite and offsite 
preparedness measures for nuclear plants is an artifact of history and reflects a knee-jerk 
reaction to what was considered a national emergency at TMI in 1979. The sources 
presented in this review demonstrate that what was necessary to provide a regulatory 
foundation was not always an accurate depiction of risk, was not based upon probabilities, 
but rather upon public perceptions of the problem and what could be done out of prudence 
rather than necessity.69 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research for this thesis incorporates a wide variety of historical background, 
case history, scientific methodology, regulatory basis, and programmatic description that 
creates a significant challenge to measure consistently against some common criteria. 
Nuclear power plant emergency preparedness and response emerges from many different 
needs, often in conflict with one another, and attempts to find some basis to settle the issue 
of what the public, the industry, and government all consider to be prudent and reasonable 
to protect public health and safety. When considering program or policy options to address 
the nuclear power plant hazard adequately in the eyes of all relevant stakeholders, it is 
therefore necessary to accommodate a significant degree of uncertainty and variability that 
characterizes both the nature of the hazard and the options for how to approach it.  
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The problem of dealing with uncertainty and variability in decision and policy 
criteria is not new, but the question remains as to what constitutes an effective evidence-
based approach that can serve to justify one course of action over another. Within the field 
of U.S. environmental regulation, the same challenge of identifying appropriate metrics 
has led the EPA to experiment with different approaches to utilizing logic models and 
strategies for analyzing multiple uncertain and variable criteria in its work as 
environmental regulators. As in the nuclear field, environmental science is forced to rely 
to some degree upon measurement of indicators that can be analyzed within a specifically 
defined context to provide insight or test the viability of certain actions with respect to 
outcomes. Risk management, therefore, must necessarily incorporate some means to 
evaluate criteria when no direct or linear measurement can be made to produce a conclusive 
result or output. Thus, when utilizing indicators to assess probabilities of outcomes, an 
accompanying logic model must also exist that explains and justifies what the indicators 
mean and their relationship to the outcome or objective under consideration. 
This thesis utilizes logic models to assist in providing a consistent structure for 
measurement and an analysis of program or policy performance within the context of the 
nuclear power plant hazard. The scientific basis for utilizing the logic model emerges from 
already-established planning guidance incorporated into federal regulations and enforced 
by the NRC. Thus, it has an acceptable basis that applies to existing planning criteria 
incorporated into both onsite and offsite requirements, and represents common ground 
between both elements of the overall radiological preparedness and response program.  
The research design for this project focuses on exploring three major policy options 
for REPP: 
• Integrate REPP program guidance and the 16 planning standards with the 
NPS all-hazards framework and principles by describing REPP 
capabilities explicitly in terms of capability targets.  
• Use a generalized all-hazards doctrine in place of REPP planning 
standards, without the prescriptive guidance for capability targets for the 
nuclear power plant hazard as provided for under the current REPP. 
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• Augment REPP with a similar oversight structure according to the model 
of the reactor oversight process (ROP), and use site-specific performance 
indicators for the offsite program as a means for assessment and 
evaluation of reasonable assurance. 
The following judging criteria are used to address how these options are defined to 
provide a full enough picture for consideration and eventual action:  
• Risk assessment methodology (updated from the NUREG-0396, Use of 
the State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analysis report, probabilistic 
risk assessment approach and the use of performance indicators)  
• Public perception (risk of radiation exposure from nuclear plants to the 
public community)  
• Industry support (congruence of offsite programs with onsite emergency 
planning requirements, site-specific assessment and evaluation programs, 
and liability under a reasonable assurance doctrine)  
• Implementation efforts (for offsite state and local government in 
accordance with existing emergency management programs and 
requirements, staffing levels, and training)  
• Federal regulatory implementation (FEMA policy and 44 CFR 350, NRC 
rulemaking 10 CFR 50.47, Price Anderson Act)  
The research should reveal trade-offs in both efficiency and viability that can 
be measured qualitatively and quantitatively to provide a further basis for analysis. This 
analysis can then be used to contrast the different policy options in terms of the judging 
criteria. The judging criteria can be used as a component in assessing the overall efficiency 
and viability of the policy option. Each policy option can be broken down into selected 
common elements of each of the judging criteria to provide a consistent basis for measuring 
indicators of effectiveness in a comparative analysis. 
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The thesis aspires to develop some basis by which to assess whether the initial 
REPP planning basis is sufficient to consider the current nuclear power plant risk to the 
offsite public accurately and objectively. Second, since 1980, additional information and 
research can provide a fuller picture of what is now understood about both nuclear safety 
and radiation exposure risk, and this information should be useful in determining an 
appropriate emergency preparedness and response strategy. 
F. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II provides a background of nuclear power plant emergency preparedness 
and the origins of its existence and its purpose in addressing the radiation risk to human 
populations. The chapter provides a broad overview of public perception of nuclear 
technology shaped by WWII and the Cold War, which extends to its perception of the risk 
posed by power reactors using this technology. The chapter also includes two case histories 
of nuclear power stations in the United States. These histories are included to illustrate the 
joint relationship between two different federal agencies for nuclear power plant oversight 
and the relationship between the federal government and the states on nuclear matters. The 
reader is thus provided with a solid foundation for the current regulatory environment in 
which federal, state, and local governments jointly operate with nuclear utilities to address 
requirements to protect public health and safety. 
Chapter III provides information regarding the current emergency management 
doctrine for capabilities-based planning under the NPS. It also includes comprehensive 
information on how jurisdictional risk assessments are conducted that form the basis for 
setting preparedness objectives using capability targets. This chapter also provides the 
reader with comprehensive information regarding the federal REPP, which sets 
requirements for emergency preparedness and planning for nuclear power plants outside 
and apart from the scope of all-hazards capabilities-based planning. The reader is 
introduced to the reasonable assurance standard of capability and performance evaluation. 
This reasonable assurance concept, used for REPP, can then be seen in contrast to the 
concept of capability gaps under the larger emergency management strategy in use for all 
other threats and hazards.  
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Chapter IV describes the emergence of risk management strategies for nuclear 
power plants and how these were justified to support a need for regulatory oversight, as 
well as the limitations upon the scientific basis for measuring risk imposed by technology 
available at the time. This information provides the reader with a deeper understanding of 
the roots behind the current regulatory requirements, and how the planning assumptions 
for emergency preparedness and response have influenced program strategies and criteria. 
This chapter also includes a more modern study of nuclear power plant accident scenarios, 
supported by evidence that provides a much different picture of probable risk based upon 
contemporary methodologies and computer simulations using modern tools. This 
discussion prepares the reader for further discussion and information on the role of 
probabilistic risk assessments, based upon data and indicators that provide a clear context 
for measuring criteria for nuclear safety, radiological impact, and human performance. The 
final portion of this chapter wraps up the discussion by introducing the use of a logic model 
framework and a structure for measuring program effectiveness to address risk-significant 
factors for emergency planning and response. 
Chapter V provides a policy options analysis, utilizing the logic model introduced 
in Chapter IV and incorporating three realistic program strategies for nuclear power plant 
emergency preparedness and response. These three strategies build upon the contextual 
information provided in Chapter III to describe how each approach will set appropriate 
objectives, define inputs and outputs, and manage outcomes based upon consistent risk-
significant factors in the logic model framework. Chapter VI then takes all accrued 
information and summarizes it into conclusions and recommendations for the most 
effective policy option to address the risk-significant factors comprehensively for 
emergency planning and response for both the onsite and offsite perspective.  
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II. BACKGROUND OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
This chapter serves as a short primer for the background of where nuclear power 
plant emergency preparedness emerges from and the reasons for its existence. The chapter 
starts with a brief overview of radiation and environmental impacts and threats from 
commercial nuclear power stations and then transitions to the discussion of historical cases 
that helped shape the current regulatory environment for emergency preparedness and 
response for these facilities. The first section provides a context for a more in-depth 
discussion of the field of radiation physics and radiation health, specifically with an 
emphasis on the connection between the historical context and the basis of the current 
radiation protection regulations. The second section discusses two examples that provide 
an understanding of the origins of the current state of radiological emergency preparedness 
in the United States. The first example addresses the origins of the joint federal 
responsibility for radiological emergency preparedness between the NRC and FEMA out 
of the aftermath of the TMI incident. The second example provides an overview of the state 
and local legal challenges and federal pre-emption under the supremacy clause that 
characterized the development of the Shoreham nuclear power station. These discussions 
set the stage for additional analysis in the following section of the contrasts between the 
federal REPP and current emergency management principles based upon the framework of 
the NPS.  
A. THE RADIATION RISK 
This section explores the central purpose of radiological emergency preparedness 
and response, which is to address the risk to the population from potential or actual 
exposure to radioactive materials that may have an adverse impact on public health. 
Radiological emergency preparedness and response programs for commercial nuclear 
power plants and their surrounding communities are designed around the concept of 
avoiding doses of radiation that may have acute impacts from a sudden and catastrophic 
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release of radioactive material.70 These programs are also designed to address cumulative 
doses received over time from a proximate source below the threshold for producing acute 
symptoms. The radiation protection concept of as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) 
achieved through time, distance, and shielding is crucial to understand how protective 
actions are designed to mitigate the risk of the effects of either acute or chronic radiation 
exposure that may cause adverse health effects in human populations, including cancer.71  
The first portion of this section explores the origins of the government response to 
public concerns regarding radiation exposure and the potentially destructive impact upon 
a human population. A brief discussion follows of the first federal regulatory structure 
implemented to control the possession and use of nuclear materials, and the original 
scientific basis for radiation risk that informed those efforts and still persists today. The 
intent is to provide enough information so that the subsequent research of the emergency 
response programs designed to act as a countermeasure for public risk can be explored 
from an informed perspective of the original basis that informed the need for their 
development and ongoing use.  
1. Public Perception of Radiation Risk 
In the United States, concern around radiation exposure and its impact on human 
health have been an issue within the public health sphere since World War II. The Allied 
deployment of the atomic bombs over Imperial Japan left a lasting legacy of the power of 
nuclear technology to cause human harm. Against this background, the Cold War emerged 
and again threatened “mutually assured destruction” between the Soviet Union and the 
United States as a result of a potential nuclear war. During the Cold War, the nations that 
had nuclear technology also began experimenting with its use for power generation. In the 
mind of the general public, the perception of nuclear technology was negative in this regard 
and was reinforced by propaganda and mass media that played upon these fears for political 
and entertainment purposes even into the 21st century. 
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During the 1950s and 1960s, countries that had developed or acquired nuclear 
technology for military and weapons systems began to experiment with nuclear power 
generation. One of the earliest U.S. examples was the development of the Shippingport 
light water power reactor, which was intended as a prototype for additional nuclear power 
plants. Further efforts led to a construction boom around the world in nuclear power that 
lasted well into the 1970s. Large fleets of these plants were implemented within developed 
countries.  
2. U.S. Federal Regulatory Approach  
The advent of nuclear technology used for power generation prompted the need for 
government, first through the AEC and later through its successor agency, the NRC, to 
address the issue of nuclear safety.72 In an unusual move, Congress vested the 
responsibility of addressing both nuclear power promotion and nuclear safety in a federal 
agency rather than the states.73 The economic need to drive growth through the supply of 
widely available and cheap electricity produced by nuclear power tempered the tone of 
regulatory documents from this period.  
Both federal policy documents and the pro-nuclear scientific and engineering 
community represented the regulatory view. This pro-nuclear faction of the scientific 
community focused on the comparison between the background radiation from the sky, the 
ground, the air we breathe, and the food we eat.74 Further, this group contrasted these 
natural levels against power reactor emissions, which, in absolute terms, were markedly 
lower. 
The opposing view from the environmental community of scientists became 
concerned over the proliferation of nuclear energy and its potential for environmental 
damage via improper waste storage or operational effects, such as thermal pollution.75 One 
of this group’s key objections was that the regulatory maximum permissible concentrations 
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of various radionuclides were based on unrealistic models.76 Maximum permissible 
concentration values were used in these early days as a quantifier for risk and were derived 
from crude models for measuring impact from radiation exposure. In practice, however, 
these values considered only the impact upon one element of a larger biosphere system, in 
which contamination could have a much greater potential impact as part of a food chain, 
which thus makes the distinction of the maximum permissible values meaningless.77 This 
group’s intent was to bring greater awareness to their concerns regarding the potential risks 
of nuclear power plants located within or adjacent to populated communities. 
The publicized anti-nuclear activists at this time brought attention to the perceived 
conflict of interest between the promotion and regulation of nuclear power by the AEC, 
and the coalescing anti-nuclear forces made this conflict of interest their first agenda item.78 
Opponents of nuclear power plants believed that the AEC’s dual role as both promoter and 
regulator of nuclear power would undermine efforts to develop alternative energy 
technologies and means to conserve energy. The reorganization of the AEC into the ERDA 
and the NRC in 1974 did not change the government’s positive commitment to nuclear 
power.79  
By the mid-1970s, this policy environment resulted in an effort by the NRC, as the 
primary regulator for commercial nuclear reactors, and the EPA to form a task force to 
address the basis for risk and identify a reasonable framework for emergency response 
planning for U.S. nuclear power plants.80 This document, the Planning Basis for the 
Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in 
Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants, published in 1978, is still the only reference 
for offsite risk methodology in existence that supports the creation of the 10- and 50-mile 
emergency planning zones around nuclear plants. Using the methods and modeling 
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techniques of the time and lacking any data on past nuclear power plant emergencies 
hampered the task force in its ability to provide a rationale for the emergency planning 
basis. Therefore, the document did not use approaches based on risk, probability, or cost-
effectiveness.81  
3. Scientific Basis for Risk Assessment 
Throughout the 1980s, the scientific community had been and continued to base its 
perspective of nuclear power plant risk around the uncertainty of the long-term impact of 
radiation upon human health. On the one hand, the environmentalist scientific community 
pointed to the lack of data providing a firm basis to evaluate the biological effects of 
radiation exposure at very low doses and dose rates. These scientists concluded that no 
level of exposure or “floor” existed below which it could be known with absolute certainty 
that no adverse health effects would occur.82 On the other hand, the pro-industry and 
government regulatory-based scientific community argued that the projection of risk-based 
upon a linear projection of dose was not an accurate depiction of impact upon human health 
if a recovery time between successive exposures was necessary.83 In other words, the dose 
effects could not be considered additive if a gap in time existed between exposures that 
would allow for tissue recovery to occur. 
The ongoing question of whether or not biological damage caused by radiation is 
somatic (particular only to the exposed individual) or genetic (affects subsequent 
generations of the exposed individual) became a prominent early focal point of the effort 
to assess the risk of these nuclear power plants.84 This somatic versus genetic debate 
magnified the potential risk and impact to an exposed population under the premise that 
biological damage could carry forth into successive generations as a consequence; this 
viewpoint was a novel factor in its potential capability for transcendence. Almost all 
environmental regulations regarding hazardous materials exposure, including radiation, 
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assume a linear dose-response for radiation risk rather than a threshold-based response 
because a NAS genetics panel study, published in 1956, recommended this approach. In 
subsequent years, some evidence suggested the report misrepresented the findings of the 
study and exaggerated the assumed consensus.85 
To understand further the root of the risk assessment for radiation exposure upon 
human health requires delving into the scientific literature. A somewhat different 
perspective on the issue of risk is provided, from which its application in emergency 
preparedness doctrine or legal mandates to develop and implement standards can be better 
understood. A review of the origins of the concept of the LNT dose model provides the 
rationale for how it has been used as the basis for ionizing radiation regulatory risk 
assessment.86  
The scientific literature on LNT is sparse. An in-depth review, however, reveals an 
important fact, the application of linearity with respect to doses of radiation and 
corresponding impact upon human health came from the convenience of finding a single 
model to address cancer risk assessments from a regulatory standpoint, not science. Among 
the various proposed models, none was determined to be biologically credible, yet LNT 
was chosen out of the need for a consistent regulatory basis for cancer risk assessment for 
both the EPA and FDA.87 
More recently discovered evidence suggests that the original NAS Genetic Panel 
technical reports that supported the widely accepted understanding of consensus on the 
linearity recommendation were falsified and fabricated to obscure the true lack of 
agreement among the panel members.88 Therefore, the sources suggest that the entire risk 
model, and thus the government implementation of hazardous materials regulations and 
regulatory guidance, is without a truly scientific basis.  
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For communities with nuclear power plants, state and local governments charged 
with the protection of public health and safety now had to identify a basis for what 
constitutes an unacceptable level of risk to the public from potential large-scale radiation 
exposure or contamination. The singular standard resource for planning and preparedness 
came from the EPA through its PAG Manual: Protective Action Guides and Planning 
Guidance for Radiological Incidents. This guide is the only comprehensive source of 
numerical PAGs to inform public officials of the counteractions necessary to protect the 
public from radiation exposure that may be introduced as a result of a nuclear power plant 
incident.89  
The EPA claims that the 1960s’ studies conducted to establish limits for the 
ingestion of food products contaminated as a result of nuclear weapons testing formed the 
basis of its methodology.90 The EPA provides its legal basis to address radioactive 
exposure and contamination “directly or indirectly affecting health” as its rationale for 
implementing its methodology but falls short of explaining the basis for risk associated 
with radiation in any of its guidance.91  
As the EPA also acts as a regulator for hazardous materials in addition to 
radioactive contamination, the environmental science community began raising questions 
with regards to the EPA’s methodology in the context of the hazards posed by nuclear 
power plants. Many of these scientists, accustomed to a practice of laboratory measurement 
protocols rather than emergency response, originally focused on the idea that maximum 
permissible concentration values were inappropriate according to the normal practice of 
environmental science that looks at the entire food chain rather than one specific 
component.92 In 1994, the federal regulations in 10 CFR 20 related to radiation protection 
finally accounted for limits on intake and derived air concentrations rather than the 
maximum permissible concentrations, to include more long-term potential health effects, 
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including genetic mutations. The EPA changed the regulations to offer a more realistic 
approach to measure dose rates and projected stochastic effects on radiation workers as 
compared to the non-occupationally exposed the general public in relatively “safe” 
occupations.93  
Additional evidence points to a similar and broader strategy leveraged by U.S. 
environmental legislation to find a level of acceptable risk that may define a threshold for 
a marginal increase of cancer risk due to a lifetime of exposure to any kind of hazardous 
substance, including radioactive material. During the era of both the Emergency Planning 
and Community Right-to-Know Act, as well as the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act, new requirements were introduced regarding exposure, reporting, and 
cleanup for around 400 different materials classified as extremely hazardous substances.94 
To provide a uniform level for adjudication of acceptable exposure levels, the EPA adopted 
and codified a threshold of one in a million (10^-6) in its legislation to be used as a 
concentration level characterizing the linkage between dose and response in terms of a 
subjective maximum additional incremental amount of cancer risk over an average human 
life span.95  
Other evidence suggests, however, that this one-in-a-million threshold originated 
as an arbitrary screening level without any real scientific or regulatory basis.96 The concept 
could be traced to a modification in an FDA amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetics Act of 1938. If a carcinogen eaten by animals left such little residue as not to 
pose a risk to humans, then the amendment allowed it.97 Eventually, the field considered 
this arbitrary threshold as safe enough to be essentially zero.98 The concept of 10^-6 
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provided a consistent basis from which to promulgate a level considered safe for hazardous 
material cleanup and mitigation measures that the Superfund program needed and required. 
As awareness around environmental pollution and the cleanliness of air and water 
began to increase as part of environmental activism and education, further debates arose 
concerning impacts on non-human life because of nuclear power plant operations. Since 
almost all commercial nuclear power plants lie next to a major body of water (with the 
exception of the Palo Verde Generating Station in Arizona), significant concerns within 
the environmental science community have been raised regarding their impact on aquatic 
life. Some of the largest concerns surrounded plant sites situated adjacent to sensitive 
ecosystems, such as estuaries or marshes, whose sensitive biome was seen to be at risk in 
the event of a radiological release from the plant into the local area. One prominent example 
was the extended fight that occurred over the licensing of the Seabrook Station in New 
Hampshire, situated within a large saltwater marsh that prompted local critics to oppose 
the project out of concern for the impact to the wetlands.99 
In addition to the potential for radioactive material releases, the cooling 
requirements for large nuclear plants are an additional environmental concern due to the 
need for constant recirculation of water that may be required up to the total streamflow. 
From a biological standpoint, some food organisms would pass through the plant and any 
associated cooling processes and would be subjected to maximum temperatures exceeding 
those of the stream, which potentially killed off the primary source of food for other species 
in the adjacent water.100 These scientists also argue that looking at the plants from an 
engineering standpoint in terms of judging the safety of the plant system itself does not 
account for externalities that may increase the risk to the community in other ways beyond 
simply a systems failure model that includes the toxicity of materials exposed to higher 
temperatures.101  
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All these developments in risk modeling and potential concerns around 
environmental impacts prompted the nuclear industry to greater awareness around its 
potential liability exposure. Industry scientists began efforts to provide a more accurate and 
rational approach to the overall nuclear power plant risk methodology. The original studies 
modeling severe accident scenarios for nuclear power plant accidents were based upon 
what is known as the original siting study, Technical Guidance for Siting Criteria 
Development issued in 1982. The limited modeling ability available at the time assumed 
that within 90 minutes, radioactive materials would be released, the fuel core would be 
damaged, and all countermeasures would fail. Due to the uncertainty on how to measure 
the impact of a radioactive release and its public health effects, the true risk of nuclear 
power could not be measured.102 Regardless, all power plant licensees had to provide a 
safety analysis comparing the projected impacts from a radioactive release with the 
engineered safety systems they proposed to implement against the benchmark from the 
original siting study and the defined planning basis of the EPZs.103 
In 2012, the NRC’s Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research published the SOARCA 
report to re-address the modeling of severe accident scenarios using updated technology 
and methodology. The report found that using a long-term station blackout (external power 
loss) scenario with two representative plants from within the U.S. fleet resulted in a core 
damage sequence beginning in 9–16 hours and containment failure after approximately 20 
hours.104 In addition, the radiological release concentrations proved significantly smaller 
than those assumed from the 1982 siting study. Core inventory release of radioisotopes 
concerning impacts upon human health, such as Iodine-131 and Cesium-137, were 
projected to be in the range of 2–16 percent rather than the original estimates from the 1982 
siting study that assumed 45–67 percent releases.105 These significant margins highlight 
the impact of better modeling and accountability for safety systems and mitigating 
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procedures, including security and safety redundancy equipment installed after 9/11, in 
response to heightened concern over terrorist activities.106 
This section has provided a brief overview of the origins and highlights of public 
perception of radiation risk and the U.S. federal regulatory approach in response to those 
perceptions and concerns. A brief discussion also ensued on the emergence of the scientific 
basis for radiation risk used to justify regulatory requirements and statutory language that 
shapes the actions of the nuclear industry and the government concerning emergency 
preparedness and response. The next two portions address two of the most significant case 
examples of how these first pioneering principles informed further the evolution of 
programs at both the federal level and at the state and local levels. In each case, the intent 
is to provide a perspective for how events triggered significant regulatory and 
programmatic reactions whose influence continues into the present day. These case 
examples also provide a context for why the current regulations and program structures 
were created out of the events of history. 
B. THREE MILE ISLAND 
On March 28, 1979, the TMI nuclear plant accident in Pennsylvania experienced a 
loss of coolant and partial fuel meltdown. Although no large-scale documented radioactive 
material release into the community was registered, it was and currently remains the worst 
commercial nuclear disaster in U.S. history. The failure of a coordinated state and local 
government emergency response to the situation was perhaps the most visible outcome 
from the incident and prompted significant changes in emergency preparedness and 
response protocols for all U.S. nuclear power plants in its aftermath.  
Prior to the TMI incident in 1979, the American public already had a growing 
community of anti-nuclear activists who perceived a threat in these relatively new 
technologies during the nuclear power construction boom that occurred throughout the 
decade. After TMI, the handling of the emergency and the confusion that resulted from a 
lack of coordination between the utility and government prompted the federal government 
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to study the issues and change the way it addressed the regulation of nuclear power.107 The 
seminal Report of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, The 
Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, was released this same year and provided the basis 
by which all future offsite regulatory guidance would be produced. 
In 1980, a Presidential Executive Order tasked the newly created FEMA to take on 
regulatory oversight responsibilities for state and local government agencies providing 
emergency response capabilities within the jurisdictions surrounding all U.S. nuclear 
power plants.108 The perceived alignment between FEMA’s role in disaster preparedness 
defined by the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 and the need to identify a regulator to provide 
accountability for state and local government put FEMA in a unique regulatory oversight 
role for state and local emergency preparedness programs.109 The legacy of this decision 
created a precedent for FEMA’s authority that, while case-specific to a commercial nuclear 
power operation as a federally licensed facility, incorporated approval, and evaluation of 
state and local plans and procedures under the auspices of the licensing process. These 
auspices were expressed as a FEMA responsibility to adjudicate “reasonable assurance” of 
state and local capability, with direct consequences to license authorization for the nuclear 
facility. At the time, most state and local government organizations lacked common 
protocols and coordination efforts to support a comprehensive program for preparedness 
and response to a catastrophic event. Further, at the time, no alternative mechanism existed 
by which such a preparedness program could be consistently supported or sustained at the 
state and local government levels.  
Based upon the authority transferred to it via the Executive Order, FEMA leveraged 
the recommendations produced out of the Presidential study on TMI to work with the NRC. 
The purpose of the joint effort was to formulate a steering committee to produce guidance 
for the implementation of a coordinated utility, state, and local government nuclear power 
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emergency preparedness and response program. Released in 1980, the Criteria for 
Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness 
in Support of Nuclear Power Plants guided the coordinated regulatory effort by FEMA and 
the NRC and established a set of common protocols (planning and evaluation standards) 
for state and local governments. The purpose of the guidance was to implement an 
emergency preparedness and response program consistently for each nuclear plant across 
the country.110 This document became the basis for the federal REPP. FEMA and the NRC 
had overlapping and sometimes conflicting roles within REPP that have been a source of 
continual tension to the current day. 
C. SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION 
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, formerly located on the north shore of Long 
Island in New York State, was a landmark case of what can happen when the state and 
local governments do not support the emergency preparedness and response requirements 
set forth in the NRC regulations. The NRC grants a license both for the construction and 
for power operations to the nuclear utility for all nuclear power plants in the United 
States.111 Due to evolving environmental regulations and ongoing challenges with 
construction issues and delays, the Shoreham project, for which planning had started in 
1965, never became fully operational and was eventually shut down in 1989 with site 
cleanup completed by 1994.112  
Among the many issues with Shoreham was the outright refusal by both state and 
local governments to comply with the requirements for emergency planning necessary for 
approval and maintenance of the operating license. In 1983, during the aftermath of the 
incident at TMI, local county officials of Suffolk County, where Shoreham was located, 
determined that constructing an evacuation plan for the residents would be infeasible if an 
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event at the plant involved a potential or actual release. This same year, the Governor of 
New York directed that if Suffolk County officials did not support any proposed emergency 
response plan, no action was to be taken by the state’s Disaster Preparedness Commission 
to approve or support one.113 
During any emergency requiring evacuation, the Long Island Lighting Company 
that represented Shoreham proposed instead to replace local fire and police with its own 
staff.114 The state and local governments predictably opposed such a proposal, and as 
discussed in a subsequent court case regarding the matter, the issue of federal preemption, 
in terms of the extent that federal law displaces state law under the Supremacy Clause as 
outlined in the U.S. Constitution, was at the root of the issue.115  
In an attempt to circumvent direct adjudication on the plan itself, the local county 
government went so far as to pass an ordinance to block any exercise of the emergency 
plan (as required to obtain approval of the plan under licensing regulations) under these 
arrangements by requiring the utility to submit the test for approval and by imposing 
criminal sanctions on the utility’s employees if the test proceeded in the face of local 
governments disapproval.116 As the Shoreham station was still within the initial licensing 
process, the action became the subject of a court case due to the effect of its interference 
in a federal licensing decision process.  
The court ruled that federal law preempted this local ordinance, given that the 
federal government had already established its precedence in the nuclear sphere. Federal 
regulation, as outlined in the AEA, expressly provides that “state and local regulation is 
permitted only in regard to the rates and services of electric power produced in nuclear 
facilities. It does not extend to the protection of public health and safety from the special 
hazards associated with nuclear facilities.”117 It subsequently ordered an injunction for the 
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exercise to proceed on the grounds that interference with the exercise was interference in 
the NRC’s ability to conduct the licensing process at Shoreham, which was an exclusively 
federal matter. Later on, FEMA and the NRC added a supplementary guidance document 
to the original guidance contained in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 to provide “guidance 
for the development, review, and evaluation of utility offsite radiological emergency 
response planning and preparedness for those situations in which State and/or local 
governments decline to participate in emergency planning” based upon events and 
outcomes surrounding Shoreham.118 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides a background of nuclear power plant emergency 
preparedness and the origins of its existence and its purpose in addressing the radiation risk 
to human populations. To understand why nuclear power plant emergency preparedness 
and response is an important homeland security issue, it is critical to acknowledge how 
WWII and the Cold War have shaped public perception of nuclear technology. Nuclear 
technology used for power reactors has often been conflated with public fears extending 
from their perception of the risk posed by other uses of nuclear technology, such as nuclear 
weapons. Thus, nuclear emergency planning has both a technical component related to the 
understanding of the risk from the accident scenario, but also a public messaging and 
cultural component that addresses fears cultivated by prominent military uses of nuclear 
technology.  
The background of nuclear power plant emergency preparedness and response 
would not be complete without two significant case histories that illustrate the origins of 
two key features. The first is the emergence of the joint relationship between two different 
federal agencies for nuclear power plant oversight that resulted from the events at TMI. 
Offsite nuclear power plant emergency planning is based upon the fundamental lessons 
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learned and gaps identified as a result of this event. These same planning principles, 
codified as the 16 planning standards, remain the official basis for emergency planning 
requirements for all U.S. nuclear power plants into the present day. The second key is the 
federal sovereignty clause for all nuclear regulation that supersedes state and local control 
over their emergency preparedness and response programs for nuclear power plants located 
in their jurisdictions. This federal sovereignty clause is a key divergence from how 
emergency management programs are normally implemented based upon local needs and 
priorities. The prescriptive nature of the federal program for nuclear power plants extends 
to state and local government operations and programs, which is explored through an 
analysis of the events surrounding the development of the Shoreham nuclear power station.  
This chapter provides the reader with a solid foundation for the current regulatory 
environment in which federal, state, and local governments jointly operate with nuclear 
utilities to address requirements to protect public health and safety. The next chapter 
provides a research-based analysis of both nuclear power plant emergency preparedness 
defined by the federal government and its uncomfortable and increasingly difficult co-
existence with all-hazards capabilities-based emergency preparedness currently used for 
all other threats and hazards. This analysis sets the stage for later discussion of risk 
management principles and policy options analysis from a solid understanding of 
background, context, and tools for effective emergency preparedness and response 
programs for the nuclear power plant hazard. The purpose is to address the research 
question to understand the comprehensive scope of challenges, shortfalls, and opportunities 
that emerge from the integration of the federal program.  
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III. THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM AND REPP 
This section builds upon the analysis of the origins of radiological emergency 
preparedness and provides an overview of the current all-hazards emergency management 
preparedness framework and the state of the separate existing program for nuclear power 
plants. The first portion outlines the current emergency management framework per the 
NPS doctrine, which is in use throughout the United States and is designed to focus around 
identifying, building, and sustaining functional capabilities for emergency prevention, 
protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. The second portion describes the modern 
REPP designed for offsite jurisdictions surrounding nuclear power plants, which often 
must incorporate the elements concurrently alongside the all-hazards framework that 
addresses the whole community.  
The intent of this section is to provide an understanding of how modern emergency 
management programs have been influenced but have also grown far beyond the realm of 
the original emergency preparedness and response doctrine developed for nuclear power 
plants. This section sets the stage for a subsequent discussion of both the historical and 
modern context for nuclear power plant risk and helps inform the policy options analysis 
that follows from a perspective of utilizing risk assessments as a basis for a measurable, 
progressive, and effective preparedness program implementation. 
A. CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING 
The relatively recent phenomenon of a capabilities-based federal emergency 
preparedness doctrine has marked a significant break from the traditional approaches of 
dealing with specific hazards and threats individually and more towards a comprehensive 
“all-hazards” approach.119 The modern experience with some of the most recent large-scale 
catastrophic natural disasters—such as Hurricane Katrina, the California wildfires, and the 
2017 Atlantic hurricane season—have emphasized the need to address the increasing drain 
and dependency upon the federal government via its DRF and direct federal support efforts 
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in the state and local jurisdictions during large-scale disasters. These incidents have taught 
that regardless of the hazard, public health and safety is a shared responsibility of the whole 
community, not just the federal enterprise.120  
1. National Preparedness System and Goal 
In 2011, the federal government made a comprehensive effort to address emergency 
preparedness in a more serious and consistent manner as a result of PPD-8 that defined 
doctrine and protocol for a comprehensive national preparedness system.121 Using PPD-8 
as a basis for authority to promulgate preparedness doctrine, the DHS and FEMA produced 
the NPG to define its approach in terms of all-hazards “core” capabilities that should form 
the basis to define and build state and local response and recovery capability via all 
emergency preparedness efforts.122 Core capabilities are broadly and generically defined 
to allow state and local end users of the doctrine to interpret their scope and application 
within their communities subjectively.  
The NPG was not without its critics after its introduction to state and local 
emergency management practitioners. These critics have raised questions regarding the 
extremely difficult analytic task of developing a set of measurable preparedness national 
capabilities that can adapt to the needs of state and local stakeholders across the whole 
community with different threats and hazards and capabilities. Many have considerable 
doubt as to whether or not each of the 10 FEMA national regions, as well as the 56 states 
and territories, hundreds of metropolitan areas, thousands of cities, and tens of thousands 
of communities would all have the interest, capabilities, and resources to implement such 
an integrated preparedness program.123  
The federal government, through FEMA and the DHS, incentivizes the adoption of 
consistent doctrine defined at the federal level down to all state and local jurisdictions 
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across the nation via the use of preparedness grant funding programs.124 The grant funding 
programs, such as the EMPG and others, stipulate the use of FEMA doctrine within 
emergency management programs as a condition of eligibility. FEMA rewards behavior it 
cannot directly mandate to the state and local jurisdictions by facilitating access to funding 
and assistance through its relief programs supported by the DRF.125 This type of approach 
arises because “the President does not have the authority to direct the resources and 
authorities of state and local governments, the private sector…and normal citizens” via 
policy instruments.126  
2. Threat Hazard and Information Risk Assessment  
State and local government sub-grantees receiving FEMA preparedness grants are 
required to use the Threat Hazard and Information Risk Assessment (THIRA) process to 
assess and characterize threats and hazards. FEMA’s THIRA guidance asserts that all 
jurisdictions need to understand the threats and hazards faced individually and collectively, 
and in so doing, be empowered to manage risk better.127 In the modern era, the term “risk 
is defined as the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or 
occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences.”128 Thus, 
recipients of FEMA’s preparedness grants are required to use THIRA to manage such risk 
in emergency management and homeland security programs within their jurisdictions.  
The modern capability assessments and frameworks offered as tools to state and 
local governments only provide potential considerations and generic best practice doctrine 
for potential adoption and use and do not attempt to circumscribe any specific or 
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prescriptive requirements generally. The rationale for this approach is the idea that because 
not only are the risks faced by the community ever-changing, but also the capabilities to 
meet them must be regularly reviewed to respond to changes in risk and needs for greater 
or more specialized support assets and personnel.129 An end user can judge capabilities to 
determine what constitutes a risk, and conduct a gap analysis based upon a subjective 
interpretation of what is necessary within the immediate community. FEMA sets forth this 
approach in its THIRA doctrine, which requires that diverse perspectives are included in 
the process and inform the dialogue as part of a community-wide collaborative whole.130 
THIRA provides a pathway to identify particular threats and hazards of interest, 
regardless of the location, to inform the emergency preparedness effort needed to prevent, 
protect, mitigate, respond, or recover from emergency or disaster events that occur.131 
Besides identifying the threats and hazards, THIRA also attempts to provide a methodology 
to mitigate risks by identifying the assets and personnel requirements needed to sustain and 
build capabilities that fulfill overall public health and safety objectives.132 THIRA’s 
approach uses community-sourced assessments through a framework model to provide a 
structured assessment of capability to allow these communities to plan for likely impacts 
through preparedness activities and maximize available resources towards their greatest 
anticipated threats and hazards.133  
Despite the structured approach towards assessing capabilities, THIRA is not a risk 
assessment in that it does not measure risk or measure a community’s resilience to impact. 
THIRA attempts to use the description of an emergency management type capability as a 
surrogate for risk and compares capability levels among the myriad of different core 
capabilities set forth within the NPG. The overall purpose of the assessment effort seems 
to be that in closing the “gaps” between each estimated capability level, and the goal for 
the desired capability level, preparedness and thus resilience will be increased. THIRA 
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does state that levels of capability should be chosen that best address risk, but does not 
provide a means to explain how it should occur.134 Therefore, THIRA’s system of 
measuring capability provides no direct correlation between capability increase and a 
decrease in risk or an increase in overall resilience and identifies no specific common unit 
that can be compared to real-world statistics, such as damage or death. 
The second step in THIRA is the effort to provide context to the threats and hazards 
identified in the previous step by identifying impacts expected to occur as a result of some 
kinetic incident involving these potential threats and hazards and using estimates for 
location, magnitude, and time to provide context.135 The identified impacts and their 
estimates for location, magnitude, and time are then used to characterize the impact in 
terms of a standardized typology of indicators, including candidates from an impacted area 
who may need screening, citizens who may need temporary shelter, and overall numbers 
of area population impacted.136  
However, the accuracy of the threats and hazards chosen for THIRA remains the 
limiting factor in its overall effectiveness, despite the precision in defining the context and 
estimating the potential impacts from these threats and hazards. The first step of the process 
in identifying which threats and hazards are of concern may not rest upon an analysis of 
any particular amount of data or evidence, which leads to the possibility that the overall 
risk assessment may be defined by the limitations of the perspectives of those participating 
in the process.  
The final step in THIRA involves estimating capabilities and then using this 
estimate to assess further a “gap” or differential in capability that translates to a 
preparedness goal to build a future level of capability.137 Since participants are provided 
no real standard against which to judge their own capabilities, it is unclear how the 
perceived gap in capability can be used as a basis for normalized risk, even within a single 
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jurisdiction.138 The larger the jurisdiction, the more difficult it can be to estimate capability 
assessments, and therefore, normalize the risk value across a larger array of response assets. 
As currently set forth, THIRA incorporates no provision to measure a return on investment 
of resources for any particular risk or threat, which makes it inadequate to use as a 
comprehensive tool to adjudicate risk-informed planning or decisions in a resource-
constrained environment that seeks to maximize its investments to protect the community 
from its greatest threats and hazards. 
This brief section has provided an overview of the current emergency management 
framework as implemented across the United States, based upon the NPS doctrine provided 
by FEMA. While the framework principles have been implemented at the state and local 
levels to varying degrees across the country, they are implemented consistently by the 
federal enterprise and thus represent a key requirement in effectively integrating federal 
support into any state or local emergency incident. This approach currently lives in parallel 
with the approach used specifically for a nuclear power plant emergency response scenario, 
which is supported by REPP discussed in the next section. The purpose of this section was 
to provide enough information to illustrate the contrast between the two approaches to 
emergency response and highlight some of the potential opportunities and challenges that 
must be considered in the policy options analysis section. 
B. RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM  
When the TMI accident occurred in 1979, responsibility for nuclear power plant 
emergency response operations had been informally implied through some level of 
relationship that was supposed to exist between the nuclear utility and the federal 
regulatory institution of the NRC. As a federal matter, nuclear operations and regulations 
were largely opaque to state and local governments that hosted these plants within their 
jurisdictions and communities, and little or no direct coordination existed. Although no 
confirmed large-scale release of radioactive materials was ever confirmed as a result of the 
TMI incident, it was abundantly clear that a gap existed in the ability of the state and local 
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governments to effectively coordinate with the utility and the federal government in the 
event of a response. As a result of the Presidential Commission Report on the TMI accident, 
a set of guidelines was introduced that became later known as the 16 planning standards, 
which were eventually codified into regulation for nuclear utilities and regulatory guidance 
for offsite state and local governments hosting these nuclear utilities. To promulgate these 
guidelines consistently to all nuclear power plants and all jurisdictions across the United 
States, and to fulfill its mandate to evaluate state and local government compliance with 
these guidelines, FEMA created REPP. 
Executive Order 12148 and the Presidential Directive of December 7, 1979, 
following the March 1979 TMI accident, established the basis for FEMA REPP.139 Making 
FEMA responsible for nuclear power plant emergency planning and preparedness for 
offsite jurisdictions in place of NRC came out of these executive actions.140 In 1980, the 
NRC and FEMA jointly issued the Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological 
Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants 
(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1) to provide onsite and offsite emergency planning guidance 
for all commercial nuclear power plants operating within the United States.141 NUREG-
0654 sets the overarching criteria, through its 16 planning standards, for preparedness and 
response to any commercial nuclear power plant emergency.142 This determination of 
reasonable assurance acts as an accountability measure imposed upon licensees and both 
state and local government agencies to create and sustain a level of preparedness and 
response capability as described by the 16 planning standards, which are the guidance 
criteria set forth by the federal government to circumscribe all radiological preparedness 
and response for nuclear power plants.  
The purpose of this section is to use research to explain what REPP is and how it 
has been established as a somewhat unique federal program that mandates state and local 
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government roles and responsibilities for nuclear power plant emergency preparedness and 
response. The first portion discusses what the basics of REPP are and what it provides. The 
second portion explains the concept of reasonable assurance and how it is used by FEMA 
to establish somewhat indirect accountability for the implementation of the 16 planning 
standards. This section provides specific research on the programmatic side of nuclear 
power plant emergency preparedness and response in the United States to be used as a basis 
for the policy options analysis contained in this thesis.  
1. Purpose of REPP and Context of the Offsite Program for Power 
Reactors 
The regulations in 44 CFR Part 350 incorporate by reference the guidance 
contained within NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which includes the 16 planning 
standards.143 The joint guidance incorporates elements that apply to nuclear power plant 
licensees that maintain onsite emergency preparedness organizations.144 The same set of 
guidance incorporates different, though complementary, elements specifically for offsite 
government preparedness and response organizations.145 Under these regulations, FEMA 
has the authority to conduct assessments and issue findings regarding offsite emergency 
plans and procedures. These assessments are part of FEMA’s efforts to determine with 
reasonable assurance that during any potential or actual radioactive release scenario, the 
government has the capacity to respond appropriately and can protect the health and safety 
of its subject citizens.146  
Through the authority granted via 44 CFR 350, in conjunction with the authority 
granted to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.47, FEMA can make recommendations to the NRC 
that impose tangible consequences on state and local government response capabilities via 
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federal licensing regulation for their nuclear power utilities. Based on the findings, the 
NRC has the ability, if necessary, to revoke the operating license of the utility, which 
represents the potential impact on energy delivery capability and economic contribution to 
the local community.147  
The tangible consequences for failure to implement REPP also have accompanying 
benefits that have sustained generally higher levels of preparedness within participating 
jurisdictions for over 30 years. A key benefit is in the requirement that nuclear power plants 
pay directly for REPP through a licensing requirement that forces the plant owners to 
subsidize the preparedness and response capabilities within the state and local governments 
around the plant as a condition of licensure and operation.148 This requirement and others 
under the program have allowed these capabilities to remain independent of many other 
changes and pressures that normally impact programs and initiatives due to politics, fiscal 
issues, bureaucratic restructuring, and other disruptions. The fact that REPP is paid for by 
the industry, and therefore does not factor into the zero-sum game of the normal federal 
budget appropriations process, shields it from both attention as a political object, and 
moreover, further scrutiny over its political value.  
With regard to nuclear matters, and including nuclear power, the federal 
government has maintained a monopoly on policy, regulation, and control over all nuclear 
issues since the time of the Manhattan Project during World War II.149 The AEC, created 
after the war with the dual purpose of maintaining the nuclear capability to support national 
defense and security, as well as addressing concerns over radiation safety, later expanded 
its focus to the promotion of nuclear power and “atoms for peace.”150 Its mission was 
bifurcated between the needs and benefits of both national defense and industrial energy 
production and the concerns of the public over effects from nuclear weapons testing, and 
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later, similar concerns regarding the presence of nuclear power plants in communities that 
could expose the public to radioactive contamination.151 Later, the newly created EPA 
would take up the cause of radiation protection for the general public, which immediately 
placed it at odds with the AEC.152 None of these measures served to support increasing 
levels of public concern, much of which surrounded the objection to the denial of state and 
local involvement in the policy process around nuclear matters. That the federal 
government seemed willing to impose potential risks upon the community in unilateral 
fashion without adequate considerations towards the public’s perspectives of safety 
became the basis for increased controversy and resistance to all things nuclear.153  
FEMA’s REPP has always been a prescriptive, standards-based program based 
upon the implementation of the 16 planning standards. These standards were created out 
of the major findings and conclusions contained in the recommendations that emerged from 
the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island.154 As a standards-based 
program, REPP’s approach establishes consistency for all state and local governments as 
program participants, and through FEMA’s oversight role, ensures the interpretation of the 
standards is an exclusively federal matter through its authority granted under federal law.155 
Thus, the federal government’s supremacy over all nuclear issues extends to the 
responsibility for public health and safety at the state and local levels through REPP. 
REPP, in contrast to capabilities-based planning defined by the NPG, is a highly 
prescriptive model subject to the federal government’s interpretation only and requires 
federal evaluation to validate it on a biennial basis. In communities with nuclear power 
plants, the jurisdictional authorities found that having both REPP and the all-hazards core 
capability model operating within the same space created conflicts within the same set of 
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responding organizations. A task force study performed within several of the FEMA 
regions containing nuclear power plants and offsite response organizations (OROs) 
participating in REPP found that the canned nature of prescriptive REPP guidance and lack 
of flexibility led to negative pre-conditioning of first responder participants, as well as to 
rote anticipatory responses during demonstrations.156  
However, the recent advancements in emergency management doctrine represent a 
clear and present opportunity to enhance REPP, especially recognizing REPP itself has 
served as a foundational basis for these advancements in doctrine and best practices across 
the emergency management discipline in recent years. To cite but one example, it may 
appear initially that the integration of REPP and NPS elements, such as HSEEP, may result 
in conflict and confusion between the two programs.157 However, REPP, along with the 
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) and the Nunn-Lugar-
Domenici (NLD) Domestic Preparedness Program, has had a significant influence on and 
provided key contributions towards the creation of HSEEP.158 Recognizing that these 
programs have a significant number of interdependencies, enhancement of REPP aligns 
with the intent of the NPG to leverage what has already been established and takes 
advantage of a level of capability that has been built and is being sustained currently.159 
As long as the federal regulations are in place to support it, REPP will continue to 
have a place in acting as the acceptable pathway for jurisdictions to address the regulatory 
requirements for the nation’s nuclear power plants. The larger question of whether or not 
the nation needs a program like REPP in the modern era of advanced emergency planning 
and preparedness doctrine is actually a question of the purpose REPP is intended to serve 
with respect to the relationship between the federal government, state and local 
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governments, and nuclear material. REPP serves more to maintain federal oversight and 
control over nuclear material and technology in general than anything it has to do with 
safety or risk from commercial power stations using nuclear fuel. The conversation of 
safety is a proxy to the discussion of nuclear material and technology being perceived as a 
strategic asset and the context of risks related to national security strategies and 
proliferation concerns. The long-standing ban on reprocessing nuclear fuel within the 
United States is similar in both its purpose and political origins. It was implemented during 
a time when the nation was highly concerned regarding the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons during the Cold War.160  
The relationship between federal policy and state and local governance has been a 
particular point of concern for any kind of democratic system since this form of 
government was first implemented. For highly valued and advanced capabilities that 
represent strategic assets of interest to protect public policy priorities at the national level, 
the dynamics of command and control extend all the way into the local communities that 
drill and exercise every other year with their nuclear power plant utilities. It is reasonable 
to propose that programs and policies that govern nuclear plants and impact local 
communities adopt a more balanced and collaborative approach to define a policy and 
program that contains an honest understanding and assessment of the needs at both levels. 
The REPP program has an opportunity to provide an example of what could be done more 
generally to integrate itself within the local emergency management enterprise frameworks 
while maintaining its purpose to satisfy public policy priorities at the national level. 
2. Reasonable Assurance 
REPP is a federal program that requires state and local entities to subject their 
emergency preparedness and response capabilities to federal review and approval on an 
ongoing basis. FEMA, as the lead federal agency for review and approval of these offsite 
preparedness efforts, must utilize the program standards and requirements as a basis for its 
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determinations of state and local capability and performance. FEMA has a Congressional 
mandate to ensure that offsite emergency response organizations are prepared to respond 
to any event involving a release of radioactive material from a nuclear plant and to protect 
the health and safety of the public.161  
FEMA’s role is to provide an independent assessment of the plans and preparedness 
of state, county, tribal, and local governments and their ability to implement their 
emergency plans. Since REPP is actually an NRC program with the offsite portion 
transferred to FEMA via Executive Order, “FEMA has entered into a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) with the NRC [under] which [FEMA] will furnish assessments, 
findings, and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans and 
preparedness are adequate and continue to be capable of implementation (e.g., adequacy 
and maintenance of procedures, training, resources, staffing levels and qualification and 
equipment adequacy).”162 FEMA evaluates documented and demonstrated capabilities to 
determine with reasonable assurance that the jurisdiction can protect public safety and 
health in the event of a radiological emergency, and provides approval in accordance with 
those findings.163 FEMA communicates its plan assessments to the NRC for the 
Commission’s use in making these licensing decisions for NRC nuclear power plants. In 
making that determination, the NRC relies on both its assessment of the licensee’s onsite 
emergency plan and FEMA findings.164  
The reasonable assurance concept inherently recognizes that it is not possible to 
achieve absolute assurance.165 A reasonable assurance finding means that FEMA is 
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reasonably (not absolutely) satisfied that the state and local REPP plans and procedures 
describe an appropriate range of responses to the defined threat (radiological, natural 
hazard or hostile event) and that the means of responding have been identified, are 
available, and can accomplish what the plan requires. The concept of reasonable assurance 
is not unique to REPP; it is similar to a concept used by financial auditors. The interpretive 
guidance published by the Securities and Exchange Commission, for example, reveals that 
“while reasonableness is an objective standard, there is a range of judgments that an issuer 
might make as to what is reasonable…[and] encompass the full range of appropriate 
potential conduct, conclusions, or methodologies.”166 In this regard, REPP similarly must 
necessarily deal with extremely low probability and high consequence events. Emergencies 
are dynamic and are not predictable in minute detail. To some extent, emergency planning 
involves contingency judgments and must be general and flexible out of necessity. 
In contrast to the absolute assurance of safety, reactor license applicants are instead 
required to provide information to the regulator “necessary in order to enable it to find [that 
the applicant] will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public.”167 
FEMA follows this same standard in making its determinations of offsite capability and 
performance, based upon its assessment of whether or not emergency plans and procedures 
are adequate to protect public health and safety.168 For offsite organizations, FEMA 
determines reasonable assurance through three main approaches: plan and procedure 
reviews, drill and exercise evaluations, and annual program documentation submissions.169 
In the context of nuclear plant emergency preparedness, FEMA makes reasonable 
assurance findings as part of an ongoing, cyclical process over a rolling two-year (biennial) 
period.  
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FEMA evaluates and relies upon several different criteria (both quantitative and 
qualitative) to decide whether plans and procedures are adequate and also whether 
reasonable assurance exists for the protection of public health and safety. In particular, 
FEMA regulations specify that the agency is to assess the adequacy of offsite emergency 
plans and preparedness based on the criteria in 44 CFR 350.5.170 This assessment, in turn, 
then incorporates the criteria found in 10 CFR 50.47 and joint FEMA-NRC guidance in 
NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1.171 Regulations in 44 CFR 350 for exercises state, “each 
State with a commercial nuclear power plant site within its boundaries or is within the 10-
mile plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone of such site shall fully participate 
in an exercise jointly with the nuclear power plant licensee and appropriate local 
governments at least every two years.”172 In general, and in the context of offsite 
emergency response capability, FEMA determines whether or not to issue a continued 
finding of reasonable assurance for each operating nuclear power plant every two years, 
following the biennial exercise.173  
The conclusion that reasonable assurance exists that a particular offsite (state and 
local) emergency plan is adequate and can be implemented is based on a combination of 
factors. These factors include the licensee’s ongoing compliance with approved 
NRC/FEMA planning standards in NRC and FEMA regulations and NUREG-0654, the 
results of the biennial exercise (radiological, natural hazard response or hostile action), 
review of the licensee’s annual letter of certification (ALC), review of offsite emergency 
procedure modifications, and review of other specific elements of offsite emergency plans.  
As a preparedness program, REPP does not try to validate each and every capability 
via drill or exercise demonstration but instead selects certain elements from the broader 
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array as the focus of capability evaluation. REPP provides this through its definition of the 
exercise demonstration criteria, and provides a capability target, or success path, for 
participating jurisdictions to meet as an indicator of overall emergency response 
capability.174 REPP therefore provides a more objective capability target for jurisdictions 
to meet, based upon the 16 planning standards, rather than a target derived from a more 
general core capability that does not define, through the THIRA process or otherwise, what 
generalized level of capability is necessary to mitigate the threat successfully or decrease 
the duration of the impact to a community.  
FEMA interprets its responsibilities under REPP to include a requirement, based 
upon the authority delegated to FEMA under 44 CFR 350, that it must directly evaluate 
state and local government performance of the exercise demonstration criteria on a biennial 
basis.175 The exercises utilize the demonstration criteria as exercise objectives and set the 
schedule of activities to match the performance requirements outlined under the assessment 
and extent of play information documented in the FEMA REPP manual.176 FEMA uses its 
own staff or hires contractors to perform the formal evaluation of the state and local 
exercise events against the assessment criteria and extent of play. FEMA also imposes a 
cost directly upon the utility to pay for this exercise evaluation role and responsibility in 
addition to the costs that the utility pays the state and local governments to support REPP 
on an ongoing basis.177  
The federal government provides guidance to all public jurisdictions with 
emergency management roles and responsibilities regarding the design, conduct, and 
follow through of simulated exercises via HSEEP.178 Under HSEEP, jurisdictions  typically 
self-evaluate their exercise performance, develop their own objectives, and assess their 
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own capabilities to perform tasks that achieve goals and objectives or critical target 
capability levels.179 Similar to THIRA, HSEEP, therefore, allows some subjectivity into 
the assessment process for exercises to give jurisdictions the flexibility to set objectives 
and capability targets appropriate for their communities and programs. Using HSEEP 
within REPP requires modifying the exercise planning approach to a more prescriptive set 
of objectives and capability targets defined by REPP. In addition, REPP evaluators are 
trained in the specifics of the requirements for the program but may not be familiar with 
the particular characteristics of how the program is implemented within different 
jurisdictions and different FEMA regions. A challenge, therefore, is to build an 
understanding of how the narrowly prescriptive performance guidelines within the FEMA 
exercise assessment criteria may be more broadly applied and represent an effective 
program within many different forms and contexts across the nation.  
HSEEP already provides the tools necessary within its guidance to manage any 
potential inconsistencies between perspectives of evaluators using pre-constructed 
templates or exercise evaluation guides (EEGs).180 In most cases, REPP selectively utilizes 
HSEEP and does not currently utilize these tools, and instead relies upon region-specific 
guidance that instructs evaluators to utilize narrative-based reporting to roll up into a final 
after-action report (AAR) issued by FEMA.181 This type of approach relies upon the 
individual evaluator’s specific interpretation of the REPP guidance and allows for a lot of 
variety in the types of observations collected to support a particular conclusion of exercise 
performance. As a result, the evaluations are not standardized with respect to defined 
capability targets and tasks, but instead are subjective to evaluator interpretation, 
experience, and level of expertise.  
The strategy FEMA currently uses to evaluate state and local REPP increases cost 
to the utilities by requiring federal employees or federal contractors to perform the 
function, when HSEEP has already been implemented, and exercise evaluators are being 
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utilized from within that community at no additional cost for all other preparedness 
exercises. On the one hand, FEMA advocates for the approach utilized by HSEEP and 
provides tools to implement it, while on the other hand, reserving aside these same 
responsibilities under REPP. It is important to note that the federal statutes for FEMA do 
not require it to perform the evaluation exclusively with its own staff or contractors it hires 
on its behalf.182 The NRC, pursuant to its responsibility to evaluate onsite emergency 
planning, preparedness, and performance, relies heavily upon the utilities to furnish and 
provide critical self-assessment and then performs spot checks on items of interest for a 
relatively small percentage of the requirements.183 State and local exercise evaluators, who 
are already familiar with the jurisdiction and its plans and procedures, can provide 
comprehensive and appropriate exercise assessments via HSEEP tools, such as EEGs to 
FEMA directly and significantly decrease FEMA’s in-house costs and the direct bill costs 
to the utility.  
The standard for reasonable assurance is the cornerstone of REPP, in that strict 
adherence to the full balance of program requirements is neither possible nor realistic given 
the volume of parameters and enormity of the task to validate all of them fully and 
completely on an ongoing basis. Such an approach represents an up-front compromise to 
the ability to verify fully the complete integrity of the program in any jurisdiction and 
instead depends on a small sample of key elements to serve as an indicator of the general 
health and capability within the program. This also leads to an approach by many 
jurisdictions that “train to the test” of what FEMA will look for with the knowledge that a 
comprehensive critical analysis of all components can never be performed. Absent the 
occurrence of an actual incident, which has never occurred in the United States since the 
TMI incident in 1979, no case history can prove or disprove the merit of the program.  
In the modern era, emergency planning has backed away from this type of detailed 
competence and capability assessment. Many different reasons exist for this change, which 
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is commonly referred to as the difference between hazard-specific and all-hazards 
approaches to planning. However, an additional key reason pertains to a potential liability 
resulting from official planning documents that detail response protocols for specific 
events. For REPP, FEMA’s responsibility to affirm any kind of limited assurance, even 
reasonable assurance, towards a state or local jurisdictions’ ability to respond adequately 
to a potentially catastrophic emergency carries a potentially equally enormous liability in 
the event of an actual incident if that ability is not adequately executed.  
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided information regarding the current emergency 
management doctrine for capabilities-based planning under the NPS. It also includes 
comprehensive information on how jurisdictional risk assessments are conducted that form 
the basis for setting preparedness objectives using capability targets. Additional sections 
within this chapter provide the reader with comprehensive information regarding the 
federal REPP, which sets requirements for emergency preparedness and planning for 
nuclear power plants outside and apart from the scope of all-hazards capabilities-based 
planning. The reader has been introduced to the reasonable assurance standard of capability 
and performance evaluation. This reasonable assurance concept, used for REPP, can now 
be seen in contrast to the concept of capability gaps under the larger emergency 
management strategy in use for all other threats and hazards.  
The purpose of this chapter is to build upon the background information and 
provide information on emergency management programmatic approaches for nuclear 
power plants. The importance of this chapter is to show how the federal program and its 
corresponding implementation has become embedded into all state and local emergency 
management programs that must contend with a nuclear power plant that exists within their 
jurisdictions. Modern emergency management programs depend upon a form of a risk 
assessment process in the all-hazards framework, and REPP includes an implied risk 
assessment in the form of the planning basis for the 16 planning standards. Given the 
potential for two competing risk assessment methodologies, it is necessary to explore now 
the deeper scientific roots of how those risk assessments were performed to understand the 
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deductive and inductive reasoning behind their conclusions that provide the basis for core 
capability analysis and the 16 planning standards.  
Based upon this research, the following chapter shifts focus to a deeper 
understanding of the basis of nuclear power plant risk that is implied but not immediately 
obvious from the programmatic side of REPP. It provides the results from the research, 
which outlines the original risk assessment basis and a modern revision of that assessment 
using current tools and methodologies. It also provides an overview of the research into 
probabilistic risk assessment methodologies and a logic model framework that can be used 
as a basis to measure programmatic requirements and weigh the effectiveness of policy 
options from a risk-informed perspective. These tools and approaches provide a basis in 
substance that can be used to assess different programmatic strategies and introduce a 
mechanism for accountability that measures program performance and results against 
relative risk. These research elements can then be used to provide a comparative analysis 
of program or policy options for radiological emergency preparedness that can be measured 
against the same set of overarching criteria tied to risk-significant elements common to all 
types of potential approaches. This comparative analysis is an effective way to address the 
research question of this thesis, which is to identify the challenges, shortfalls, and 
opportunities that emerge from integration of the all-hazards methodology with REPP.  
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IV. RISK MANAGEMENT FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
This section provides the results of research within four components of risk-related 
subject matter that pertain to nuclear power plant emergency preparedness and response. 
The first portion looks at the existing and historical context for how public health and safety 
risk was assessed in the 1960s and 1970s and used as a basis for programmatic guidance 
and regulatory requirements for nuclear power plants and state and local governments 
hosting these plants. The following section summarizes the results from a modern analysis 
of this historical risk basis using modern tools and assessment methodologies incorporating 
two case studies for existing nuclear power plants currently operating in the United States. 
The third portion of this section focuses on the probabilistic risk assessment methodology, 
and the use of multi-criteria integrated risk assessment approaches. These two concepts for 
addressing an uncertain and variable context for decision making are likely to be 
characteristic of state and local government offsite decision makers dealing with a nuclear 
power plant emergency. The last portion of this section proposes a potential new basis for 
using a logic model framework to evaluate program policy that incorporates a common 
risk-informed basis and uses indicators to measure relative performance of different policy 
approaches and options against a consistent set of risk-significant criteria for nuclear power 
plants. The intent is to provide a research-based understanding of how risk has been 
managed and how it can be enhanced to allow the measurement of risk using a probabilistic 
framework that can accommodate incident and site-specific factors while maintaining a 
foundation in unified and consistent principles pertinent to nuclear power plants.  
REPP incorporates its own basis for a risk management strategy for commercial 
nuclear power plants into its planning assumptions to define the context of risk to public 
health and safety from any release of radioactive materials into the community around that 
facility. The Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government 
Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants 
(NUREG-0396) and Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency 
Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0654) 
work together to provide the planning basis and 16 comprehensive planning standards that 
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justify the requirements under REPP. However, modern tools and analysis techniques 
reveal that what is possible today has the potential to influence a broadly different 
understanding of a more accurate risk basis not available to scientists and regulators in the 
1960s and 1970s.  
Risk management depends on a consistent form of threat and hazard identification 
and risk assessment, benchmarked against some target objective that can be measured 
either qualitatively or quantitatively. In some cases, the use of indicators is needed to 
provide a framework for the measurement of relevant factors that can then be used as a 
basis for comparison, especially when the phenomena under consideration are not directly 
measurable. For nuclear power plants, REPP uses the planning basis from NUREG-0396 
to justify the set of requirements set forth in NUREG-0654 for emergency planning. The 
planning basis in NUREG-0396 is used as the context for the hazard from nuclear power 
plants that justifies to what extent emergency planning is needed based upon the 10- and 
50-mile EPZs. Implied within this hazard context and subsequent capability requirements 
for emergency preparedness and response included in NUREG-0654 is the assumption that 
nuclear power plants pose such sufficient risk to the offsite community that planning is 
necessary based upon the parameters of the EPZs.  
The significance of this implied risk assessment in federal regulatory guidance 
contained within REPP is that the assessment itself places boundary conditions on the 
planning parameters not clearly based upon evidence. Further, the SOARCA study 
provides additional evidence that the anticipated release based upon a design-basis  
accident is likely much less than originally anticipated, based upon updated and more 
accurate computer modeling capability. With respect to general emergency management 
threat and hazard assessment methodology, FEMA’s approach manages risk by relative 
capability building capacity not necessarily tied to any notion of absolute risk or consistent 
threshold. This approach, entitled THIRA, is another form of a logic model that 
accommodates uncertainty by defining core capabilities for national preparedness without 
defining any consistent manner by which they could or should be measured.  
Instead, the functional categories are assumed to be related even though the targets for 
capability development are defined and measured differently in every case. This approach 
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is equivalent to using the same model but not using common units to provide any basis by 
which to compare the metrics from one model to another in any meaningful way. As a 
result, the analysis for the original planning basis of EPZs, the SOARCA study, and THIRA 
are all important to consider within the context of the proposed logic model using 
consistent risk-significant factors that can be adjudicated for each potential policy 
approach. 
A. ORIGINAL OFFSITE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY 
PLANNING BASIS 
The planning basis in NUREG-0396 explains the rationale for the approach used 
for commercial nuclear power plants. The report claims that to be a viable approach, a 
planning basis using a risk assessment approach needs to compare the consequences from 
a nuclear accident with that of a non-nuclear accident to provide a uniform planning basis 
and indicate what level of risk may be mitigated by the planning effort.184 This claim 
references an understanding of risk as “accident consequences times the probability of 
accident occurrence.”185 The authors then claim that non-nuclear emergency planning 
efforts generally do not use a quantified risk assessment, and instead are based upon expert 
intuition of the severity of the threat.186 The conclusion states that the lack of a quantified 
risk assessment approach in non-emergency planning, therefore, precludes it being used as 
a basis for nuclear planning.187  
The concepts of relative risk and absolute risk help planners to understand more 
clearly what risk methodology approaches may be appropriate for nuclear planning. In the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lexicon, the definition of absolute risk is given 
as the “level of risk expressed with standard units of measurement that allows for 
independent interpretation without comparison to estimates of other risks.”188 The same 
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DHS lexicon describes relative risk as “the ratio of risks when compared to each other or 
a control.”189 With relative risk, the “risk value of a scenario is meaningful only in 
comparison to other similarly constructed risk values.”190 An example of this comparison 
is the case for hazard-specific planning that tries to compare the impact of minor riverine 
flooding in a low-lying area to the impact of a hurricane in the same area.191 However, the 
combination of the two concepts creates a much more powerful approach to risk 
methodology and can be especially useful for nuclear planning. 
An example of quantified risk assessment based on relative risk can be found via 
the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) that helps fire managers use a 
deliberative risk analysis process to help make strategic and tactical decisions during fire 
incidents.192 The main feature is the ability to perceive the consequences of a response 
decision across many different variables for a single particular snapshot in time.193 
Decision makers for incidents involving radioactive releases from commercial nuclear 
plants are similarly in need of decision support that helps them to make “a complex 
judgment in which the radiological risk must be weighed against the [response or 
protective] action’s inherent risks.”194  
Another quantitative model that provides a basis for understanding risk is the 
approach detailed through the NRC’s ROP incorporated into its power reactor inspection 
process. The ROP framework is divided into seven cornerstones of safety and security, 
within which a combination of inspection activities and licensee-submitted performance 
 
189 Department of Homeland Security, 26. 
190 Collins, Grimes, and Galpin, Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government 
Radiological Emergency Response Plans, 26. 
191 Department of Homeland Security, DHS Risk Lexicon, 26. 
192 “Welcome to the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS)!,” Wildland Fire Decision 
Support System, last updated June 24, 2019, https://wfdss.usgs.gov/wfdss/WFDSS_Home.shtml. 
193 Wildland Fire Decision Support System, Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS): 
Quantifying a Qualitative Relative Risk Assessment (Reston, VA: U.S. Geological Survey, n.d.),1, accessed 
July 28, 2018, 
https://wfdss.usgs.gov/wfdss/pdfs/Quantifying_a_Qualitative_Relative_Risk_Assessment.pdf. 
194 Environmental Protection Agency, PAG Manual, 2. 
67 
indicator data provides an evidence-based foundation for regulatory evaluation.195 As is 
shown later, the ROP provides a uniquely suitable framework to incorporate a measurable 
basis for performance into an ongoing risk assessment process already proven within the 
field of nuclear power. This approach provides an opportunity to align the onsite and offsite 
programs together in the risk assessment process to help each to benchmark performance 
and cost within a common framework. 
Qualitative assessment methodologies, such as THIRA, are difficult to place into 
context because they lack common units that allow risk practitioners to understand the 
basis of comparison and thus the significance of particular elements towards outcomes. 
Consequently, offsite decision makers attempting to implement a rational, measurable risk 
framework for emergency planning and response to nuclear power plants in their 
community have no readily available program to apply a rigorous, evidence-based 
approach to their decisions. REPP calls only for a qualitative assessment of adequacy for 
public health and safety based upon a subjective determination of “reasonable 
assurance.”196 
REPP contains an existing framework of the 16 planning standards as a basis for 
FEMA’s own evaluation of risk indicators (or risk-significant) elements. For onsite 
assessment, the NRC uses a significance determination process based upon risk indicators 
and identification of impact to risk-significant planning standards.197 What is missing for 
offsite is a way to apply a probabilistic structure to these planning standard indicators to 
help measure the significance of a particular planning standard against a particular 
outcome. A model similar to the NRC’s probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) process could 
add a measurable component to the 16 planning standards as risk indicators and allow 
offsite programs to assign risk values to their efforts under REPP. 
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To begin to understand the concept of risk in terms of emergency planning for 
nuclear power plants, a first step is to provide context for the risk terminology itself. 
Relative risk or odds ratio of any threat should be examined in the context of absolute risk, 
which is the actual likelihood of the occurrence of such an event in the community or 
population at risk.198 In the context of nuclear emergency planning, absolute risk would 
refer to the actual number of people who experience measurable impact as compared to 
those exposed to risk but do not experience measurable impact (experienced event vs. 
exposed to the potential event).  
Relative risk is the likelihood of event occurrence after being exposed to a particular 
risk variable, as compared to a likelihood of event occurrence to another population or 
group not exposed to that same risk variable.199 In emergency planning, relative risk refers 
to the actual probability that a particular threat or hazard will trigger an event that results 
in measurable impact, as compared to simply being exposed to a threat or hazard that does 
not trigger any events that lead to a measurable impact. 
An odds ratio compares the event likelihood to event frequency.200 Odds ratios 
compare event likelihood based upon the influence of some other factor that increases risk, 
as opposed to its likelihood without that factor.201 For emergency planning, an odds ratio 
expresses the odds that the presence of a threat or hazard within a community increases the 
likelihood of an event occurring as compared to another community that lacks the presence 
of that particular threat or hazard. 
Putting these concepts together reveals an approach to using known data on nuclear 
power plant incidents to inform an appropriate understanding of risk, and therefore, a risk 
strategy. The PRA approach assigns grades, based upon criteria developed from technical 
adequacy, to each sub-element of its analysis. An overall grade is then assigned to each of 
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its technical elements.202 Within REPP, the 16 planning standards and multiple sub-
elements already provide the base structure for a similar approach, having defined the 
demonstrable criteria but failing to take the additional step to place an evaluation 
conclusion for each element within the context of absolute or relative risk, or odds of 
impact to public health and safety.  
REPP’s approach to capability assessment is more prescriptive than THIRA, but 
the principles are similar. The capabilities of any response asset are assessed and evaluated 
against the REPP 16 planning standards, for which evaluation criteria are specified within 
the program guidance.203 REPP already incorporates at least three steps of the THIRA 
process within its framework, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. A Subset of THIRA Steps Incorporating Selected REPP Elements 
Within this structure outlined in Figure 1, REPP provides a functional basis for 
applying the THIRA concept by characterizing the radiological release more than EPA 
PAGs as a technological hazard and providing context for that hazard in identifying the 
anticipated extent of the impact using the two exposure pathways. These exposure 
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pathways (plume and ingestion) are used as planning parameters based upon time factors 
and expected behavior of radioactive effluent releases for a power plant accident 
scenario.204  
The capability targets are already defined by the 16 planning standards, as required 
capability elements that must be demonstrated to FEMA and the NRC via REPP. These 
capability targets do not need to be reinvented from a more broad-based core capability to 
try to fit into REPP. The 16 planning standards already provide enough detail to describe 
the capability and associated tasks that must be performed as a result of applying that 
capability to an incident or accident situation.  
The need for advance planning to deal with radiological emergencies is crucial, 
since the “decision may have to be made under emergency conditions, with limited 
information and little time to analyze options.”205 Planning ahead of time is crucial to 
anticipate the key factors in the relationship between release magnitudes, environmental 
factors, and the need for protective actions.206 As radiation can be detected and measured, 
the nuclear emergency planners use the PAGs published by the EPA to understand the 
consequences of radioactive releases. Developers of the EPA PAGs considered the need to 
strike an appropriate balance for overall outcomes considering both the potential 
consequences of response actions and consequences from radiation exposure in emergency 
decision making.207  
Besides relative risk, the EPA PAGs provide nuclear planners with a basis for 
absolute risk values that establish a quantitative relationship between radiation exposure 
and risk, and provide a basis for assessing this risk based upon measuring projected or 
actual exposure rates. The absolute risk value is useful when such standard units of 
measurement, such as for radiation exposure, allow the assessment of risk based upon 
interpretations of these measurements alone. As an example, NUREG-0396 uses the plume 
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exposure guidelines set forth in 10 CFR Part 100 as a basis for absolute risk in siting 
requirements for nuclear power plants.208  
Concepts of relative and absolute risk merge within the guidance provided to 
nuclear planners and already provide support for a planning basis that applies to both onsite 
and offsite emergency planning for nuclear power plants. The claim that risk-based 
methodologies are not appropriate for nuclear planning, which NUREG-0396 asserts, does 
not hold up to additional scrutiny.209 Additionally, NUREG-396 also concludes that it was 
beyond the acceptable scope in undertaking a risk-related rationale because it may imply a 
determination of an acceptable level of risk.210 This assertion is made even though it is 
certainly possible to outline such a rationale as the EPA did in its PAGs by simply asserting 
that such risk-based methodologies cannot determine appropriate risk levels nor be used as 
safety limits.211  
The original planning basis in NUREG-0396 also dismisses two other 
methodologies for both probability and cost-effectiveness. The probability approach is 
rejected in the same manner as the risk approach, and in the report, asserts that the basis 
for planning guidance should be the ability to select an accident probability below which 
emergency planning is no longer justified.212 Since the report assumes that emergency 
planning does not generally follow such probabilities, it also assumes it should not be 
applied in this context either and argues that people generally will allow themselves to be 
impacted from much more likely events that also have catastrophic consequences without 
undertaking any formal contingency planning effort.213 The report goes on to support the 
earlier argument in stating that radiological emergency planning is based upon the public 
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perception of the problem and what is prudent rather than what is necessary to do about 
it.214 In one respect, the role of probability is acknowledged, but only in a narrow sense in 
terms of an accident sequence based upon a design basis for a nuclear power plant.215 
The cost-effectiveness approach is dismissed in asserting that the approach would 
have to analyze the cost comparison between the potential health effects averted and the 
cost of the planning effort.216 The report concludes that understanding what the planning 
development and maintenance costs are may be too difficult in retrospect and adds the 
dimension that unstated considerations exist concerning the fact that these plans are already 
in existence.217 Since no large-scale accident had occurred by 1978, no one had experience 
as to the real costs of the health effects, which the report used as its reference for the basis 
of the effectiveness of the plan.218 In all three cases of dismissing risk, probability, and 
cost-effectiveness, the viability of these components is analyzed mostly in isolation from 
each other, rather than considering how they are all components that can possibly work 
together to inform the overall understanding of risk as a whole concept. 
The remaining concept chosen by the task force that drafted NUREG-0396 as a 
planning basis was the idea that a spectrum of possible accident scenarios could be selected 
to restrict what needed to be done in terms of planning parameters.219 Since the task force 
had access to crude projection models of these scenarios, a technical basis for emergency 
planning could be argued in using projected consequences from these accidents as a 
planning basis.220 These projection models were originally intended to be used as part of 
the siting criteria for where nuclear power plants should be located relative to their 
proximity to population centers and other infrastructure.221 The estimates for the dose 
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based upon these models led to the creation of the 10-mile emergency planning zone and 
the 50-mile emergency planning zone as a planning basis for REPP.222 
This portion of the section on nuclear power plant risk uses the research to describe 
the current risk assessment basis incorporated into the programmatic guidance found in 
REPP and in federal regulations. The research provides an understanding as to how the 
modern planning constructs provided for in REPP were established based upon risk 
assessments and scientific analysis performed in the 1960s and 1970s that were limited by 
the technology and methodologies available at the time. The intent of this portion is to 
provide a comparative basis for this risk assessment with the following portion that 
addresses the same overall nuclear power plant hazard assessed with modern tools and 
methodologies. The value of this research and comparative analysis is to characterize the 
opportunity to introduce an enhanced approach using probabilistic methods and a multi-
criteria integrated risk assessment strategy as an improved and more accurate basis for 
nuclear power plant risk. 
B. MODERN HAZARDS ANALYSIS OF A RADIOACTIVE RELEASE 
The original basis for offsite nuclear power plant emergency planning chose not to 
specify a particular accident sequence or series of accident events that led to a specific 
radioactive release scenario. Instead, only the aspect of the appropriate range of planning 
to address incidents across some reasonably encompassing wide range was addressed in 
the NRC guidance released in 1978 as A Planning Basis for the Development of State and 
Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water 
Nuclear Power Plants.223 Further, the same set of guidance conceded the need for more 
guidance to address accidents beyond the design basis outlined in the application for the 
original permits for construction and site operation.224  
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The effect of these two parameters was to de-couple the offsite emergency planning 
basis from the basis used to approve and license reactors and siting based upon the 
engineering design features of the plant itself. The 1978 Planning Basis study affirmed that 
an implied connection between the planning basis and any particular known accident type, 
partly because of an absence of large-scale accidents, could not be drawn from the reactor 
siting studies alone.225  
It was therefore proposed, “that offsite planning for a generic distance around 
nuclear power plants is prudent and useful.”226 The study went on to state that these generic 
distances corresponded to a 10- and 50-mile ring around all commercial nuclear power 
plants as the necessary planning context for the hazard. In 1980, following the TMI event, 
FEMA and the NRC jointly published Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of 
Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power 
Plants, which affirmed NRC endorsement of the specific guidance contained in the 1978 
Planning Basis study.227  
Over time, the capability to model the risk from radioactive releases from 
commercial plants improved significantly using more sophisticated and advanced 
computing capability brought on by the modern age. By the early 2000s, scientists inside 
the NRC finally had recognized the need for a more accurate and updated approach. The 
SOARCA report published in draft form in 2012 undertook the issue of modeling the 
consequences of a radioactive release from two existing U.S. plants representing both 
major reactor design types in use at the time. The SOARCA report was the first serious 
effort by the regulatory community to revisit the question of risk basis in over 30 years and 
showed that by “using the most current emergency preparedness practices and plant 
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capabilities, as well as the best available modeling, these analyses are more realistic than 
past analyses.”228 
The most important results from the SOARCA report provide evidence that severe 
reactor accidents progress much more slowly than anticipated in the original 1978 Planning 
Basis document. Several factors were identified to support this conclusion, including better 
modeling and focus on more likely scenarios than in the past.229 In contrast, NUREG-
0654/FEMA-REP-1 specifies that the “range of times between the onset of accident 
conditions and the start of a major release is of the order of one-half hour to several hours 
[and] the subsequent time period over which radioactive material may be expected to be 
released is of the order of one-half hour (short-term release) to a few days (continuous 
release).”230 In fact, the time factors associated with the release of radiological material can 
vary widely based on site-specific plant designs and accident and event mitigation 
strategies.  
The SOARCA analyses considered internal and external initiating events and chose 
those events capable of producing the shortest timelines to core damage and a release of 
radioactivity to the environment. The SOARCA study used seismic events as the initiating 
conditions for modeling accident scenarios because of the immediacy and significance of 
their impact on plant systems.231 Due to the timing of SOARCA completion relative to the 
accident at Fukushima Daiichi, the analyses did not assess the effects of newly available 
strategies for the mitigation of beyond design basis (BDB) events required by NRC orders 
issued in 2012 and 2013. The BDB events addressed by these orders include the initiating 
event used in the SOARCA analyses to produce the shortest timelines to core damage and 
a release of radioactivity to the environment (i.e., a seismic event). NRC Order  
EA-12-049 now requires licensees to have strategies “to maintain or restore core cooling,  
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containment and [spent fuel pool] cooling capabilities following beyond design basis 
external events.”232 The industry refers to these strategies as diverse and flexible mitigation 
or FLEX strategies.  
Given the initiating event and accident sequence postulated by each of the 
SOARCA analysis cases, FLEX strategies would provide a timelier and effective 
mitigation capability than the implementation of 10 CFR 50.54(hh) equipment. This 
equipment is “intended to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel 
pool cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the 
plant due to explosions or fire.”233 In addition to BDB events, these strategies could also 
be employed anytime that operators needed them to compensate for a failure of design 
basis accident mitigation strategies. 
It is reasonable to expect that the SOARCA results would have been different (i.e., 
less consequential) had the analyses assumed that both reference sites were in compliance 
with NRC Order EA-12-049 (and related NRC orders). While the results for the 
“mitigated” cases would have been improved (e.g., no core damage in either short-term 
station black out (SBO) case for Surry since portable power sources are now available for 
instrumentation and equipment), no credible “unmitigated” cases would likely have 
happened because operators and the plant staff would be following their FLEX support 
guidelines to implement FLEX strategies. With safety functions maintained on an 
indefinite basis, no core damage or radiological release would have occurred. 
The differential in the timing, and thus the probability of a severe accident in terms 
of radiological release, has a significant impact upon the offsite strategy for emergency 
response. A delayed or even mitigated release could change the sense of urgency in 
evacuating the population. It is well understood that evacuation carries its own set of risks 
and hazards, which must be weighed against the risk of radiation exposure in this scenario. 
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A “fast-breaker” scenario, in which it was expected that little or no lead warning time 
would be given before the impact of the radiological release reaches the offsite community, 
in the past provided means for the justification that a lot of advanced planning and 
preparedness, based upon using over conservative estimates, was therefore considered 
necessary.  
By corollary, such an approach also necessarily had to include many default 
assumptions for what level of impact would be needed for a pre-adjudicated response 
strategy. Pointedly, SOARCA’s results showed the statistical unlikelihood of a large early 
release or simply its physical impossibility.234 Taken together, these implicit factors of 
anticipated short warning times and default assumptions for impact, precluded the kind of 
thorough, more critical analysis that would have allowed emergency planners to operate 
from a more realistic picture of the actual risk. State and local governments were essentially 
required to take as given the parameters of emergency planning set by the NRC based upon 
essentially arbitrary factors. As put by the NRC in the Planning Basis study, “Radiological 
emergency planning is not based upon probabilities, but on public perceptions of the 
problem and what could be done to protect health and safety… it is a matter of prudence 
rather than necessity.”235  
For this reason, the SOARCA study emphasized the contrast in its approach based 
upon the notion that past analysis relied upon simplified qualitative models.236 One of the 
most significant of these qualitative models was the 10- and 50-mile EPZs.237 The basis 
for these arbitrary EPZ sizes is questionable. The SOARCA report concluded that a power 
plant release resulted in essentially zero human fatality risk, and the results fell thousands 
and millions of times below the probability of average cancer fatality in the United 
States.238 Thus, the notion that such margins are prudent and reasonable fails to live up to 
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the evidence that shows projected exposures and dose rates contributing to cancer risk are 
far below the actual risk from the protective action itself (i.e., evacuation). 
In addition to the EPZs, the SOARCA study also found immense differences in the 
modeled release concentrations of radionuclides. These release concentrations, as 
projected or later measured in the field, are the basis for offsite governments to take 
protective actions within the offsite community, including shelter and evacuation. 
Projected release concentrations, modeled based upon plant source term and 
meteorological conditions around the site, determine the need to issue protective actions 
when compared to a trigger-level set by the EPA. These trigger levels, called PAGs, act as 
a threshold for emergency action.  
The SOARCA study found that, for the two sites modeled, the release rated much 
lower than the previously expected level based upon past studies and analysis when using 
modern methodologies and more accurate simulation tools.239 Most of the justification for 
the basis behind why these nuclear power plant releases are harmful to human health is 
because the releases are expected to contain radioactive iodine and cesium. However, even 
just looking at iodine, the SOARCA analysis predicted no greater than 10–15 percent 
releases, as opposed to the 1982 study that predicted a 45 percent release.240 These 
projected radionuclide release concentration differentials represent wide margins, 
especially considering that the requisite emergency response strategies would also be 
strongly skewed towards overreaction as a result. This overreaction is based upon the 
probability of the belief by a public official, acting as a decision maker, who is led to 
believe the concentrations were expected to be significant enough to cause severe harm to 
any exposed populations. In the early stages of an emergency, offsite emergency response 
actions are based upon radiological projections from this type of data. By skewing the 
numbers to indicate a greater probability of a higher concentration in any potential release, 
public officials are more likely to evacuate populations in the belief that doing so avoids 
receiving a significant dose of radiation from the airborne contamination. This belief, 
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compounded with the assumption discussed earlier regarding the amount of time available 
to act prior to exposure, adds even greater urgency to act more quickly and more 
aggressively to evacuate greater numbers of the population sooner.  
While on the surface acting more quickly and aggressively in the face of such an 
emergency scenario may be considered reasonable, and even laudable, the available 
protective actions represent choices that carry a risk of their own that must be factored in. 
NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 envisioned the 10-mile EPZ as a baseline, which could be 
extended as if to imply that response operations could extend much further as necessary.241 
The SOARCA report espoused the opposite approach assuming that any response beyond 
the EPZ required the justification of data supporting the need for protective actions.242 The 
concept of a shadow evacuation that occurs beyond the areas exceeding the protective 
action guides published by the EPA as a basis for protective actions (i.e., evacuation) is 
normally not factored into the planning basis. The SOARCA study assumed a shadow 
evacuation of about 20 percent beyond the 10-mile EPZ based upon a phone questionnaire 
survey.243 During the Fukushima disaster event that occurred in Japan in 2011, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on the incident specified difficulties 
in the evacuation because of infrastructure damage because of the earthquake and tsunami, 
especially for hospital patients and nursing home residents.244 In addition, the report also 
highlighted challenges for up to 160,000 people separated from their sources of supply to 
meet daily sustainment requirements.245 The World Health Organization (WHO) published 
frequently asked questions (FAQs) regarding the Fukushima accident five years after its 
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occurrence. In the publication, the WHO asserts the significance of the risk of evacuation 
itself, especially for certain segments of the population.246 
C. PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT AND MULTI-CRITERIA 
INTEGRATED RISK ASSESSMENT 
Beyond analyzing the nuclear power plant hazard, describing and outlining the 
methodology showing how overall risk assessment incorporates hazard information is 
similarly significant. The methods currently used for the offsite programs, consisting of 
regulatory guidance frameworks described in NUREG-0396 and referenced in NUREG-
0654, depend upon a subjective assessment of reasonable assurance rather than the 
objective measurement of risk factors.247 For the onsite programs, the NRC uses a 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to provide point estimates of risk using 
real numbers to provide a clear rubric for what can go wrong, how probable those 
conditions are, and what the consequences may be.248 The PRA differs from the 
methodology outlined in NUREG-0396 and NUREG-0654 in its use of more rigorous 
analysis via event trees and fault trees that use frequency estimates for possible sequences 
of events. The NRC’s PRA uses three levels to identify accident sequences: (1) progression 
towards severe accidents as a result of core damage, (2) consequence analysis to estimate 
measurable health effects, and (3) contamination resulting from a release.249 The final level 
of PRA combines the consequences with the respective estimated frequencies.  
The NRC PRA provides a robust, measurement-based methodology to establish a 
risk-based upon measurement criteria. To assess ongoing risk, the NRC has developed a 
comprehensive approach based upon inspection and other measurements to assess nuclear 
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power plant safety and proactively seek to address any potential performance issues.250 
This methodology, entitled the NRC ROP, uses a series of objective performance indicators 
(PI) combined with inspection findings to arrive at an overall assessment.251 The NRC 
expects each site to develop and implement performance indicators to set measurable 
bounds for station operation within appropriate safety margins.252 For the NRC onsite-
focused program, an example of performance criteria for the Palo Verde Generating Station 
Unit 1 in Arizona is the measurement of drill and exercise performance, which uses a ratio 
of successful opportunities to the total number of opportunities.253 The performance 
indicators fall within a series of seven major safety cornerstones that represent categories 
of inspection and monitoring activities in three key areas of reactor safety, radiation safety, 
and safeguards (protection of the plant against sabotage or other security threats).254 
In the NRC example of its reactor oversight framework (also referred to with 
regards to the underlying process as ROP; see Figure 2), the overall mission devolves into 
three specific strategic performance areas that contribute to mission success to protect 
public health and safety. These performance areas incorporate reactor safety, which has 
four related subcomponents, radiation safety that has two related subcomponents, and 
safeguards that have one specific subcomponent. Each subcomponent is entitled as a 
cornerstone or an area in which oversight efforts will specifically focus on reviewing 
performance indicators and conducting inspections. Within the cornerstones, a dynamic of 
dependency exists between some of the subcomponents of the reactor safety strategic 
performance area. It is necessary to realize that activity in one cornerstone area has a direct 
dependency on activity within another area, and thus, the evaluation of performance 
indicators and inspection results should be viewed contextually within this relationship. 
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Additional areas of oversight defined around three additional principles are intended to be 
cross-cutting to all areas and are related to human performance, problem identification and 
resolution, and a safety-conscious work environment (these areas are shown in the bottom 
of Figure 2). These principles underscore each of the cornerstones, apply across all other 
areas, and help broadly inform the oversight activities focused upon the seven cornerstone 
areas.  
 
Figure 2. Example NRC Reactor Oversight Framework.255 
In the ROP, PIs are information metrics related to performance in certain attributes 
of each of the seven major safety cornerstones and provide an indication of problems that 
may increase the probability or consequences of an off-normal event if left uncorrected.256 
Power reactor licensees submit performance assessment data described in the guideline 
Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline published by the Nuclear Energy 
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Institute (NEI), which has been accepted by the NRC for use in reporting PI data.257 The 
PI data, combined with the inspection program, provides a broad assessment of the plant’s 
safety performance, and the results are color-coded into a simple model (green, white, 
yellow, red) to signify the overall level of safety at the site.258 The inspection program itself 
focuses on risk-significant activities or those that have the greatest amount of influence on 
accidents.259  
The PRA process, which models the systems and activities under inspection, 
determines what is “risk-significant.” The NRC has used PRA to pre-define certain “risk 
significant” elements into the series of planning standards as noted under 10 CFR 50.47 
that are key factors in the determination of the significance of its inspection findings 
towards overall safety risk.260 Taken together, the PRA informed inspection program, and 
the licensee-reported performance indicators provide a cost-effective and efficient 
framework to assess overall onsite risk on a continuous basis. Since onsite and offsite 
programs both use the same 16 planning standards as outlined in NUREG-0654/FEMA-
REP-1, a potential opportunity exists to apply also the same approach to the offsite 
program, and to collect PI data from offsite to complement the data from the onsite utility 
to provide a fully comprehensive risk picture.  
A whitepaper published by the EPA demonstrates another approach to using PRA 
in which PRA’s purpose is to inform and improve the decision-making process and 
provides examples of its successful use in health and ecologically related analysis.261 The 
EPA’s approach particularly applies to emergency management decision makers faced 
with a potential or actual problem at a nuclear power plant within their jurisdiction because 
it addresses PRA’s use to assist with high degrees of uncertainty and variability in the risk 
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assessment process. The key benefit of PRA, as described by the EPA, is the ability to 
support a quantitative assessment of uncertain and variable factors within the decision 
process.262 Emergency managers in these scenarios, similar to the EPA, face a comparable 
dilemma of addressing complex, variable, and uncertain problem factors that make 
equitable and effective decision making a challenging task.263 
Offsite state and local government authorities, having responsibility for public 
health and safety within their respective jurisdictions, increasingly benefit from greater 
access to data and information sources that technology affords. As this trend continues to 
grow, so should the ability to use data to weigh potential risk factors together in a decision-
making process, even when constrained by different degrees of uncertainty and confidence 
in the available information.264 Another key benefit of PRA is that it can be used with other 
analytical approaches that introduce additional critical factors related to cost, regulatory 
impact, and industrial standards.265 Thus, a PRA component may be integrated into the 
total analysis strategy, which can include a capabilities-based assessment or some other 
deterministic analysis already in use. In REPP, the addition of a PRA could attach 
quantitative values to otherwise abstract assessments of adequacy in comparison with the 
16 planning standards or as a stronger foundation of assessing reasonable assurance. 
The scenario of a nuclear power plant accident may possibly benefit from a PRA-
based approach because it considers a range of criteria that must be factored into the 
decision-making process, representing elements with different degrees of confidence, and 
interrelationships between decision alternatives.266 In REPP, emergency response plans 
aim to provide dose savings for the population at risk across a spectrum of accidents that 
may produce doses in excess of EPA PAGs.267 Arriving quickly at a careful and appropriate 
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balance between the radiological risk and the potential risks and consequences of the 
protective action is necessary when advising the public to take some action.268 Inherent 
risks of protective actions include risks in public evacuations. These evacuation risks were 
documented as a result of the Fukushima disaster, with figures showing that well over 
1,000 fatalities occurred as a result of the evacuation.269 A strategy that incorporates an 
objective and comprehensive basis for adjudicating these decisions may be helpful to both 
facilitate higher quality analysis and justify decisions to take action that affects the public. 
While PAGs help to provide some numerically based criteria, a decision-making process 
with an ability to measure the inherent risk of all possible actions in addition to just the 
radiological risks may possibly provide a significant advantage to decision makers. 
The questions that arise regarding uncertainty and variability affect the process of 
decision making itself and make it an iterative one comprised of planning, scoping and 
problem formulation, analysis, interpretation and risk characterization, and risk 
communication.270 EPA Region III provides a useful model to illustrate the conceptual and 
strategic approach in its Multi-Criteria Integrated Resource Assessment (MIRA) 
methodology, which is designed to facilitate collaboration among partners for decision 
making concerning more than one objective.271 One aspect of the MIRA framework is the 
use of indicators; in this case, EPA Region 3 defines indicators as an element of some 
system or phenomenon under consideration in which a need exists to take action or make 
some decision towards the desired outcome.272 This approach segments the hierarchy of 
indicators across both administrative level activity and environmental activity, both of 
which can be measured and used in the overall analysis.  
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The MIRA framework provides the means by which appropriate and clear metrics 
can be set within the context of otherwise abstract criteria and may be applied to programs, 
such as REPP. The 16 planning standards set by NUREG-0654 already establish clear 
criteria but lack the framework of measurement that allows their use inside a more 
comprehensive risk measurement framework. NRC’s ROP that uses performance 
indicators also provides a model that can inform the development of an appropriate 
structure that may be used for offsite radiological emergency preparedness and response. 
The MIRA approach, with its environmentally focused indicator set and the NRC ROP 
with its safety cornerstones that define its set of performance indicators, provides an 
appropriate basis that includes both sets of relevant factors to an offsite program. 
D. LOGIC MODEL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING NUCLEAR POWER 
PLANT RISK TO OFFSITE COMMUNITIES 
Offsite government agencies with a nuclear power plant located within or near their 
jurisdictions have a responsibility to protect public health and safety against a release of 
radioactive materials from the plant that presents an immediate or long-term risk to their 
populations. Effective response and recovery operations—that provide dose savings to the 
public in excess of federally defined protective action guides—demand assessing incident-
related data and making an informed decision on protective action.273 The provisions for 
collecting certain data in a protective action decision (PAD) process are clearly outlined in 
the guidance on the subject as part of the REPP planning standards.274 Although the data 
itself can be compared to EPA PAGs to ascertain the appropriate context for the 
radiological impact, the overall methodology to incorporate data into a risk-informed 
decision-making process in a structured and efficient manner is far less defined. 
The research question of this thesis is the following: which benefits, shortfalls, and 
challenges emerge from the integration of the hazard-specific emergency preparedness and 
response program established under REPP with the all-hazards core capabilities and the 
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NPS doctrine? To understand how to compare these benefits, shortfalls, and challenges 
among various integration approaches, a potential framework by which the different 
approaches can be measured in terms of data-driven decision making support for these 
nuclear power plant emergency events must be outlined. A few integrative approaches can 
be modeled in terms of what data and information the planning and response protocols may 
require to be collected to support emergency PADs, which in turn, mobilize resources to 
protect public health and safety from the hazard. For offsite government organizations, a 
logic model structure can be introduced to help provide a comparative methodological 
approach to risk assessment, overall program management, and decision making for both 
steady-state (non-disaster) and disaster state conditions. 
Research into an appropriate logic model and approach to integrating data-driven 
decision making into an analysis of potential policy options within the context of 
environmental health can provide a useful starting point for potential incorporation into 
radiological emergency planning and response. EPA Region III has developed a promising 
approach that may potentially be adapted to the needs of offsite decision makers needing 
to address preparedness and response to a potential nuclear power plant accident. The 
EPA’s model uses an integrative approach to incorporating data and analysis specifically 
designed to address variability and uncertainty inherent in its decision making. The 
recognition that more robustly sophisticated approaches can be used to build upon this 
model and provide greater depth to the analysis and a stronger foundation for the risk 
assessment informs this model.275 A common logic model framework can be used to 
measure comparatively how each potential structured approach contributes to facts and 
information necessary to the decision-making process. A logic model framework can also 
be used to identify how potential integrative approaches between REPP and all-hazards 
capabilities-based frameworks can either more or less support an assessment of risk by 
decision makers. 
In terms of a logic model structure, the EPA example uses an iterative process to 
incorporate data into program administration and management. The process the EPA uses 
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in Region III is structured to ensure the quality of the data collected, connect the 
requirements of programs to environmental results and prioritize further efforts based upon 
those results, use the data to directly inform decision making, and connect other additional 
data sets to gain further insight as a feedback mechanism for refinement and 
accountability.276 The EPA incorporates these structured principles into a process that 
feeds data into logic models, then looks at pre-defined indicators to evaluate the impact 
upon the environment (especially when impact cannot be directly measured), and follows 
up with a MIRA tool to decide what to do next or how to apply regulatory actions.277 
In a similar manner, offsite government agencies with a nuclear power plant could 
use a similar approach to augment programmatic activity for both preparedness and 
response with logic models, data, and a MIRA-like approach to enhance comparative 
analysis and quantify the relative impact of preparedness and response efforts via 
measurable criteria. Logic models could be used to understand how REPP program 
activities (or NPS core capability-enhancing activity) impact capabilities for the 
implementation and execution of emergency response and recovery-oriented protective 
actions. The impact of these actions can also be assessed in terms of the impact upon a 
hierarchy of indicators and a tool, such as MIRA that can provide insight into how program 
activities or PADs affect dose-savings outcomes and environmental conditions or results 
in a populated area. In addition, logic models and MIRA or a similar tool can prioritize 
different outcomes and activities based upon a hierarchy of outcomes in a resource or time-
constrained environment.278 
Several logic model terms need to be outlined to explain how the components of 
the model may use data and information points relevant to REPP and nuclear power plant 
hazards to define more fully what a logic model useful for comparison may consist of. 
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Using the EPA Region III methodology as a basis, a proposed framework, and definitions 
of logic model terms are as follows:279 
• Baseline: a current state of emergency response capability related to 
potential outcomes and impacts to the community from a radiological 
release. The baseline measure is a point from which to assess the potential 
success or accomplishment of desired outcomes or reduction in the 
duration of the impact. 
• Program Impediments: any barriers to completing emergency 
preparedness (capability building) and/or emergency response activities 
effectively or efficiently. Examples of barriers for a radiological 
emergency preparedness program could include financial barriers related 
to equipment procurement, jurisdictional authority barriers, or political 
and elected official support for governmental roles and responsibilities 
related to the power plant.  
• Activities: assigned or self-generated tasks, in connection with roles and 
responsibilities outlined in plans and procedures for preparedness, 
response, and recovery tied to planning standard requirements or 
capabilities for all-hazards emergency management by the community.  
• Outputs: measures of activities or service delivery in connection with 
some defined role or responsibility as defined by plans and procedures. 
These outputs can be measures of performance, qualitatively or 
quantitatively, for the execution of capabilities. For the nuclear power 
plant scenario, examples include the evacuation time estimate (ETE) of 
local populations within the 10-mile EPZ or the percentage of the 
population who can effectively hear the outdoor warning sirens as 
determined by acoustical testing.  
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• Outcomes: results that define an overall organization or entity’s mission 
that tie capabilities and tasks to organizational purpose and mission sets as 
defined under the logic model. These capabilities and tasks may include 
end-states or final conditions as the result of some programmatic activity 
or change that occurs as a consequence of program activity. For nuclear 
power plant emergencies, the ability to provide evacuation support for pre-
identified members of the population with access and functional needs to 
facilitate their transport away from the hazard area in a timely manner is 
just one example of an outcome.  
• Impacts: divided into chiefly, either mission-related or statutory, which, 
ideally, are congruent. In the case of public health, the impacts are 
generally characterized as acute or chronic effects.280  
A key part of the logic model framework is the use of indicators, which act as 
proxies for a condition or state that is the desired knowledge element to be tracked (such 
as an environmental condition related to the concentration of radioisotopes). Indicators 
ground an assessment of the current situation in the context of what has occurred, what is 
occurring, and what may occur in relation to a goal or objective. In terms of offsite 
radiological emergency preparedness and decision making, indicators denote pieces of 
information in a larger system represented in terms of the offsite community in which a 
need or desire exists to make PADs or execute some protective action. These decisions and 
actions take place in the context of an anticipated, projected, or actual impact. An indicator 
hierarchy can be used to organize data and measures into levels that correspond to the type 
of activity being measured.281 
For a preparedness program, such as REPP, with the primary goal to create and 
promulgate plans and procedures that fulfill key capabilities necessary to establish, sustain, 
and execute emergency response and recovery capabilities, the hierarchy of indicators may 
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measure offsite state and local government programmatic activities against the 16 planning 
standards. However, assessing all these elements for a large program on an annual basis, 
including all corresponding sub-elements, presents a daunting task in terms of assigning 
metrics or measurable indicators for each individual element that can then be incorporated 
into a comprehensive logic model framework. Within REPP, a total of 125 points of formal 
evaluation are outlined within NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 that must be adjudicated by 
FEMA for offsite state and local government agencies to arrive at a determination of 
reasonable assurance.282 In all, a total of 351 points of “checkmark” review and evaluation 
are described in the FEMA REP Manual that are used to assess state and local offsite 
government programs. These points include additional items required by FEMA necessary 
for offsite programs to demonstrate to establish “applicability” of the 125 criterion 
elements specified in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 to offsite plans and procedures.283 
REPP sidesteps the burden of this breadth of program evaluation and inspection through a 
subset of six evaluation criteria that, absent an actual incident, provide an indicator 
framework that can be assessed through a simulated demonstration exercise.284 However, 
the evaluation criteria do not specifically provide a structure to incorporate data and 
measures and leaves it unclear as to how the criteria can be assessed consistently to provide 
a level of reasonable assurance that public safety and public health can be or is being 
protected.  
Better defining how data collection may be employed to augment the program 
assessment of either evaluation criteria or the 16 planning standards under REPP requires 
a more robustly defined process capable of incorporating additional information beyond 
just the radiological exposure data points that can be easily measured. Offsite decision 
makers incorporate radiological impact information into their assessment process but also 
incorporate considerations of other factors that affect overall population risk, including 
evacuation times and congregate care resources, as well as recovery considerations dealing 
with contamination levels and long-term impacts. The MIRA process can provide a more 
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robust approach that incorporates data based upon analytical principles relevant to this type 
of decision making, including a consideration of stakeholders, context, criteria and their 
metrics, the significance of the data metrics, and value judgments within a common 
framework.285 According to research into the model adopted for use by EPA Region III, 
the MIRA process can be generally broken down into four major steps:286 
• Define the context for the decision (i.e., offsite 10-mile EPZ potential 
radiological exposure based upon a nuclear power plant release) 
• Define the criteria applicable to the data collection that supports the 
context for the decision, including any narrative-based information, data, 
and organization of appropriate indicators. Consider multiple sources of 
information from monitoring data, model outputs, and even study results 
or planning criteria. The aggregate information can be used to construct a 
series of composite elements for which multiple indicators can be 
assigned.  
• Apply significance to the data, based upon subject-matter expertise and 
judgment to identify how indicator values contribute to a least-adverse 
decision impact or a most adverse decision impact for public health and 
safety, resource availability, time, and cost.  
• Apply stakeholder values to help rank and evaluate different decision 
options and criteria. This iterative learning process occurs through 
initializing a question, looking at criteria, assessing indicators, and 
collecting data to identify options and arrange them in order of least to 
most attractive based upon an understanding of consequences, outcomes, 
and impacts. 
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To measure benefits, shortfalls, and challenges from potential approaches to 
integration, suggesting an approach that identifies the most risk-significant planning 
standards under existing frameworks, such as REPP and then applying a logic model, 
indicator hierarchy, and beginning a decision approach based upon MIRA, provides a basis 
for a comparative analysis of integrative approaches. The NRC defines risk-significant 
planning standards within the framework of the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 
Appendix B for the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process 
supported by Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.287 For onsite inspection, the NRC stipulates 
that four of the 16 planning standard components be highlighted as “risk significant” as a 
subset of the 16 planning standards outlined under 10 CFR 50.47 and NUREG-
0654/FEMA-REP-1 generally conceptualized as follows:288 
• Emergency classification system 
• Emergency notifications 
• Emergency accident assessment capability 
• Emergency protective actions 
To establish a common basis for applying a logic model, defining appropriate 
indicators, and then incorporating a MIRA framework, these four risk-significant areas, as 
defined by the NRC, can also be applied to offsite programs. The advantage of doing so 
not only highlights the strong relationship between onsite and offsite programs but also 
provides a cross-cutting basis and foundation for integrating programmatic models and 
approaches that align with current regulatory guidance as established by existing protocol.  
The four risk-significant areas could be baseline factors whereby different policy 
options could be compared in terms of how well they comprehensively assess program 
performance. The use of indicators to define measurable criteria in terms of performance 
is necessary due to the absence of actual data from a real incident. In this manner, the 
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designation of performance indicators could help support an overall assessment of offsite 
risk using a logic model framework, the MIRA process, and existing program requirements 
within REPP. This approach augments the existing program with an additional formal 
analysis that can be used as a comparison for different program strategies, and thus, policy 
options for managing and overseeing an offsite program.  
Each element can be broken down in terms of how it provides context to evaluate 
an offsite program strategy and its corresponding activities to provide a means by which to 
incorporate the four risk-significant planning standard elements into a proposed logic 
model. Each of the four represents a functional area within a program that includes both 
offsite preparedness and offsite response and recovery anticipated to be necessary for an 
emergency event. For offsite planning, accident prevention and mitigation in terms of plant 
systems are an onsite responsibility, and thus, a PRA or other methodology applied to an 
engineered system lies outside the scope of offsite planning and response. A series of 
indicators that can be used to derive an understanding of the level of response capability 
by the ORO can be measured. The series of indicators corresponds to one or more of the 
four risk-significant planning standards in an offsite context and incorporates measurable 
elements that reflect how the program strategy applies focus to managing outcomes critical 
to offsite public health and safety.  
Consider the matrix in Table 1 that outlines a logic model framework for an offsite 
program built upon the four risk-significant planning standards. 
Table 1. Example Logic Model Incorporating RSPS Elements 
RSPS Element Objective Output Outcome Impact 
Emergency 
Classification 
    
Emergency 
Notification 
    
Accident 
Assessment 
    
Protective  
Action 
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The risk-significant planning standards lie along the vertical axis of Table 1, and 
the logic model components along the horizontal axis of Table 1. In each box, indicator 
data populates the specific cell with respect to a consistent set of logical parameters applied 
for each strategic program type. In such an approach, the same logical criteria are applied 
to program plans and procedure evaluation, as well as performance from simulated (or 
actual) events to measure overall risk and thus program performance.  
To provide context for the logic model, consistently measuring the same criteria 
across different program approaches relevant to the same or similar risk parameters that 
are, in turn, relevant to a nuclear power plant located in a populated community is crucial. 
The baseline, potential impediments, and activity portions of the logic model come from 
the existing program requirements. In each risk significant planning standard area, the 
criteria may be outlined in terms as described within the regulatory guidance of NUREG-
0654/FEMA-REP-1 for offsite programs and thus serve as the indicator for those sections 
of the matrix. This portion of the matrix corresponds to the overall objective for measurable 
performance, which includes a baseline requirement under the regulatory guidance, 
incorporates thresholds or upper/lower bounds of performance, and describes the overall 
activity as what needs to happen. The objective section is specific, measurable as an 
indicator, actionable and achievable by an offsite program, and time-bound by set 
evaluation intervals.  
Outputs are measures of activities directed to achieve a goal. Outputs demonstrate 
service delivery or accomplishment of some responsibility in support of an objective. 
Outcomes are end-states or final conditions as the result of some programmatic activity or 
change that occurs because of program activity, which relates to mission-oriented or 
strategic-level relevance. Finally, impacts are measurable criteria in terms of mission-
related public health and safety or statutory obligations that must be fulfilled by the 
program strategy overall. By assigning indicators in each category, further insight can be 
gained from evaluating offsite conditions as a result of protective actions using tools, such 
as MIRA, and further prioritizing program activities and outcomes based upon both MIRA 
and the logic model to inform ongoing decision making.  
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E. CONCLUSION 
The intent of this chapter was to provide a research-based understanding of how 
risk has been managed and how it could be enhanced. REPP currently lacks the ability to 
measure risk using a probabilistic framework that can accommodate incident and site-
specific factors while maintaining a foundation in unified and consistent principles 
pertinent to nuclear power plants. It is important that this characteristic distinguish nuclear 
power plant risk from other types of risks and hazards that state and local governments 
must address as part of their all-hazards approach to emergency management. Without 
measurable criteria for risk, it is difficult to adjudicate resource allocations for preparedness 
programs and provide appropriate benchmarks for measuring capability as part of a larger 
preparedness enterprise that may span several jurisdictions or regions. In addition, the 
benefits of a measurable basis for risk provide a means to evaluate different policy options 
and proposals for programmatic requirements against a common set of criteria that must 
be satisfied and maintained to provide reasonable assurance of public health and safety. 
The next chapter utilizes the background of radiological emergency preparedness, 
the modern framework for all-hazards emergency management, and the tools for measuring 
radiation risk together to evaluate three potential approaches to modern radiological 
emergency preparedness and response for nuclear power plants. The common foundation 
for analysis is the logic model framework that utilizes the four risk-significant planning 
standards that need to be addressed in all types of programmatic or policy approaches. Each 
potential policy option is expressed as a different functional implementation in which its 
effectiveness to address the four risk-significant areas can be evaluated. A matrix is utilized 
to summarize the narrative and provide a reference for how the particular policy measures 
or adjudicates each of these four critical areas. The intent is to provide a basis from which 
a productive and risk-informed perspective can be established to select the appropriate 
policy and programmatic approach. It is a given that each nuclear power plant site and 
surrounding jurisdiction will be unique in some respects. However, a need also exists for a 
unified approach to radiological emergency preparedness and response that meets the intent 
of the current federal regulations and provides a common basis for state and local 
government response capability evaluations. This identification of an appropriate unified 
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approach is designed to address the research question of this thesis, which is to identify the 
challenges, shortfalls, and opportunities that emerge from the integration of all-hazards 
capabilities-based planning with the prescriptive requirements of REPP. The policy options 
analysis in the next chapter utilizes the four risk-significant planning standards within the 
logic model framework to provide the means to measure the objectives, outputs, outcomes, 
and impacts from each risk-significant area that applies to both onsite and offsite programs.  
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V. POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS 
REPP has an opportunity to benefit from the recent evolution of scientific research, 
emergency management doctrine, and enhancement of risk assessment strategies since the 
early 1980s when it was created. Three distinct policy options are presented in this section 
and subjected to a comparative analysis using the four risk-significant planning standards 
(RSPS) as a basis. This analysis is intended to provide a common framework to address 
the research question of this thesis, which is to provide a structured approach to identify 
which benefits, shortfalls, and challenges emerge from the integration of the hazard-
specific REPP with the all-hazards core capabilities and the NPS doctrine.  
For each policy option, the same logic model is applied using the four RSPS to 
identify how each programmatic approach would address objectives, outputs, outcomes, 
and impacts. The discussion of each policy option precedes a matrix of the same four RSPS 
against the criteria of indicators corresponding to specific objectives, outputs, outcomes, 
and impacts that pertain to how each program approach may address the RSPS element. 
The series of indicators described in the matrix incorporates measurable elements that 
reflect how the particular program strategy will approach managing outcomes critical to 
offsite public health and safety. The goal is to provide a comparative basis for how each 
program approach (corresponding to an overall policy option) can assess program 
performance and provide an evaluation of overall offsite risk.  
A. INTEGRATION OF REPP WITH ALL-HAZARDS CAPABILITY-BASED 
PLANNING 
Recognizing how REPP has contributed to and also may benefit from emergency 
preparedness doctrine that has been implemented across the nation may fit with envisioning 
how a more integrated approach creates an economy of scale in the preparedness enterprise. 
This analysis allows existing programs and efforts to work with REPP in a mutually 
beneficial manner and takes advantage of efficiency gains that apply common principles 
to multiple hazards, allowing for more unified planning, training, and exercise effort across 
the whole community. 
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The increasing challenge with such programs as REPP arises when the funding that 
supports most preparedness activities requires a different methodological implementation 
of emergency preparedness that conflicts with the REPP program for nuclear power plants. 
In each jurisdiction where it is implemented, REPP is funded by the nuclear utility, and the 
costs of the offsite program incurred by FEMA are recovered via direct bill from the federal 
government per federal statute.289 The chain of accountability for REPP performance is, 
therefore, not aligned or correlated directly with any other federal grant or program, which 
typically funds state and local emergency management activities. This discrepancy 
effectively increases the cost of the nuclear emergency preparedness program because 
these nuclear programs lack any economy of scale support from the larger preparedness 
enterprise.290  
As a result, state and local governments around nuclear power plants face a 
dilemma; follow one prescriptive set of guidance for preparedness and response to their 
nuclear plants and another, more generalized and sometimes conflicting set of guidelines 
for all other hazards. The disparity between the prescriptive approach is compared to the 
subjective core capability approach that can be scoped and defined by the individual 
jurisdiction using federal guidance only as a framework. The resulting segmentation of 
preparedness programs creates a duplication of effort, resources, and time that serves no 
one, including the state and local governments trying to plan, train, and exercise one way 
for all hazards and another way for nuclear power plant emergencies.  
Most of the documentation for federally defined emergency preparedness is recent 
(within the last 5–10 years), whereas the documentation for nuclear power plant emergency 
preparedness dates back to the late 1970s and early 1980s. Some evidence suggests the 
nuclear power plant emergency preparedness programs influence modern federal 
emergency preparedness doctrine, but this carryover represents a significant challenge in 
maintaining both the original and evolutionary versions at the same time for nuclear power 
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plant jurisdictions.291 The administrative overhead and associated costs with maintaining 
both REPP and all-hazards programs aligned under the core capability framework 
promulgated by FEMA for use in its grant-funded programs at the state and local level is a 
burden to efficiency and consistency within the emergency preparedness enterprise. 
1. Description of a REPP All-Hazards Integration Policy 
Proposing an integration policy for state and local governments to incorporate their 
preparedness and response program for nuclear power plants within their existing all-
hazards emergency preparedness programs is possible. Significant components of the 
modern all-hazards emergency preparedness and response protocols, as defined by FEMA, 
have emerged from elements of REPP.292 Therefore, incorporating REPP planning 
standards into an all-hazards framework and still preserving the integrity of REPP, which 
intends to build and sustain response and recovery capability for a nuclear power plant 
incident, is also possible. In this manner, state and local jurisdictions can achieve an 
economy of scale within their statewide preparedness programs and still retain the ability 
to participate in REPP and its accompanying funding stream. 
The main challenge with a REPP all-hazards integration policy is to find an efficient 
approach to accommodate continued federal evaluation of state and local preparedness 
activity. Under an all-hazards emergency preparedness program supported by federal 
grants, the application process assures accountability, as do quarterly reports and 
monitoring visits conducted by federal representatives.293 Grant program compliance 
monitoring efforts typically look for cumulative program level “performance” 
documentation, and not specific activities, which leaves it instead to the state-level 
applicants to define the scope of their projects and devise the strategy to build capabilities 
according to their own priorities and resources.294 REPP is a much more prescriptive 
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program concerning the fulfillment of the specific requirements specified in the 16 
planning standards, and does not allow the participants at the state and local levels to set 
the scope and extent of activity but rather demands formal compliance with specific 
program parameters in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1.295 Under an integration strategy, 
developing a process to track and attributing all activities necessary for REPP-specific 
compliance would be necessary, something generally not necessary to the same degree for 
grant-funded emergency preparedness activities.  
Notwithstanding these challenges, REPP integration has a significant advantage in 
providing a unity of program strategy for state and local emergency managers. 
Traditionally, REPP has been managed as “separate and apart” from the rest of the program 
due to its unique method of administration from the federal enterprise. However, the 
capabilities and program activities may fit just as appropriately within the modern all-
hazards framework and may no longer require a separate program to support the integrity 
of those capabilities. By recognizing REPP as an administrative strategy rather than the 
basis of a specific set of capabilities, state and local governments can perceive the 
opportunity to achieve the same outcomes under their own program without having to 
subscribe to the federal model. 
All-hazards preparedness is now dominant in today’s emergency planning efforts 
at all levels. REPP, as a legacy program, is both confined to one hazard and narrowly 
prescriptive in its structure. To close the gap represented by the two approaches for state 
and local emergency preparedness programs, aligning REPP with an all-hazards NPS, can 
be realized when compared to similar efforts needed when first implementing portions of 
HSEEP within REPP. HSEEP applies today within REPP on a limited basis to incorporate 
the benefit of focusing on what is necessary to demonstrate the required capabilities during 
a simulated exercise event rather than the procedural steps to achieve a particular outcome 
pursuant to those capabilities.296 This strategy shows an example exists of how jurisdictions 
 
295 Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Federal Emergency Management Agency, Criteria for Preparation 
and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power 
Plants, 5. 
296 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Program Manual, 178. 
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can more broadly incorporate the elements of NPS (including HSEEP) into the REPP 
structure to provide a common protocol between REPP activities and capabilities within 
the greater all-hazards emergency preparedness enterprise. Other examples of integration 
efforts between emergency preparedness programs exist, but the rigid structure of REPP 
also can introduce challenges, some of which will not be resolved without further guidance 
and clarification.  
2. Incorporation of the Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation and the 
National Incident Management System  
In a limited effort to reconcile the growing divide between REPP and all-hazards 
doctrine, FEMA began to experiment with incorporating elements of its all-hazards 
doctrine into the emergency preparedness program for power plants. The attempt to use 
HSEEP within the nuclear power plant program represented one early attempt. HSEEP 
uses the same core capability doctrine that permeates all other federal emergency 
preparedness guidance, which made FEMA realize that some kind of crosswalk had to be 
established to build a bridge between HSEEP and the nuclear power plant planning 
standards.  
FEMA’s efforts to incorporate HSEEP doctrine into REPP have been mixed at best. 
The HSEEP core capability guidance appears in the latest version of the Program Manual: 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness, but FEMA acknowledges that it is an incomplete 
fit and insists that the crosswalk only approximates a relationship between the REP 
demonstration criteria and core capability descriptions.297 FEMA also points out the 
difficulty of reconciling the contrast between prescriptive criteria for capability 
demonstration required by REPP for reasonable assurance and subjective assessments of 
core capabilities used by HSEEP defined differently for each jurisdiction.298 Due to the 
prescriptive nature of REPP, the two approaches used within the same program create 
challenges in defining the proper interpretation of how the 16 planning standards are 
supposed to be implemented.  
 
297 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 226. 
298 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 226. 
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HSEEP also provides a structure that defines guidance for how exercises should be 
evaluated. The criteria for evaluation include a structured method for gathering and 
categorizing evaluation data from an exercise event, which is facilitated by an EEG.299 The 
EEG tool provides a focus for evaluation activities and is pre-drafted during the exercise 
planning process. Using EEGs reduces the possibility that exercises become “regulation by 
inspection,” whereby evaluators use “what if” scenarios to create exceptions endlessly to a 
passing evaluation.300  
Within a prescriptive program, such as REPP that defines compliance in terms of 
standards and criteria, adjudicating exercises focus around whether or not the 
demonstration “meets the intent” behind the REPP planning standards in 44 CFR 350.301 
This determination, by statute, is a federal decision.302 As REPP exercises must use these 
requirements as the basis for exercise objectives, these exercises are narrowly defined 
around planning standard elements and can easily lose realistic context on how a 
community may respond or recover under its all-hazards strategy. REPP exercises can, 
therefore, be criticized as unrealistic or too artificial, which then diminishes their credibility 
and value to the wider preparedness strategy and other preparedness efforts within the 
community.  
In addition to HSEEP, aspects of the National Incident Management 
System/Incident Command System (NIMS/ICS) have also already been adopted by and 
integrated into REPP, via state and local government preparedness and response 
protocols.303 NIMS/ICS principles, therefore, also affect how onsite NPP organizations 
interface with offsite government preparedness and response, as both fall under the same 
 
299 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program, 5–
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301 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Program Manual, 171. 
302 Department of Homeland Security, “Exercises.”  
303 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System (Washington, 
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16 planning standards.304 NPP organizations traditionally used guidance in NUREG-
0654/FEMA-REP-1, Table B-1 (Minimum Staffing Requirements for NRC Licensees for 
Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies) as the model for their response organizations.305 At 
Table B-1’s development in 1980, no such ideal as NIMS or the ICS existed, so the model 
did not reflect NIMS/ICS organization or principles and still does not to this day. While 
some minor alignment by the nuclear power plant organizations has occurred within the 
limited flexibility of Table B-1, full alignment is not possible until the existing regulatory 
requirements and guidance (Table B-1 and other related nuclear power plant operational 
and inspection documents) can be revised and updated to include NIMS/ICS terminology 
and structure.  
In 2017, FEMA refreshed its NIMS program and expanded its emphasis on 
principles of command and coordination, resource management, and information 
management.306 ICS principles continue to dominate the preferred doctrine for command 
and coordination of emergency events, and a unified coordination effort across all sectors, 
including the private sector, is increasingly common.307 For a nuclear power plant operated 
by the private sector, the inability to participate directly within this coordinating structure 
because of outdated regulatory guidance potentially poses a serious challenge to onsite and 
offsite coordination. Even the existing regulatory guidance in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-
1 stipulates that the integrated approach is most likely to protect public health and safety.308 
 
304 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Appendix E to Part 50—Emergency Planning and Preparedness 
for Production and Utilization Facilities.”  
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3. Incorporation of Core Capabilities into the 16 REPP Planning 
Standards 
The advent of the NPG into modern emergency management practice, introduced 
to state and local jurisdictions across the nation as the concept of capabilities-based 
planning programs and preparedness programs under federal grants, required a THIRA for 
each major jurisdiction. For those jurisdictions with nuclear power plants, REPP had 
already imposed the requirement to structure the emergency response program around the 
16 planning standards contained in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1. Core capabilities 
presented another methodology that had to be incorporated into the overall program, which 
resulted in some elements being both a component of the 16 planning standards and also 
part of one (or more) core capabilities.  
Emergency management preparedness programs at the state and local level are 
funded by federal preparedness grants issued through FEMA to the states and territories.309 
All U.S. states and territories that receive federal preparedness grants are required, through 
the THIRA process, to specify how they will build or sustain a core capability using 
capability targets, which act as objectives for some needed or desired level of capability 
that will sufficiently meet the threat or hazard within the local community context.310 
Capability targets must contain some kind of metric for comparative benchmarking, but 
again, the assessment strictly compares one relative measure of that capability with another 
within the same category (i.e., this year we have three purple fire trucks to support our 
response capability, next year we want to have six purple fire trucks to provide a better 
response capability).311 FEMA sets the capability target language based upon its own 
agendas within the THIRA framework, and leaves it to states to figure out how to address 
an appropriate number or metric.  
FEMA recognized that REPP capabilities required through the 16 planning 
standards could be loosely aligned to certain core capabilities, and began to include a 
 
309 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Preparedness Grants Manual, 6. 
310 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Emergency Management Performance Grant Program,” 
3. 
311 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201, 19. 
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crosswalk comparison within the FEMA REPP manual to help jurisdictions tie REPP 
capabilities to core capabilities.312 Within the REPP manual, FEMA stated that the 
crosswalk was only a potential “menu” of correlations rather than a prescriptive one size 
fits all list, a distinction that implicitly recognizes the variability of how core capabilities 
are interpreted among jurisdictions.313 Supposedly, the inclusion of the core capabilities 
would also allow standardization of REPP exercises that could use elements of HSEEP, by 
tying the subset of demonstration criteria for REPP performance evaluations to core 
capabilities.314  
REPP currently features 16 planning standards and sub-components as the basis by 
which FEMA evaluates offsite programs and performance through a combination of plan 
reviews, an annual letter of certification on program activity, and at least a biennial exercise 
that demonstrates certain key program requirements in a simulated environment. FEMA 
considers these criteria and recommendations for program requirements as general for 
complying with the requirements pursuant to §350.5 of 44 CFR Part 350 applicable to state, 
local, and tribal governments responsible for an offsite program.315 Any substantive change 
to the 16 planning standards would necessarily require formal rulemaking at the federal 
level, and for the purposes of this thesis, the focus upon the four risk-significant planning 
standards as a comparative basis is for the purposes of a policy options analysis within an 
academic context and not pursuant to or intended as part of any such rulemaking.  
Tying core capabilities into REPP through the exercise demonstration criteria, 
rather than the full set of the 16 planning standards, represented the chief challenge. Due 
to earlier efforts to integrate HSEEP into REPP, FEMA focused on how the core capability 
doctrine would apply only to exercises, rather than the entire program. Fundamentally, 
exercises emerge from a cycle of preparedness activities, which predicates exercises upon 
 
312 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Program Manual, 227–28. 
313 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 226. 
314 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 226. 
315 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1. 
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previously instituted training and planning efforts.316 These training and planning elements 
must also be tied to core capabilities during those stages to demonstrate how an exercise 
validates applied training based upon the roles and responsibilities outlined in the planning.  
A secondary challenge relates to how FEMA evaluates REPP exercises. FEMA 
suggests that HSEEP should be used in the exercise development process and also that 
REPP-specific EEGs should be used for evaluation.317 To use EEGs effectively, some 
alignment must also exist between not only core capabilities but also capability targets and 
critical tasks that tie jurisdiction-specific plans and procedures to REPP requirements 
outlined in the 16 planning standards. Instead, at least some of the FEMA regions choose 
to use separate evaluation criteria developed apart from HSEEP, and focused instead on its 
own array of “points of review.”318 FEMA’s exclusive role in evaluating REPP exercises 
in a manner inconsistent with HSEEP creates a challenging situation for state and local 
jurisdictions, which must then do business separate and apart from the accepted protocol 
to accommodate FEMA exercise evaluators not trained to or using the HSEEP standard. 
4. Applying a Logic Model Framework to REPP Integration 
Defining an approach to integrate the elements of the NPS that overlay the 
components of REPP while preserving the integrity of the program and incorporating 
elements of the modern emergency management preparedness doctrine is possible. Doing 
so has a number of direct benefits that include leaving 44 CFR 350 or 10 CFR 50 intact. 
Therefore, the change would be less likely to impose any “backfit” cost burden on the 
industry.  
As a strategy to integrate REPP with an existing all-hazards emergency 
preparedness program, jurisdictions could develop a strategy document or “game plan” that 
would set the course to maintain capabilities and satisfy requirements for reasonable 
assurance while also introducing the ability to understand the program within the larger 
 
316 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program, 3–
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317 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Program Manual, 226. 
318 Federal Emergency Management Agency, REP Exercise Preparation Guide: Version 3.0. 
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all-hazards and NPS doctrine that drives the balance of preparedness programs. The basis 
of the strategy overlays the components of the NPS as a “lens” across the existing REPP 
elements. This approach has three key benefits: 
• Maintains familiar structure for assessing the fulfillment of REPP 
requirements and therefore assessing reasonable assurance 
• Adds capability to represent REPP program efforts in terms of core 
capabilities, and thus formally recognizes the contributions REPP makes 
to these capabilities within the context of all other preparedness programs 
• Allows drills and exercises to achieve additional flexibility without 
compromising REPP requirements by specifically delineating the extent of 
play necessary to satisfy requirements so that enhancements can be 
applied in a responsible manner 
Such an approach also provides a pathway for REPP efforts to integrate with Multi-
Year Training and Exercise Planning (MYTEP) efforts that span across jurisdictions and 
provide new opportunities to apply capabilities developed under REPP, and in some cases, 
capabilities developed under other programs to fulfill REPP requirements. These types of 
efficiency gains provide a significant benefit to communities well trained in REPP 
activities but may have gaps in other capabilities. These jurisdictions now have a clearer 
opportunity through REPP to become involved in further preparedness efforts that provide 
mutual benefit.  
The overlay strategy aligns with the NPS and the Comprehensive Preparedness 
Guide (CPG) 201, more specifically, its THIRA process. An overlay methodology also 
integrates FEMA doctrine with established REP program guidance that meets the intent of 
the 16 planning standards found in 44 CFR 350. Through the development of various tools 
that identify REP-specific core capabilities, FEMA headquarters staff, FEMA regional 
staff, and OROs could collaborate. The shared objective would be to identify potential 
baseline capability targets based upon established requirements and associated potential 
critical tasks for the demonstration of those requirements that will assist FEMA in making 
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its determination of reasonable assurance. This process also lays the foundation for 
expansion across all mission areas by utilizing additional core capabilities at the preference 
of the state and locals.  
In the context of the THIRA model, specifically Step 3, which is to establish 
capability targets, identifying what is needed from REPP is mandatory ultimately to satisfy 
both the requirements under the 16 planning standards and the exercise demonstration 
criteria. It is also necessary to document in the FEMA required ALC those activities that 
satisfy the demonstration of the balance of requirements not demonstrated through 
simulated drills or exercises. The NRC-defined risk significant planning standards can 
provide a common basis for setting the context that can then be used to introduce a logic 
model framework based upon performance indicator data. The four RSPS, as defined by 
the NRC, are as follows:319 
• Emergency classification system 
• Emergency notifications 
• Emergency accident assessment capability 
• Emergency protective actions 
The RSPS may be able to stipulate the key context in providing a basis for the 
introduction of performance indicators that can be set as points of measurement for 
program evaluation. These activities, in terms of risk significance, indicate areas in which 
the performance of programs must be prioritized to have a significant impact in reducing 
consequences and effects from any potential or actual emergency that may result in an 
uncontrolled release of radioactive materials into an offsite community. As such, they 
represent a possible foundation for a model or approach to provide a comparative basis 
between different program strategies.  
Therefore, in the context of NPS, performance indicators could be segmented into 
the elements of planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise (POETE), which 
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would allow for the potential representation of REPP activities into the state preparedness 
reports (SPRs). Figure 3 illustrates an example of how the POETE model may be 
represented: 
 
Figure 3. POETE Model Example 
The POETE model shown in Figure 3 recognizes that for REPP, organize, and 
equip functions largely belong together as a combined element that mostly follows a 
specific entity’s roles and responsibilities. Most organizations participating within REPP 
have missions within the community that determine their capabilities and the equipment or 
facilities support those capabilities needed to reinforce their missions. Thus, the traditional 
model of POETE is adjusted to emphasize the importance of the evaluation/improvement 
component and the integration of equipment/facilities native to a particular organization 
that assumes a role and responsibility in accordance with its mission and its commitment 
to REPP. 
To highlight the relationships between REP and NPS, and also to show the 
components and current program elements that pertain to each POETE element, the 
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preparedness cycle model shown in Figure 4 can be used to describe the elements 
pertaining to preparedness efforts across these five main POETE functional areas. Each of 
these areas pertains to a list of elements implemented to support the cycle: traditional 
planning, training, and exercise elements. The fifth aspect of evaluation includes 
continuous improvement efforts on an ongoing basis. The elements also represent a 
feedback cycle, in which outcomes from planning, training, and exercise efforts, as well as 
actual events are incorporated into a formal AARs and improvement planning that builds 
a progressive preparedness program.  
 
Figure 4. Preparedness Cycle Example.320 
To understand better how the overlay model could be implemented, it could require 
an example of where specific performance indicators could be derived from out of the basis 
of existing plans, procedures, and protocol. A REPP all-hazards integration strategy could 
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set the performance indicators to outline how REPP within any particular jurisdiction could 
be represented within each component of the POETE model. The following strategy is a 
suggestion only and represents how a jurisdiction may approach POETE and what efforts 
will address each POETE component: 
A.  Planning:  
1. Revise the required NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 crosswalk using 
an enhanced “checkmark level” template, derived from a 
comprehensive analysis of the FEMA explanations and 
instructions to meet the intent of the NUREG criterion included in 
the current FEMA REP manual.321 Each of the 16 planning 
standards includes specific criterion outlined in the FEMA REP 
manual that specifies how FEMA will evaluate compliance with 
what it views as the intent behind the planning standard.322 These 
criteria can be incorporated into the crosswalk and then tied to 
specific plans and procedures at the local or state level that address 
the criterion. Performance indicators could be tied to having and 
maintaining comprehensive plans and procedures for each role and 
responsibility necessary to meet the 16 planning standards. This 
approach allows for simpler development of training objectives 
and exercise objectives that follow established plans and 
procedures as a basis. Further, each of the elements links directly 
to a specific program requirement. 
B. Exercise/Operationalize:  
1. Develop master “extent of play” document using the FEMA 
assessment areas detailed in the REP manual as a basis to organize 
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the components of what is demonstrated, compiled with NUREG 
planning standards evaluation areas, core capabilities, and the 
FEMA REP manual assessment criteria explanation/extent of play. 
This extent of play represents how the ORO may demonstrate 
REPP capabilities through drill and exercise activities, and how 
these demonstrations will address elements of the 16 planning 
standards under the program guidance.323 The primary purpose of 
the extent of play would be to set a realistic performance indicator 
for the demonstration of capability that would be possible inside a 
simulated environment. 
2. Segmenting drill and exercise activities across a greater number of 
integrated components, where possible, with other drill and 
exercise activities, provides an opportunity to demonstrate REPP 
capabilities. These efforts could be coordinated as an ORO through 
the jurisdiction’s Training and Exercise Planning Workshops 
(TEPWs) and MYTEP events that encompass a whole 
community’s emergency preparedness efforts.324  
3. Developing drills and tests that emphasize elements traditionally 
not focused on in REP exercises build capability in accordance 
with THIRA capability targets more generally. These would not 
necessarily be for formal evaluation initially but would include 
extended activations, off-hours response, elimination of pre-staged 
elements for activation, and other elements as appropriate. Using 
the required exercise to achieve an economy of scale would 
provide an opportunity for validating additional capabilities. These 
additional capabilities can be added as performance indicators that 
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help tie together preparedness elements under REPP with other 
programs, which thus support an integrated REPP all-hazards 
strategy and approach. 
C. Training:  
1. Develop training modules based on planning elements from 
NUREG-0654 crosswalk “checkmark level” elements to support 
greater awareness and retention of offsite planning concept of 
operations, emergency response protocols, communications, and 
functional roles and responsibilities across the ORO. Modules 
could be set up in a progressive series (“tracks”) and implemented 
as course offerings in addition to the FEMA courses that support 
REPP capabilities. Performance indicators could align with 
successful completion, and as necessary, recurrent training course 
completions that address various capabilities and competencies 
needed under the nuclear power plant emergency response and 
recovery scenario. 
D. Organization/Equipment (including Facilities):  
1. Master organizational chart for nuclear power plant emergencies 
(inclusive of entire ORO, including federal partners and inclusive 
of both response and recovery components). This chart is beyond 
the block diagram for emergency response required under the 
program and provides a reference for who is directly involved from 
the whole community.325 Performance indicators in an 
organization may include metrics to ensure that positions are filled 
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and that bench-depth support is available for 24-hour or extended 
activation periods.  
2. A new template for the required ALC to be reformatted to match 
the checklist now provided in the FEMA REP manual and 
converted into a fillable form that is easier to update.326 
3. Supporting documentation for the ALC may follow a clarified 
rubric for which components need to be submitted and what 
file/folder structure is needed to be transmitted electronically. 
4. Development of an enhanced process for cost tracking and specific 
budgeting for funds appropriated from the utility in support of the 
program. This enhanced process may help support better 
situational awareness of how resources are being allocated to 
support specific REPP requirements as outlined in the offsite 
planning.  
E. Evaluate/Improve:  
1. Adoption of the exercise after action report and improvement plan 
(AAR/IP) process and templates to create and use consistent AARs 
for all exercises/drills/table tops (TTXs) conducted in support of 
REPP requirements to build a more progressive/comprehensive 
exercise program with accountability for issues and follow up. 
Currently, FEMA evaluators in some jurisdictions use a site-
specific template that does not align with HSEEP guidance.327 
2. Introduction of both a plan and procedure review meeting and a 
concepts and objectives meeting (C&O meeting) as part of the 
exercise planning process to ensure awareness of plans and 
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procedures as a basis for exercise objectives (and critical tasks) and 
also reconciles past AARs and improvement planning items into 
the planning process for the next exercise.328 
3. Use exercise EEGs to streamline data collection, enable a thorough 
assessment of capability targets, provide a consistent process for 
assessing overall preparedness, and map exercise objectives to 
results.329 
A REPP all-hazards integration policy may incorporate key performance indicators 
from the POETE model into a simplified framework that represents a common basis for a 
logic model that can evaluate policy options across standard elements, such as the four 
RSPS. An integration approach simply incorporates the relevant criteria from the existing 
16 planning standards to act as a basis for comparative analysis with other policy options. 
The NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix B Emergency Preparedness 
Significance Determination Process outlines this approach with the required criteria for 
each RSPS and expected outputs. These objectives and criteria apply onsite and offsite and 
are therefore appropriate for an integration strategy but also can better unify onsite and 
offsite program strategies.330 
Using a logic model to describe the programmatic approach for a REPP all-hazards 
integration policy option involves identifying which criteria may be used to describe the 
objectives, outputs, outcomes, and impacts for each of the four RSPS. Each box in the 
matrix describes the indicator criteria that the REPP all-hazards integration program 
strategy may use to contribute to an assessment of overall offsite risk. The series of 
indicators provides a perspective towards how REPP all-hazards integration may be used 
to manage program performance with respect to the goal of protecting offsite public health 
and safety.  
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3–4—3–5. 
329 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 5–2—5–3. 
330 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Program Manual, 4. 
118 
To walk through how it may be used, consider the first example in Table 2 for the 
RSPS element of emergency classification. Under a REPP all-hazards integration policy 
option, the overall objective for emergency classification is defined by the statute; in this 
case, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), which describes the requirements for what emergency 
classification must do and acts within the logic model as the indicator metric for the 
objective. The output then describes what tangible evidence of compliance must be 
produced or demonstrated to show compliance with the objective. In this case, the output 
indicator is the development and use of a standard scheme of emergency classification and 
corresponding action levels. Any activity involved in the process of POETE (including 
planning for, training upon, and exercising this particular output) may be considered as a 
potential candidate for use as a performance indicator contributing to the objective. In this 
manner, the outputs of the objective can take the form of a wide variety of POETE elements 
that can be measured or assessed within the program.  
One advantage of tying performance indicators to POETE activities is that the 
activity can have value or relevance across more than one program area, and in many cases, 
across different programs within the larger emergency preparedness enterprise. This 
association provides a potential foundation for data collection efforts that can serve as 
performance indicators for the REPP integration policy strategy but also serve as 
performance indicators for capability targets in other areas and contribute to a more 
comprehensive analysis of what is being done to sustain or build capabilities that can be 
captured in the THIRA/SPR process. In relation to this, the outcome indicator acts as a 
check on the quality of the output by assessing what the output actually achieves with 
respect to the objectives, but may also be used to assess outcomes for other program 
objectives if the POETE elements are the same or similar. For emergency classification, 
Table 2 shows an outcome that events are declared in a timely and accurate manner, which 
can be used as an indicator metric to test whether or not the output is working to meet the 
intent of the objective. As a further example, activities related to the process of ensuring 
that events are declared in a timely manner may have dependencies upon alert and 
notification processes, decision trees, or other elements that result from POETE activities 
and may be leveraged for hazards other than the nuclear power plant scenario.  
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The impact column in Table 2 incorporates the relevant core capability element 
from the all-hazards framework to provide an indicator for how well the objective defined 
for the RSPS supports building a capability within the core area defined by the NPG. For 
emergency classification, the objective, as evidenced by the output and directed towards 
achieving some measurable outcome, represents an activity that can be accounted for under 
the situational assessment core capability. The core capability is described in this instance 
as the indicator and provides the opportunity to measure the contribution of the REPP 
activity (described by objectives, outputs, and outcomes) for emergency classification in 
terms broadly applicable that can be compared to other similar efforts across all hazards. 
By extension, REPP activities for emergency classification are indicators for program 
performance but also represent capability targets that can be used to measure the sustaining 
or building up of core capabilities. This integration can then be incorporated into THIRA 





Table 2. Logic Model Representation of REPP Integration Policy Option 
RSPS 
Element 








“A standard scheme of 
emergency classification and 
action levels is [in use].”336  
Events are declared in a 
timely and accurate 
manner.337 
Situational assessment core 
capability—Ability to provide “all 
decision-makers with decision-relevant 
information regarding the nature and 
extent of the hazard, any cascading 
effects, and the status of the 
response.”338 
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1. “Procedures for notification 
of State and local governmental 
agencies are capable of alerting 
them of the declared emergency 
within 15 minutes after the 
declaration of an emergency and 
providing [subsequent] follow-
up notifications.340 
2. Administrative and physical 
means have been established for 
alerting and providing prompt 
instructions to the public within 
the plume exposure pathway.  
3. The public [alert and 
notification system] meets the 
design requirements of FEMA-
REP-10,―Guide for Evaluation 
of Alert and Notification 
Systems for Nuclear Power 
Plants, or [complies] with the 
FEMA approved ANS design 
report and supporting FEMA 
approval letter.”341  
The notification process 
(e.g., procedures, systems, 
and resources) are capable 
of alert and warning as a 
result of a classified 
emergency.342 
 
Public Alert and Warning Core 
Capability—Ability to deliver 
“coordinated, prompt, reliable, and 
actionable information to the whole 
community through the use of clear, 
consistent, accessible, and culturally 
and linguistically appropriate methods 
to effectively relay information 
regarding any threat or hazard, as well 
as the actions being taken and the 






Methods, systems, and 
equipment for assessment of 
The dose projection process 
and field monitoring 
Environmental Response/Health and 
Safety Core Capability—Ability to 
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estimates of radioactive 
material released to the 
environment.346  
conduct “appropriate measures to 
ensure the protection of the health and 
safety of the public and workers, as 
well as the environment, from all-
hazards in support of responder 









“1. A range of public PARs 
[(excluding KI)] is available for 
implementation during 
emergencies.  
[2. ETEs for] the population 
located in the plume exposure 
pathway EPZ are available to 
support the formulation of 
PARs and have been provided 
to State and local governmental 
authorities.”349  
The process provides PARs 
that are in accordance with 
planning “commitments or 
Federal guidance to the 
extent that appropriate 
PARs would be issued to 
cover affected populated 
areas within the [established 
EPZs].”350 
Physical Protective Measures Core 
Capability—Ability to “[implement] 
and maintain risk-informed 
countermeasures, and policies focused 
on protecting people, borders, 
structures, materials, products, and 
systems associated with key 
operational activities and critical 
infrastructure [sectors].”351 
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123 
Overall, the REPP all-hazards integration policy option provides a basis that can 
readily incorporate existing frameworks and thus maintain already-in-place regulatory 
compliance for both onsite and offsite programs. The objectives and outputs within the 
logic model framework for an integration strategy can be derived directly from the NRC 
Inspection Manual EP significance determination process, and the impacts can be tied to 
modern all-hazards core capabilities. Setting appropriate metrics around these elements 
may be the least challenging and may be more attractive to policy decision makers who 
want to maintain the integrity of REPP, but also want to take advantage of economy of 
scale within their preparedness programs. Further research is necessary to elucidate 
additional nuances from an integration strategy that may impact particular local 
jurisdictions and the unique aspects of how the strategy may accommodate capability needs 
for specific scenarios around individual nuclear power plants.  
B. REPLACEMENT OF REPP WITH ALL-HAZARDS CAPABILITIES-
BASED PLANNING 
The challenges associated with REPP compliance or integration may not be viewed 
as cost-effective or as a favorable return on investment of limited resources in all cases. 
The possibility exists that either the utility or a government jurisdiction may explore the 
option to replace REPP with another program structure that provides the same capability-
building outcomes. It may be desirable to set the objectives of such a strategy to align with 
modern risk analysis and assessment principles to achieve greater efficiency in alignment 
with existing programs and cost savings. However, it is also necessary to ensure a 
consistent basis for adjudication and management of risk across jurisdictions to prevent 
potential inequities in overall safety levels and discontinuities in response and recovery 
capabilities for this type of hazard.  
1. Description of an All-hazards Policy as a Replacement for REPP 
Instead of attempting to integrate or overlay the 16 planning standards of REPP and 
its corresponding framework into all-hazards planning, REPP could simply be replaced by 
the same process used for the all-hazards approach. A nuclear power plant could be seen 
as one hazard within an array of many but not require a dedicated program given the well-
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established emergency management framework already in place within and across the 
nation. Several important considerations to such an approach pose potential impacts to the 
capabilities REPP provides and the regulatory structure that ensures uniform and adequate 
implementation. Of these, two of the most prominent address how the nuclear power plant 
risk may be addressed as a basis for preparedness and response and how the structure of 
core capabilities may be used to establish regulatory consistency sufficient to support 
requirements under federal law. 
REPP is a voluntary program for state and local offsite government.352 Utilizing 
REPP for state and local government provides an approved, established pathway for a 
nuclear power plant within its jurisdiction to achieve and maintain regulatory stability 
necessary to support federal licensing requirements pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954.353 Without offsite participation in REPP, the plant licensee must still demonstrate an 
appropriate emergency plan and emergency response capability that incorporates the same 
capability to meet the licensing requirements for the facility to be authorized to operate.354 
Another option is for the offsite government to propose some other basis by which 
reasonable assurance may be established pursuant to a federal evaluation not using the 
existing structure of REPP, which is known as an “alternative approach” that meets or 
exceeds current standards.355 In either case, the provisions for emergency preparedness and 
response must be presented and approved by the federal government to fulfill regulatory 
requirements necessary for the nuclear power plant to operate, with either a utility-run 
comprehensive emergency program, or one that satisfies review under the alternative 
approach provision in REPP. 
 
352 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Program Manual, 1. 
353 “Renewable Energy Production Incentives,” Congress of the United States, Code of Federal 
Regulations, title 42 (2010 comp.): Chapter 23 Development and Control of Atomic Energy, § Division 
A—Atomic Energy (2010), sec. 2012(d)(e), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2010-
title42/html/USCODE-2010-title42-chap23-divsnA.htm. 
354 Podolak, NRC: Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans, 
1. 
355 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Program Manual, 235. 
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A REPP replacement policy option would need to address both an understanding 
of the nuclear power plant risk, and if using the current doctrine of emergency preparedness 
core capabilities, how these capabilities would be able to define a normalized basis or 
standard across the nation. Such an option may create a more realistic basis for risk that 
informs a more appropriate countermeasure strategy than the current one, which may be 
overly conservative. The context of nuclear power plant risk specifically within the larger 
frame of radiological exposure risk could be reset, given the potential for radiation 
exposure with the proliferation of material that could end up as part of a device, such as a 
radiological dispersion device (RDD).356 
2. Resetting the Nuclear Power Plant Risk in an All-Hazards Context 
As this option involves approaching nuclear emergency preparedness in the same 
manner as any other hazard the community faces, the first step is to use the existing process 
for THIRA to identify the specific hazard and then place it into an appropriate context. 
Using the THIRA methodology is necessary to align with the same process used for all 
other threats and hazards and provides a pathway for jurisdictions to adopt a single, 
consistent framework for characterizing risk and building capability that includes the 
nuclear power plant.  
The impact of a radioactive release from a nuclear power plant depends upon 
several factors and takes place within both a short- and long-term context.357 Any accident 
that involves radioactive releases to the environment depends upon a set of initiating 
conditions and specific thresholds that create an emergency situation and may require both 
onsite operator intervention and potentially offsite protective action.358 Therefore, 
identifying the hazard based upon the context of the particular set of initiating conditions 
and thresholds form the basis of the need to perform emergency actions. These criteria are 
 
356 National Urban Security Technology Laborator, Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) Response 
Guidance: Planning for the First 100 Minutes (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2017), 
8, https://www.dhs.gov/publication/st-frg-rdd-response-guidance-planning-first-100-minutes. 
357 Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Federal Emergency Management Agency, Criteria for Preparation 
and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power 
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358 Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Federal Emergency Management Agency, Appendix 1–3. 
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already known based upon the engineering specifications of the design and are available to 
emergency planners because utilities are required under current federal law to develop 
them as part of the licensing criteria.359 In terms of understanding accident risk, the criteria 
of activities taken both on and offsite must be understood in the context of outcomes and 
consequences to mitigate population risk from a series of occurrences that lead to a release 
and public exposure to radioactive materials. 
Federal regulations circumscribe emergency planning around these specific 
initiating conditions and thresholds that can lead to what is known as a design basis 
accident; that is, one that may occur based upon known design feature limitations and also 
result in a significant release of radioactive material offsite.360 Accidents, such as 
Fukushima, illustrate the limitations of this approach and the consideration that BDB 
accidents should also be considered as part of the emergency planning program for both 
onsite and offsite.361 In both cases, steps have been taken due to regulatory changes and 
industry-sponsored initiatives to address the BDB scenarios, and these have been 
incorporated into emergency planning efforts at all U.S. sites.362 As such, the task of 
identifying the hazard of concern and placing it into context has been addressed through 
the onsite planning process.363 An offsite program can utilize this contextual hazard basis 
to inform its own response and recovery actions as a mitigation strategy for the expected 
outcomes of onsite activities and outputs.  
For the short-term context, understanding how an offsite organization may 
characterize the release based upon criteria relating to time, concentration, and other 
meteorological factors that affect the dispersion of material and its impact upon the 
 
359 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Emergency Plans,” sec. (b)(4). 
360 “Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants,” 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Code of Federal Regulations, title 10 § 50.49 (2015 comp.): sec. 
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361 International Atomic Energy Agency, The Fukushima Daiichi Accident, 59. 
362 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Mitigation Strategies (ARCHIVED) (Washington, DC: Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, 2012), 4, https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan-
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surrounding community, is necessary.364 Doing this relatively quickly and employing a 
strategy that sizes up the potential impact and making a decision on what to tell the public 
based upon projections and estimates is a challenge. Fully characterizing an airborne 
release before it impacts populated areas requires more than available time allows, even 
using modern methods, and so actions must always be taken proactively.365 These actions 
must be planned in advance so as to provide a usable process workflow that can guide 
decision making and focus attention on the right data and information necessary to justify 
public protective actions.  
A challenge with the short-term context is the lack of an agreed-upon safe level of 
radiation exposure, and from a risk perspective, the lack of a limit or threshold below which 
protective actions cannot be considered due to an emergency event; the requirement is only 
for guidance to be provided.366 Therefore, assessing accidents and characterizing them 
based upon projections and estimates applies to all scenarios as a default action, which 
requires emergency personnel to be deployed and the response organization be 
mobilized.367 Although the EPA has established its PAGs to be used as a basis for taking 
protective actions for a potentially or actually impacted population, these guides are 
suggestions, not hard limits or thresholds for radiation safety.368  
PAGs can be loosely correlated with the set of initiating conditions and thresholds 
set by onsite emergency planners in their emergency plans, which provide some idea of the 
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potential risk to the offsite community as a result of onsite plant conditions.369 However, 
the overall risk will depend on not only release probability and concentration, but also will 
depend on where the meteorological conditions will take the offending material.370 In the 
early phase, exposure to the airborne plume is the most pressing concern, and every effort 
will be focused upon finding where the plume is and where it may be going to evaluate the 
potential or actual impact upon populations within that affected area.371  
In the long-term context or late phase, making a more precise determination of 
where the plume footprint has “landed,” or where the deposition of radioactive materials 
ended up directs the effort.372 In this instance, the concern is for long-term repeated or 
chronic exposure, either through proximity to deposited materials on the ground or uptake 
of contaminated materials through food (especially milk), and water.373 The long-term 
effects of contamination, especially upon soils and groundwater sources that may be 
difficult to mitigate, pose serious challenges but also reflect the difficulty in providing 
accurate estimates due to the amount of surveying and sampling that must be undertaken 
to obtain accurate data.374 Radioactive decay, a natural process by which radioactive 
materials gradually lose their radioactivity over time, makes it necessary to continue to 
sample and monitor affected areas to determine remaining rates of radioactivity, and thus, 
the risk to human health through exposure or uptake.375  
In addition to impacts upon human health, the late phase also includes 
considerations for contaminated infrastructure and contaminated homes that may have 
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been within the release path or affected later through shifts in meteorological conditions.376 
Even after the release from the nuclear power plant has terminated, rainfall and other 
natural phenomena can shift the footprint of contaminated areas into other adjacent areas 
not previously affected.377 In all cases, the post-release effects of contamination add to the 
already complex assessment of health-related impacts from exposure to the airborne 
portion of the release. Again, the lack of a safe “clearance level” for radioactively 
contaminated materials means that a risk assessment must be all-inclusive of any detectable 
level of contamination or a level determined as part of the incident response process, which 
makes pre-planning based upon threshold contamination levels infeasible.378  
Based on the THIRA approach, the threat or hazard concerning nuclear power 
plants is clearly the unmitigated release of radioactive materials that impacts the 
surrounding community.379 This hazard results from a set of initiating conditions and 
exceeds certain thresholds that defeat the prevention and protection measures in place at 
the power plant that result in radioactive material transiting the site boundary as an airborne 
plume and eventually depositing upon the terrain within the surrounding community.380 
Context descriptions in terms of magnitude, location, and time can be projected and later 
measured more precisely using current standardized methodologies and tools, although the 
potential exists for overestimation of impact.381  
Using FEMA’s standardized impact language sets the scope of parameters that may 
not be able to translate well from the types of data that can be collected from both the early 
initial phase and the later phase of these incidents. Much of what can be measured during 
and after radioactive releases is in the form of indicator data to inform an overall 
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understanding of risk and not necessarily to certainties regarding the actual impacts.382 
Applying FEMA’s THIRA methodology to radioactive incidents or other scenarios where 
the impact is assessed from indicators presents the potential to skew the hazard assessment 
if these indicators are taken out of context. Capability targets based upon these same 
indicators may, therefore, appear to show the need for more or fewer capabilities than may 
be required for the purposes of setting appropriate and cost-effective capability 
objectives.383  
One significant challenge of tying impact metrics to capability objectives is 
determining how the measurement of potential radiation exposure relates to human health 
impact. The relationship between these two factors is implicit, based upon how scientific 
and legal precedent has set the threshold for acceptable risk as not greater than one in one 
million as previously discussed.384 In general, radiation health effects are not unique in 
terms of source or cause and can be measured only statistically, using trend analysis and 
other tools to try and detect some repeatable pattern that can be reliably duplicated due to 
the same scenario or circumstances (such as via a confidence interval).385 Using FEMA’s 
THIRA methodology forces the determination of an explicit and prescriptive relationship 
between ambient radiation levels in excess of the PAGs and direct (acute and stochastic) 
human health impact that would apply in all cases.386 Further research will be needed to 
determine whether this explicit relationship can be quantified and whether or not the 
evidence supports a particular conclusion. 
The next step for THIRA is to establish capability targets for a potential emergency 
response to an incident involving the offsite release of radioactive materials.387 The 
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existing framework of REPP provides a ready-made set of capability targets via the 16 
planning standards, which define the capabilities necessary for emergency response but 
also the capabilities needed for the preparedness program that supports it.388 In this manner, 
the REPP 16 planning standards can provide a foundation for the all-hazards strategic 
approach that may supersede it. The 16 planning standards may be modified, but pursuant 
to the THIRA methodology, such a modification follows from an evaluation of the location, 
time, and magnitude of impacts that determine the appropriate capability level. Based upon 
any reassessment of the potential risk that could be quantified with a different set of metrics 
tied to human health impact, the resultant necessary level of capability for emergency 
response could be more closely tied to actual risk rather than projections of potential risk.  
As with any risk assessment, the sourcing of the data to support the information 
included in the assessment is critical to provide a balanced, realistic perspective that can 
be useful for strategic planning and decision making. For a tool, such as THIRA, to become 
truly useful, the capability to measure a return on investment for preparedness and quantify 
the risk that the nuclear power plant poses to the community in comparison with other risks 
must be included. Such a comparison needs common units to measure overall risk among 
different threats and hazards and allow jurisdictions to direct their resources to those areas 
that provide the greatest return on investment.  
3. The Consistency of Capabilities and Performance Standards across 
the Nation 
A major purpose of the THIRA tool is to feed into the SPR that informs the federal 
government regarding the status of capability levels at the state and local levels.389 Since 
federal grant programs largely support the capabilities at the state and local levels, the 
federal government has an incentive for having a reporting system in place (beyond the 
standard financially based grant reports) that looks at capability-based strategic goals 
across the nation. The National Preparedness Report (NPR) presents this data and provides 
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a synchronized methodology to roll up state and local capability data as an overall national 
or federal-level benchmark for each major community.390 From this basis, the federal 
government justifies the continued investment in federal grants to the states by tying the 
data in the report to its overall strategic plan for national preparedness that emerges from 
the NPG.391 Therefore, it is in the best interest of all parties to ensure the risk assessments 
and capability estimates to meet an array of threats and hazards are rigorous and objective 
to ensure taxpayer resources are allocated and expended in a manner that represents an 
appropriate return on investment.  
REPP, as another federal program, requires consistency in how it applies to state 
and local jurisdictions because requirements in the overall program jointly and 
simultaneously affect the utility.392 Since each nuclear utility within each jurisdiction 
where the plants reside bears the cost of REPP, costs cannot be allowed to fluctuate based 
upon inconsistencies in program requirements from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.393 The 16 
planning standards that form the basis of REPP act as the lowest common denominator in 
program standards that each jurisdiction and utility must apply within their respective 
programs.394 Even as costs vary in what it takes to implement those 16 planning standards 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from plant to plant, the overall basis remains the same. 
In a REPP-replacement policy option where REPP’s prescriptive standards detail 
the specifics of the sometimes-unique requirements for responding to a nuclear power plant 
emergency go beyond the generalized level of a core capability, the basis of a capability as 
compared to the prescriptive requirements often found in REPP presents a dilemma. 
Capabilities, by their nature, focus on the capacity to perform or address something, 
whereas a planning standard under REPP carries with it a demonstration requirement that 
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seeks specific performance of the element as described by the standard.395 The key 
difference is that capabilities may be built and measured in a variety of different ways by 
using vastly different methodologies. Variations in how these capabilities are established, 
by what basis, and then assessed against licensing requirements for nuclear power plants 
potentially creates inequity in the regulatory application, as well as cost. These inequities, 
in turn, affect the consensus of what constitutes meeting the intent of the regulatory 
standard and potentially affects the cost of the nuclear utility business from one jurisdiction 
to another based upon differences in regulatory interpretation, which is at risk of violating 
the intent of the establishment of a standard pursuant to the AEA.396 
Under the NPG and THIRA, assessments, and strategies are relative to each other 
within a specific jurisdiction for which the assessment applies.397 For a nuclear power plant 
following this strategy, the possibility exists that the variations in methodology and the 
manner in which they are built and measured may create vast differences in cost and 
program complexity across the different jurisdictions. This scenario creates a potential 
competitive disparity between various jurisdictions that potentially affects the overall 
regulatory burden of any particular utility, depending upon where it is located. Some 
nuclear utilities own large fleets of power plants across multiple states, which thus create 
a potential cost and administrative overhead differential between different units under the 
same owner. While from a methodological standpoint, the replacement of REPP with the 
all-hazards framework makes logical sense, the larger picture includes additional elements 
that may pose challenging or even untenable situations for nuclear utilities as a common 
stakeholder. 
 
4. Applying a Logic Model Framework to REPP Replacement 
Similar to the approach for a REPP all-hazards integration strategy, a REPP-
replacement strategy would necessitate the development of a jurisdiction-specific approach 
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to define the context of the nuclear power plant hazard and establish the capabilities 
necessary to prepare for, respond, and recover from an event that results in offsite 
radiological exposure. The most significant challenge would be to re-set the risk basis with 
compelling evidence to convince the regulator that an alternative approach other than 
REPP could still protect public health and safety and yet meet the intent of the regulatory 
standards for licensing. On the one hand, it could be assumed that offsite state and local 
government would continue to use all-hazards capabilities-based planning for the balance 
of their threats and hazards, so the REPP-replacement would most likely also need to 
establish parity with this doctrine. On the other hand, if an alternative were not compatible 
with all-hazards capabilities-based planning, it would need to provide some further benefit 
that would outweigh the disadvantage of misalignment and potential loss of coordinated 
preparedness programs and activities that could leverage the economy of scale across the 
state and local enterprise of resources, time, and cost.  
Using the logic model approach incorporating the four RSPS, a potential strategy 
for the REPP-replacement policy option would be to try to find a new, less conservative 
basis for emergency classification. Based upon results from the SOARCA study and a less 
conservative threshold for the context of exposure risk in a release situation (such as a 
smaller plume EPZ) it may be possible to make a case for an adjustment to the overall 
planning basis. A reduction in the size of the EPZ down to five miles or less drastically 
reduces the footprint for offsite action and correspondingly reduces the need for capacity 
and capability to educate, prepare, alert, and implement protective actions, including 
evacuation. Further reductions in the threshold of action or decisions for applying 
protective actions based upon some anticipated level of exposure greater than one in a 
million (10^-6) similarly would decrease the amount of capability needed to protect public 
health and safety effectively if it could be argued compellingly that actual public health 
risks could be established from a more probabilistic quantitative basis. Such a basis would 
also need to show that by comparison with corollary factors for including regulatory costs 
and unnecessarily high capability standards for a mass evacuation or mass prophylaxis of 
the public with medical countermeasures potassium iodide (KI), the existing program is 
wasteful and unwarranted and a new understanding of the actual risks is needed.  
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The balance of the RSPS, including emergency notification, accident assessment, 
and protective action, would follow from this adjusted threshold for classification but 
would be expected to exhibit a reduced scope in accordance with the adjusted planning 
basis. As such, the emergency notification could be expected to include a smaller overall 
population within a smaller EPZ, and could potentially be accomplished without the use of 
an outdoor warning siren system or a least a large reduction in the size of such a system. 
An accident assessment capability—informed by a more modern understanding of the 
public health impact based upon a more realistic threshold greater than one in a million 
additional lifetime risk for cancer—could incorporate a simpler survey and monitoring 
strategy due to reduced area size. Field measurements could be automated if the cost-
benefit was realized due to the reduced area of concern. All these potential gains would 
depend upon the federal regulator’s approval of the emergency plan basis, whether 
incorporated into the onsite or as part of the offsite, to be approved and issued under the 
provision of reasonable assurance.  
Consider the representation in Table 3 of what a REPP-replacement policy option 
would address in terms of the same four RSPS and with respect to the potential cost-benefit 
trade-off of needing to develop and gain approval for a new regulatory planning basis. The 
same overall objectives, as defined by the federal regulator, are included as objectives, with 
the nature of the output and outcome representing the incorporation of a modified or 
alternative approach pursuant to a different standard planning basis. As with the all-hazards 
integration policy option, the REPP replacement policy option identifies the criteria that 
may be used to describe the objectives, outputs, outcomes, and impacts for each RSPS 
element. The series of indicators provides a perspective towards how REPP replacement 
may be used to manage program performance with respect to the goal of protecting offsite 
public health and safety.  
To walk through how this replacement would be used in a REPP replacement policy 
option, consider the first example in Table 3 for the RSPS element of emergency 
classification. Under a REPP replacement policy, the overall objective is defined by an 
indicator that matches the criteria the NRC uses to assess inspection findings for 
significance to the overall intent of the emergency preparedness program requirements. 
136 
These criteria describe what the emergency classification activity should be defined as, and 
what it must do. The reason for using the inspection criteria as opposed to the statute is to 
avoid the incorporation by reference of the planning basis that pertains to the context of 
the current statute, which is a key reason for adopting the REPP replacement policy option 
to redefine the context of acceptable bounds and limits for emergency planning. Thus, the 
inspection criteria provide the structure to be used as an indicator but are uninhibited by 
accouterments that may be used to establish accountability for the current planning basis.  
The output column indicator acts as a metric to control for the production of the 
standardized scheme of emergency classification but allows for the use of a modified risk 
basis rather than the current model in the regulations. The additional feature allows for the 
utilization of modern probabilistic methods to connect the classification levels directly with 
offsite impacts. As an indicator metric, it ensures that whatever tool or methodology used 
for classification translates to an offsite decision-maker as actionable information that can 
be assessed in terms of offsite impact. In a similar manner, the outcome column sets an 
indicator for tying declaration time frames to likely impacts that will have a measurable 
effect on public health. This important feature ensures that whatever emergency 
classification scheme is used has the effect of being directly relevant to public health 
outcomes that can be used as a basis for offsite protective actions.  
The impact column in Table 3 incorporates the relevant core capability element 
from the all-hazards framework to provide an indicator for how well the objective defined 
for the RSPS supports building a capability within the core area defined by the NPG. For 
emergency classification, the objective, as evidenced by the output and directed towards 
achieving some measurable outcome for use in mitigating public health impact, represents 
an activity that can be accounted for under the situational assessment core capability. In a 
REPP replacement policy, the basis for evaluating the situation at the nuclear power plant 
is directly connected to offsite concerns regarding the impact upon public health. As with 
the all-hazards integration policy, the core capability is used as the indicator and provides 
the opportunity to measure the contribution of the program activity (described by 
objectives, outputs, and outcomes) for emergency classification in terms broadly applicable 
that can be compared to other similar efforts across all hazards. Despite having a different 
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basis than the current regulatory scheme under REPP, a REPP replacement program should 
still describe activities for emergency classification as indicators for program performance 
and also be able to represent capability targets that can be used to measure the sustaining 




Table 3. Logic Model Representation of REPP Replacement Policy Option 
RSPS Element Objective Output Outcome Impact 
Emergency Classification “A standard emergency 
classification and 
action level scheme, the 
bases of which include 
facility system and 
effluent parameters, is 
in use by the nuclear 
facility licensee, and 
State and local response 
plans call for reliance 
on information 
provided by facility 
licensees for 
determinations of 
minimum initial offsite 
response measures.”398  
A standard scheme of 
emergency 
classification and 
action levels is in use, 
which reflects a 
modified risk basis 
informed by modern 
probabilistic methods 
for the likelihood of 
offsite impacts.  
 
Events are declared in a 
timely and accurate 
manner, based upon the 
likely impact of 
radiation exposure at 
levels probable or 
proven to be harmful to 
human health within 
the boundary of the 
EPZ during an 
established present 








the nature and extent 
of the hazard, any 
cascading effects, and 
the status of the 
response.”399 
 
398 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Inspection Manual, B–21. 
399 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Core Capabilities.” 
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RSPS Element Objective Output Outcome Impact 
Emergency Notification “Procedures have been 
established for 
notification, by the 
licensee, of State and 
local response 
organizations and for 
notification of 
emergency personnel 
by all organizations; the 
content of initial and 
follow-up messages to 
response organizations 
and the public has been 
established; and means 
to provide early 
notification and clear 
instruction to the 
populace within the 
plume exposure 
pathway Emergency 
Planning Zone have 
been established.”400  
 
 
“1. Procedures for 
notification of State 
and local 
governmental agencies 
are capable of alerting 
them of the declared 
emergency within a 
[reasonable time] after 





2. Administrative and 
physical means have 
been established for 
alerting and providing 
prompt instructions to 






and resources) are 
capable of alert and 
warning as a result of a 
classified 
emergency.402 




prompt, reliable, and 
actionable information 
to the whole 
community through 
the use of clear, 
consistent, accessible, 
and culturally and 
linguistically 
appropriate methods to 
effectively relay 
information regarding 
any threat or hazard, as 
well as the actions 
being taken and the 




400 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, B–27. 
401 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, B–27. 
402 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, B–30—B–31. 
403 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Core Capabilities.” 
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RSPS Element Objective Output Outcome Impact 
Accident Assessment “Adequate methods, 
systems, and equipment 
for assessing and 
monitoring actual or 
potential offsite 
consequences of a 
radiological emergency 
condition are in use.”404  
“Methods, systems, 
and equipment for 
assessment of 
radioactive releases are 
in use.”405  
 
The dose projection 
process and field 
monitoring capability 
provide technically 
adequate estimates of 
radioactive material 







measures to ensure the 
protection of the health 
and safety of the 
public and workers, as 
well as the 
environment, from all-
hazards in support of 
responder operations 
and the affected 
communities.”407 
Protective Action “A range of protective 
actions has been 
developed for the 
plume exposure 
pathway EPZ for 
emergency workers and 
the public. Guidelines 
for the choice of 
protective actions 
“1. A range of public 
PARs [(excluding KI)] 
is available for 
implementation during 
emergencies.  
[2. ETEs] for the 
population located in 
the plume exposure 
pathway EPZ are 
The process provides 
PARs that are in 
accordance with 
planning commitments 
to the extent that 
“appropriate PARs 
would be issued to 
cover affected 







policies that are 
focused on protecting 
people, borders, 
 
404 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Inspection Manual, B–40. 
405 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, B–40. 
406 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, B–41. 
407 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Core Capabilities.” 
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RSPS Element Objective Output Outcome Impact 
during an emergency 
are developed and in 
place, and protective 
actions for the ingestion 
exposure pathway EPZ 
appropriate to the 
locale have been 
developed.”408  
available to support 
the formulation of 
PARs and have been 






products, and systems 






408 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Inspection Manual, B–42. 
409 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, B–42. 
410 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, B–44–B–46. 
411 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Core Capabilities.” 
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The REPP-replacement policy option may present some of the largest opportunities 
to impact the size and scope of the program to achieve cost reductions and link emergency 
preparedness and response protocols with probabilistic assessments of risk. The primary 
challenge is to generate the scientific analysis behind these adjustments to the risk basis. 
This analysis would need to convince the federal government to adjust its strategy to 
manage and regulate nuclear power plant risk pursuant to its responsibility under the AEA. 
Reducing the need to establish certain capabilities as currently defined to the extent they 
are established within REPP, may act as an equalizer for overall preparedness investment 
across the whole community. Some inequity for current emergency preparedness 
investment may be due to REPP, which enjoys a significantly higher proportion of resource 
allocation due to the regulatory requirements than most other hazards across the spectrum 
for which preparedness is funded by grant dollars. A REPP replacement option may allow 
the state or local jurisdiction to render its own judgment as to the criticality or priority of 
this hazard related to nuclear power plants within its own unique hazard environment. 
Additional research would be needed to establish a viable scientific basis as a candidate to 
replace the current risk-planning basis used for nuclear power plants.  
C. AUGMENTATION OF REPP WITH THE ROP FRAMEWORK AND 
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
REPP, as a standards-based program, provides a potential basis for what is 
considered adequate preparedness and response activities for the offsite state and local 
governments but lacks the framework for the measurement of risk. It is instead assumed 
that adherence to the criteria within the 16 planning standards provides reasonable 
assurance that the capability exists or would exist for the implementation of protective 
measures should an emergency involving offsite release occur.412 However, no expressed 
direct relationship exists between the 16 planning standards and assessment of risk, given 
the fact that an unanticipated and unmitigated release of radioactive materials may occur. 
As a result, implementation of the 16 planning standards within an offsite community 
 
412 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Program Manual, 2. 
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surrounding a nuclear power plant was not evaluated in terms of what measurable effect, 
if any, the offsite protective actions could or would have on public health and safety.  
1. Description of a REPP Augmentation Policy with ROP and PI 
REPP lacks an express relationship between how the offsite program could be 
measured in terms of effectiveness in the desire to achieve the dose savings called for in 
NUREG-0654 as the principal rationale behind emergency planning.413 Thus, no direct 
means are available to adjudicate the cost-benefit of these programs or show how 
preparedness activities can be measured with regards to how well they mitigate risk to the 
community. However, an opportunity exists to augment REPP with elements of an existing 
NRC program that may provide a structure and a means to measure indicators of risk. As 
a policy option, this augmentation would not replace REPP, nor would it incorporate the 
all-hazards framework, but instead would add the objective measurement of performance 
data in the form of performance indicators. The main advantage of this approach would be 
the benefit to the evaluation process that focuses on the adjudication of clear metrics for 
program management and exercise demonstration performance rather than subjective 
determinations of adequacy with respect to the singular federal interpretation of a standard.  
A safety assessment of nuclear power plants traditionally comes from a 
deterministic-type analysis. The IAEA describes the objectives of deterministic safety 
analysis as “to confirm that safety functions can be performed with the necessary reliability 
and that the possibility of certain conditions arising that could lead to an early radioactive 
release … can be considered as practically eliminated.”414 In the United States, the NRC 
uses a deterministic approach in its analysis of the safety of nuclear power plants and 
 
413 Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Federal Emergency Management Agency, Criteria for Preparation 
and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power 
Plants, 6. 
414 International Atomic Energy Agency, Deterministic Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants, 
STI/PUB/1851 (Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2019), 5, 
https://www.iaea.org/publications/12335/deterministic-safety-analysis-for-nuclear-power-plants. 
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supports a defense-in-depth philosophy.415 In particular, the deterministic safety analysis 
of the nuclear power plant core damage frequency (CDF) metric is a proxy for the 
individual latent cancer fatality risk, and the large early release frequency (LERF) metric 
is a proxy for the individual early fatality risk.416 The approach identifies an implied 
relationship between the projected frequency of CDF and LERF, as a result of plant 
conditions, and the impact on human health offsite. Evidence of this relationship rests in 
the stated regulatory guidance for the use of CDF and LERF metrics as a basis for an 
acceptable PRA that assesses changes in risk against the NRC’s policy statement on safety 
goals for the operation of nuclear power plants.417  
The NRC’s approach to PRA describes estimating three levels of risk, starting with 
the CDF metric at level 1 and culminating at level 3 aimed at estimating the consequences 
in terms of injury to the public and damage to the environment.418 The deterministic safety 
analysis approach and the use of the PRA methodology provide the foundation for the 
NRC’s ROP. “The oversight process calls for using objective measurements of the 
performance of nuclear power plants [and] focusing inspections on activities where the 
potential risks are greater.”419 Specifically, the NRC’s defense-in-depth approach 
represents conceptual attributes of a nuclear power plant design and tangible physical 
barriers between fission products and the environment that are successive in nature to 
provide for public protection.420 The integrity of these barriers is one of the most important 
key safety areas (for reactor safety) that comprise the NRC’s cornerstones of safe 
operation.421 Comprehensive protection of public health and safety is thus rooted in nuclear 
power plant conditions and frequency estimates for such conditions that lead to a release 
 
415 “83 FR 4520—An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions 
on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis—Content Details—2018-01901,” 4, Office of the Federal 
Register, National Archives and Records Administration, accessed August 7, 2019, 
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/FR-2018-01-31/2018-01901. 
416 Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 5. 
417 Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, “83 FR 4520,” 8. 
418 Nuclear Regulatory Agency, “Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA).”  
419 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), 2. 
420 Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, “83 FR 4520,” 14. 
421 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), 2. 
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of radionuclides that impacts public health, and potential changes to the plant design or 
operation must be measured in terms of this overall risk. 
Augmentation of REPP using the NRC ROP methodology and incorporating 
performance indicators relevant to offsite activity would increase the accountability of state 
and local programs based upon the use of a measurable framework. The four RSPS can be 
used as a basis to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the program based upon metric or 
indicator data, and not only subjective determinations of reasonable assurance unique to 
each evaluation instance. It is also possible that better alignment between offsite and onsite 
programs may be able to occur based upon the use of a similar framework for using 
performance indicators to assess overall risk, as onsite and offsite programs are 
interdependent and must work together to provide an overall comprehensive and integrated 
public health and safety protection program.422 The two main components of a REPP 
augmentation policy option consist of ROP methodology to incorporate the offsite and the 
use of performance indicators based upon the 16 planning standards in NUREG-
0654/FEMA-REP-1. 
2. The Reactor Oversight Process Model Incorporating the Offsite 
NRC’s ROP, based upon defense-in-depth, PRA principles, and seven overarching 
criteria for overall public safety, applies a risk management framework that allows the base 
criteria to inform the development of meaningful and appropriate metrics that can be used 
for program management and evaluation. As currently incorporated into the NRC 
regulatory framework for commercial nuclear power plants, ROP does not explicitly 
include the offsite program for state and local government responses to a radioactive 
release scenario impacting the surrounding community within the 10- and 50-mile 
emergency planning zones. However, the ROP methodology could be used to consider 
potential enhancements to the offsite program and REPP, specifically by incorporating a 
 
422 Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Federal Emergency Management Agency, Criteria for Preparation 
and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power 
Plants, 23. 
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means to measure the effectiveness and impact of decision making, response protocols, 
and preparedness activities with respect to public health and safety risks.  
Onsite or plant-based risk is measured through inspection criteria and performance 
indicators across the seven key cornerstones of safety that range across three key areas of 
oversight: reactor safety, radiation safety, and physical protection safeguards.423 In 
addition, cross-cutting areas of human performance, a safety-conscious work environment, 
and a focus on problem identification and resolution apply across all cornerstones.424 This 
structure could be slightly modified to apply also to an offsite program, which focuses on 
the same mission to protect public health and safety but is also tailored to specific offsite 
key areas. The four RSPS could serve as a basis to incorporate performance indicators that 
align with both ROP methodology and NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 evaluation criteria. 
This alignment provides the foundation to assign a metric performance indicator based 
upon the REPP evaluation points of the review that contribute to FEMA’s assessment of 
offsite programs. 
A key benefit of applying the ROP model to an offsite program is incorporating the 
specific performance metrics that allow preparedness activity to be measured against a 
more formal PRA, which thereby explicitly connects program activities and risk. While 
FEMA’s THIRA model incorporates a capability assessment that may contribute to the 
development of an actual performance metric, it lacks an objective measurement that can 
be compared with a relative level of public safety and cost-benefit. Introducing a formal 
PRA approach may help offsite programs better understand how their program efforts are 
reducing risk to their communities from a nuclear power plant incident by showing how 
individual activities build a capability that, when demonstrated, shows how response assets 
will work to result in effective protective actions that provide dose savings.  
During a nuclear power plant emergency, the activity of offsite agencies involves a 
series of key functional responsibilities that address population safety and mass care, 
radiological impact assessment, public warning and information, and contamination 
 
423 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), 3. 
424 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 3. 
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control measures (including food and water interdiction). These key areas can be 
incorporated into a ROP-like framework that replaces the onsite program cornerstones with 
offsite ones tailored to these four key functional areas. Each functional area contains a 
subset of offsite cornerstones that include elements derived from the components of the 16 
planning standards pertinent to the offsite program. All these elements, in turn, can be tied 
to one or more of the critical capabilities described by the RSPS, which thus allows this 
approach to be compared with other approaches for policies that integrate REPP with all-
hazards capabilities-based planning or REPP replacement strategies.  
To apply the ROP model to the offsite programs, how offsite actions change or 
influence risk factors to public health must be analyzed as a result of offsite conditions 
surrounding the nuclear power plant. Although onsite programs use CDF and LERF as 
indicators for a surrogate for risk to indicate how plant conditions may affect human health, 
offsite programs will need a different but equally relevant metric or set of metrics to show 
how offsite conditions could impact human and environmental health. These metrics would 
need to include how state and local governments anticipate (via preparedness activities) 
and execute (via response and recovery activities) roles and responsibilities to reduce the 
impact of the incident upon public health and safety. The appropriate indicators for the 
offsite then have to be subject to measurement to provide some comparative basis for what 
the measurement means, and translated into some final determination of adequacy for 
probabilistic risk or reasonable assurance. In the NRC ROP framework, the indicators are 
simply measured against the 16 planning standard criteria and color-coded into categories 
(green, white, yellow, red) as an overall performance rating.425  
3. Performance Indicators Tied to the 16 Planning Standards 
The use of a probabilistic approach for offsite radiological preparedness, response, 
and recovery depend upon the critical need for key officials in a decision-making role to 
weigh issues quantitatively of the high relative importance that exhibit significant 
complexity and regulatory impact.426 Point estimates of risk, such as a lifetime probability 
 
425 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 5. 
426 Environmental Protection Agency, Risk Assessment Forum White Paper, 10. 
148 
of cancer risk of 10^-6 as a result of exposure to a hazardous substance, are called 
deterministic in nature and generally convey average or worst-case estimates.427 These 
point estimates do not reveal the extent of any uncertainty in the estimate itself, including 
whether or not repeat measurements under the same conditions in the future will produce 
results within or near the point estimate.428 As such, these types of risk assessments using 
point estimates with exposure incorporate varying levels of conservatism and certainty, but 
only yield an estimate at some point within a range of possible risks.429 Thus, the 
measurement of performance indicators can provide a relative means to adjudicate more or 
less probability of risk based upon some activity for which the output and outcome 
contributes or detracts from an objective, criteria, or standard. 
Given the uncertainty of human health-based risk assessments in general, and in the 
specific context of offsite radiological releases from a nuclear power plant, one practice 
used by EPA in exposure assessment scenarios is to identify the “sensitivity of exposure 
or risk estimates to key inputs [that] can focus efforts to reduce uncertainty by collecting 
additional data.”430 Projecting the radioactive release concentrations within a simulated 
environment to compare these concentration levels in a particular area to the PAGs is an 
example of a typical offsite approach to try and reduce uncertainty regarding offsite PADs. 
PAGs—pre-determined point estimates of risk that assume exposure to certain 
radionuclides known to be found within nuclear power plants—are indicators of conditions 
that will increase the frequency of both acute effects and increase the risk of chronic effects 
within the exposed population.431 The additional data collected by offsite field teams to 
characterize the radiological impact in a particular area based upon PAGs increases 
 
427 Environmental Protection Agency, 10. 
428 Environmental Protection Agency, 10. 
429 Environmental Protection Agency, 10. 
430 Environmental Protection Agency, 11. 
431 Environmental Protection Agency, PAG Manual, 3. 
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decision-maker confidence in understanding offsite conditions. It is also a key factor in the 
decision making for offsite protective actions.432  
Measurement of radionuclides provides a key input for determining public health 
impact and thus is a critical component of offsite public health and safety risk assessment. 
Avoiding all unnecessary doses to the public is foundational to a radiological emergency 
response, and the PAGs provide the point estimates of risk for when public protective 
action should be taken, despite not being defined as acceptable levels of risk or strict 
numeric criteria.433 PAGs can, therefore, represent one factor in a MIRA that facilitates 
decision making for protective action, and acts as an indicator for the protective action 
RSPS that exhibits sensitivity to various offsite actions that affect overall public health 
impact. These offsite actions can be measured to produce a rank-ordered comparison of 
various protective actions the offsite state and local government entities can ask the public 
to take. This comparison, using MIRA principles in its design, can factor in both 
quantitative and qualitative data, and model the uncertainties of the data, as well as the 
decision itself based upon an index of offsite indicators.434 
Offsite indicators that may be indexed include a range of factors and may also 
include administrative level factors, environmental and meteorological factors, geopolitical 
factors, and operational factors during a response scenario that contribute towards the 
overall risk to public health and safety. These factors would be measurable concerning 
either some qualitative scale or otherwise quantitative in nature and are expressed within 
units that factor into an overall dose projection that can be then compared with the PAGs. 
The objective of the analysis of indexed factors is to inform the offsite decision-making 
process by modeling the various choices to show a sensitivity correlation in either 
increasing or decreasing the projected dose. Decision makers could use the index as a 
means to anticipate the impact of their decisions upon offsite public health and safety, and 
 
432 Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Federal Emergency Management Agency, Criteria for Preparation 
and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power 
Plants, 61. 
433 Environmental Protection Agency, PAG Manual, 1. 
434 Environmental Protection Agency, “Multi-Criteria Integrated Resource Assessment (MIRA).” 
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incorporate the PAGs as a way to account for public health impacts but are expanded to 
account for how offsite decisions contribute to overall risk. 
Under a framework modeled after the NRC ROP, offsite programs can assign 
performance indicators to functional elements that align with the 16 planning standards as 
set forth in NUREG-0654. The performance indicators can be set to focus upon measurable 
elements that FEMA can then use to assess and evaluate offsite programs as part of REPP. 
FEMA has attempted to use its assessment areas for exercise evaluation as a means to 
adjudicate the demonstration of reasonable assurance that “focuses more on accomplishing 
the mission than on the steps are taken to achieve a result.”435 The challenge with this 
approach is the difficulty in program management and administration when the linkage 
between the activities and outputs that produce outcomes and the outcomes themselves are 
not thoroughly understood or themselves are subject to evaluation. In other words, no clear 
success path exists; only a success determination that is in and of itself subjective if based 
upon the ambiguous principle of reasonable assurance. 
Within NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, each of the 16 planning standards has an 
associated set of evaluation criteria that outline how documentation or functional 
demonstration should be used to communicate the operational implementation for each 
essential planning component.436 The opportunity exists to support this intent directly by 
setting performance metrics based upon which party is responsible for each element of the 
criteria, and aligns both offsite and onsite programs together when interdependencies exist 
for the same elements. Offsite performance indicators would also contribute to a better 
utilization of resources and more efficient program management since it would now be 
possible to evaluate not only the end result but the efficiency of the means to arrive at that 
result and look for ways to improve while still achieving required objectives and producing 
desired outcomes. The 16 planning standards provide a ready-made criterion that covers 
not just exercise evaluation but the entire spectrum of program management, for which 
 
435 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Program Manual, 178. 
436 Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Federal Emergency Management Agency, Criteria for Preparation 
and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power 
Plants, 24. 
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performance indicators could provide a comprehensive and measurable rubric to evaluate 
both the means to meet the objectives and the outcomes to meet the mission. 
4. Applying a Logic Model Framework to ROP and Performance 
Indicators 
An augmentation approach for incorporating ROP and performance indicators into 
REPP could be devised by assigning the indicators from the 16 planning standards 
evaluation criteria rather than pursue a POETE framework. For example, under the 
emergency classification RSPS, the outputs would be the evaluation criteria derived from 
planning standard D that pertain to the offsite (planning standard element D.3 and D.4).437 
Proceeding in this manner, the corresponding evaluation criteria elements for the remaining 
three RSPS could form the basis of performance indicators; insofar that each pertains to 
the elements that are an offsite responsibility (excluding licensee-only evaluation criteria).  
Using a logic model to describe the programmatic approach for a REPP 
augmentation policy involves identifying which criteria may be used to describe the 
appropriate objectives, outputs, outcomes, and impacts for the same four RSPS. As with 
the other policy options, the REPP augmentation policy option seeks to identify a series of 
indicators that can provide a perspective towards how augmentation may be used to 
manage program performance with respect to the goal of protecting offsite public health 
and safety. In an augmentation scenario, the advantage to state and local governments lies 
in the ability to define custom performance indicators for the outputs based upon the 
requirements in the NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 evaluation criteria. These performance 
indicators can be designed and deployed specific to each program and can be used as 
proxies for other, more subjective evaluation methods administered by FEMA or others 
that may not be sensitive to local priorities and needs.  
Consider the example in Table 4 for the RSPS element of emergency classification. 
Under a REPP augmentation policy option, the overall objective is defined by the statute 
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and describes the requirements for what emergency classification must 
 
437 Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Federal Emergency Management Agency, 42. 
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do and acts within the logic model as the indicator metric for the objective. The output then 
describes what tangible evidence of compliance must be produced and demonstrated to 
show the fulfillment of the objective. In this case, under a REPP augmentation policy, each 
program would develop site-specific performance indicators designed to address the 
evaluation criteria relevant to emergency classification as set forth by NUREG-
0654/FEMA-REP-1. The set of performance indicators are designed to measure activity 
related to the fulfillment of the objective and produce an outcome as described in the 
outcome column. The outcomes are derived from the process used to determine the relative 
significance of inspection findings as related to the emergency preparedness requirements 
set forth by the NRC.  
As with the other policy options, the impact column incorporates the relevant core 
capability element from the all-hazards framework to provide an indicator for how well the 
objective defined for the RSPS supports building a capability within the core area defined 
by the NPG. For emergency classification, the objective, as evidenced by the output and 
directed towards achieving some measurable outcome, represents an activity that can be 
accounted for under the situational assessment core capability. Within an augmentation 
policy option approach, the use of performance indicators provides a pathway for how 
activities used to either sustain or build a core capability could be measured in a more direct 
manner. This approach provides the added benefit of using performance metrics as a way 
to measure the return on investment of resources, knowledge, or time towards closing 
capability gaps as outlined in THIRA and the SPR.  
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Table 4. Logic Model Representation of REPP Augmentation Policy Option 
RSPS Element Objective Output Outcome Impact 













Events are declared in 
a timely and accurate 
manner.440 





regarding the nature and 
extent of the hazard, any 
cascading effects, and the 
status of the response.”441 













and resources) are 
capable of alert and 




Public Alert and Warning 
Core Capability—Ability 
to deliver “coordinated, 
prompt, reliable, and 
actionable information to 
the whole community 
through the use of clear, 
consistent, accessible, and 
culturally and linguistically 
 
438 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Inspection Manual, B–21. 
439 Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Federal Emergency Management Agency, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response 
Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, 42. 
440 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Inspection, B–24–B–25. 
441 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Core Capabilities.” 
442 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Inspection Manual, B–27. 
444 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Inspection Manual, B-30–B-31. 
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RSPS Element Objective Output Outcome Impact 
E.1, E.2, E.5, E.6, 
E.7.443 
appropriate methods to 
effectively relay 
information regarding any 
threat or hazard, as well as 
the actions being taken and 
the assistance being made 
available, as 
appropriate.”445 











I.7, I.8, I.9, I.11.447 
 
The dose projection 
process and field 
monitoring capability 
provide technically 
adequate estimates of 
radioactive material 




Response/Health and Safety 
Core Capability—Ability to 
conduct “appropriate 
measures to ensure the 
protection of the health and 
safety of the public and 
workers, as well as the 
environment, from all-
hazards in support of 
responder operations and the 
affected communities.”449 
 
443 Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Federal Emergency Management Agency, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response 
Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, 43–46. 
445 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Core Capabilities.” 
446 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Inspection Manual, B–40. 
447 Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Federal Emergency Management Agency, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response 
Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, 57–58. 
448 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Inspection Manual, B–41. 
449 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Core Capabilities.” 
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RSPS Element Objective Output Outcome Impact 
Protective Action 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), 
Emergency 
Protective Actions.450  
Site-specific 
performance 





J.2, J.9, J.10, J.11, 
J.12.451 
 
The process provides 




Federal guidance to 
the extent that 
appropriate PARs 
would be issued to 
cover affected 






implement “and maintain 
risk-informed 
countermeasures, and 
policies focused on 
protecting people, borders, 
structures, materials, 
products, and systems 
associated with key 





450 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Inspection Manual, B–42. 
451 Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Federal Emergency Management Agency, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response 
Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, 59–65. 
452 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Inspection Manual, B–44. 
453 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Core Capabilities.” 
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Additional performance indicators could be introduced that expand upon and 
describe the comprehensive capability desired by the program by using the output 
evaluation criteria as a foundation. This option is, therefore, expandable and flexible, able 
to provide a solid basis for measuring performance necessary to meet regulatory 
requirements but also adaptable to incorporate additional performance criteria in a 
progressive program strategy. A progressive strategy would allow continuing compliance 
but also have the ability to evolve with the emergency management enterprise to build and 
sustain capabilities based upon measurable performance. 
Overall, the REPP augmentation policy option incorporating the ROP framework 
and performance indicators tied to the 16 planning standards provides several advantages 
over both the REPP all-hazards integration policy option and the REPP replacement policy 
option, in that a robust framework for developing the performance indicators can be readily 
derived from the existing program. The challenges lie in the extensive amount of 
recordkeeping and tabulation of performance indicator information across so many facets. 
Using only the four RSPS helps mitigate some of the data that would need to be collected, 
by focusing the data collection only around the evaluation criteria tied to planning 
standards D, E, I, and J. Augmenting these elements only provides a potential clearer 
picture of impacts upon risk, based upon how the PI measurements contribute to a feedback 
mechanism for program management where the greatest potential impacts can occur. The 
basis in establishing this policy option from the NRC’s own PRA process in using the same 
four RSPS contributes to the unity of purpose between the offsite and onsite programs.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides a policy options analysis by utilizing the logic model 
introduced in Chapter IV and incorporating three realistic potential program strategies for 
nuclear power plant emergency preparedness and response. These three strategies build 
upon the contextual information provided in Chapter III to describe how each approach 
will set appropriate objectives, define inputs and outputs, and manage outcomes based 
upon consistent risk-significant factors in the proposed logic model framework. Policy 
choices are therefore rooted in measuring their ability to address risk-significant factors 
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and identify what methodology they propose to use for program design. Each approach 
incorporates the relevant portions of regulatory guidance or statutory requirements that will 
need to be addressed in any program or policy variant.  
The research and analysis in this chapter is designed to provide a means to address 
the research question of this thesis, which is to identify which benefits, shortfalls, and 
challenges emerge from the integration of the hazard-specific REPP with the all-hazards 
core capabilities and the NPS doctrine. The logic model framework and the consistent use 
of the four risk-significant planning standards provide a basis to measure the performance 
of each policy option against a common set of criteria tied to risk management for public 
health and safety. It is also possible, based upon the results of the research, to identify how 
such an approach utilizing a logic model framework may be used to provide a more robust 
and more easily measurable context for the determination of reasonable assurance. Further 
research is needed to address additional policy considerations, including potential 
rulemaking, to allow the current REPP program to evolve into greater compatibility with 
contemporary approaches to emergency management.  
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The research question for this thesis is to find out which benefits, shortfalls, and 
challenges emerge from the integration of the hazard-specific emergency preparedness and 
response program established under REPP with the all-hazards core capabilities and the 
NPS doctrine. To do so, this thesis utilizes a logic model framework to facilitate the process 
of evaluating different policy options and approaches to an emergency preparedness and 
response program for nuclear power plants in the United States. The logic model 
framework includes a common metric of RSPS for understanding what elements are most 
critical to any programmatic approach and is rooted in the long-established protocol for 
nuclear safety. The framework, based upon the strategy used by the EPA for evaluating 
and using data in decision making where a high degree of variability and uncertainty exists, 
helps effectively navigate the complex nature of nuclear emergency preparedness and 
response. It is possible to untangle the various aspects of integrating complex programs 
together by augmenting one with another, or replacing one with another using this model.  
The value of using the logic model framework as a basis for evaluating policy 
options is the clarity such an approach brings to the community decision maker, who is 
ultimately responsible for the public health and safety in their jurisdiction that hosts one of 
these nuclear plants. For many years, since the TMI accident in 1979, communities have 
relied upon REPP as the singular approach to nuclear emergency preparedness for the 
offsite community. While REPP incorporates the lessons learned from that TMI incident 
and makes a valuable and important contribution to the modern emergency management 
enterprise, it is not a comprehensive solution. Much has been learned in the past four 
decades, and that knowledge has a place in contributing to the community decision maker’s 
understanding and strategic direction that must address this hazard. The policy options 
presented in this thesis explore three distinct possibilities to utilize the contemporary body 
of knowledge and unify the hazard-specific approach of REPP with modern all-hazards 
frameworks.  
Nuclear power plants present both an opportunity and risk to communities that host 
them within their geopolitical boundaries. Striving to achieve a balance between perceived 
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costs and benefits can be a challenging exercise for any community and its public sector 
leadership, who must evaluate the potential safety risks and emergency response capability 
of its jurisdiction as part of its responsibilities. The public continues to perceive a 
radioactive release from a nuclear power plant as a supremely catastrophic incident, and it 
is thus more difficult to conduct a rational dialogue regarding the measurable context of 
the programs designed to protect the public health and safety from the potential hazard. As 
a result, costs and program requirements designed to mitigate perceived public health and 
safety risk, as well as public perception of the hazard, may be artificially inflated.  
The clear choice for a modern policy approach to nuclear power plant emergency 
preparedness and response is to augment the existing REPP protocol with a robust means 
to measure capability and performance. The concept of reasonable assurance, in the form 
currently used by REPP, is difficult to define comprehensively and measure consistently 
based upon the 16 planning standards alone. Likewise, the existing NPS doctrine of THIRA 
and user-defined capability targets do not address a reliable means of adjudicating 
performance, even if that capability can be implied from resource inventories. Therefore, 
to answer the research question of this thesis effectively, the conclusion of the research and 
policy options analysis is to augment REPP principles with the use of an oversight 
framework and measurable site-specific performance indicators tied to probabilistic risk 
assessment.  
A. TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN EFFICIENCY AND COST BURDEN FOR 
INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT 
For almost 40 years, REPP has been the accepted programmatic protocol to achieve 
the careful balance of interdependency between onsite regulatory compliance and offsite 
contribution to nuclear power plant emergency preparedness and response. In 1980, no 
universally acceptable vehicle was available to implement an emergency preparedness and 
response program consistently across the entire nation. The federal government was also 
not able to mandate a state and local government directly to adopt any such program. The 
only solution was to use the federal licensing basis for nuclear power plants as a way to 
force utilities to get their state and local governments on board with the program as 
partners, without which it would mean the loss of an operating license. Nuclear power 
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plants represent an economic benefit to the community, and complying with REPP was 
portrayed simply as a necessary cost of doing business.  
As a result of the dynamic between the federal government and the state and local 
governments, the cost of REPP was ultimately borne by the nuclear industry itself. Over 
time, improvements and enhancements to onsite accident prevention and defense-in-depth 
safety systems have decreased the likelihood of a catastrophic design-basis accident. Thus, 
the significant release of radionuclides out into the community is no longer a likely or even 
probable consequence from one of these accident sequences. This view gives rise to the 
perception that any emergency preparedness and response program should, accordingly, 
account for a more appropriate assessment of offsite risk and commit resources from a 
preparedness standpoint in a more equitable fashion with respect to other, and more likely 
hazards within the community. In the last decade, even FEMA has recognized this reality 
and incorporated tools, such as THIRA, into its doctrine for use by state and local 
emergency planners in an attempt to reconcile hazard and threat assessment with 
emergency preparedness and response resource expenditure.  
For the industry, continuing to spend money on REPP seems superfluous when so 
much has been done onsite from a prevention standpoint that the risk calculus has adjusted 
downward, and simultaneously, the capability of the offsite has increased under modern 
emergency management protocols and programs. The cost of operating a modern nuclear 
power plant has increased sharply due to the increasing amount of regulations introduced 
after the Fukushima incident and the dynamic competition of modern electricity markets. 
All these situations have placed an increasing emphasis on reducing costs and stay within 
margins that make these plants viable from an economic point of view as a business 
operating in a competitive marketplace. Many in the nuclear industry also recognize that 
the early assumptions about uncontrolled and unmitigated accident scenarios driving the 
baseline planning assumptions for emergencies no longer apply or are unrealistic in the 
first place. Taken together, it becomes difficult to continue to justify the need for REPP at 
all.  
State and local governments have come to realize that REPP programs within their 
jurisdictions are much more difficult to maintain in the sense that they now represent an 
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alternative approach to emergency preparedness and response that differs from their all-
hazards program. REPP just does not fit into modern hazard assessment-driven program 
strategies and is so prescriptive that it creates a significant amount of administrative 
overhead to maintain and submit separate evidence of compliance to FEMA. It is, 
therefore, grossly inefficient, despite being supported by utility money, in that it cannot be 
easily aligned with the rest of the all-hazards program and benefit from an economy of 
scale already in place. However, both FEMA and the NRC accept REPP as the one 
acceptable methodology to achieve compliance with the regulatory requirements pursuant 
to the federal government’s responsibility to oversee nuclear programs. Therefore, its 
principles retain value for both industry and government, which prioritize the ability to 
adopt an already-guaranteed success path. The rejection of REPP introduces a risk that the 
jurisdiction may not receive support from the federal enterprise either from a liability 
standpoint or if a need exists for consequence management support during an incident.  
Under a REPP integration policy, a logic model framework using the RSPS shows 
that the performance of this approach benefits from the ability to use REPP activities as 
performance indicators for all-hazards capability targets. Integration also benefits from 
characterizing REPP activities under the POETE framework, which allows for the 
identification of common elements that may present opportunities to achieve some 
economy of scale with similar activities in other programs. The dilemma is that the 
prescriptive nature of REPP pre-defines the capabilities that must be formally evaluated to 
achieve compliance. Merging the amount of pre-defined prescriptive capabilities needed 
under REPP with the all-hazards framework, while seeming to be logical at first, actually 
compounds the existing burden if the prescriptive components under the planning standards 
translate as capability targets. The resulting payload of documentation that would then need 
to be submitted would be burdensome even for a well-funded program, and would not be 
cost-effective in terms of how much is being expended as compared to other hazards or 
threats.  
For a REPP replacement strategy, the capability exists today, as demonstrated by 
SOARCA, to establish an alternative approach to the overall risk basis and reset the 
benchmark of capability needs for an emergency. The logic model framework shows that 
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while an opportunity exists to re-scope the hazard, each jurisdiction and utility would be 
taking on the task of re-inventing the wheel in some sense to meet the same criteria set 
forth by the RSPS that would still apply to any program strategy. This responsibility to re-
define the boundaries of nuclear power plant emergency preparedness and response also 
comes with a significant amount of liability to defend the modified risk basis in the event 
an emergency event actually occurs. Thus, the logic model framework points out the need 
to address the principles of RSPS in terms of objectives, outputs, and outcomes free from 
both restrictions but also potentially the confidence of any pre-existing regulatory or 
programmatic precedent. Changing the basis of risk would also require federal rulemaking 
to remove or at least modify the basis of the requirements away from the original 1982 
siting study, the 1978 planning basis, and the incorporation by reference of the hazard 
context specified by the 10- and 50-mile emergency planning zones.  
Alternatively, in a REPP augmentation policy option, it is possible to keep the 
integrity of the capability requirements established by REPP but introduce a more effective 
program management structure using a ROP-like model and custom performance 
indicators. The logic model framework using RSPS shows how a jurisdiction could 
approach policy to maintain compliance and alignment with the regulatory requirements 
but eschew the burdensome approach to integrate the all-hazards framework. The use of 
custom performance indicators that are not simply capability targets translated directly 
from the 16 planning standards can be both scalable to maintain the integrity of REPP and 
measurable to custom priorities. It need not be a given that REPP must provide both the 
content and structure to support an effective program. In the case of REPP augmentation, 
the site-specific performance indicators provide an alternative approach that addresses one 
of the core problems with REPP in that it requires exclusive federal adjudication for all the 
specified points of review.  
One of the main advantages of REPP augmentation is that it preserves the principles 
of REPP and removes the REPP structure that contributes to cost and resource inefficiency. 
The use of performance indicators could absolve the need, at least theoretically, for the 
federal government to impose the cost of its own efforts and resources to administer the 
program directly. Each site, as it already does with the NRC, may be able to specify 
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performance indicators for its offsite program and present an oversight framework (such 
as that set forth by the ROP) to the federal government on how it will self-assess its own 
performance subject to spot-checking and supplemental-only review by the federal 
enterprise. The logic model framework shows clearly how this policy option could 
integrate the use of performance indicators into the measure of outputs from program 
activities for each of the four RSPS.  
As a result of the application of the logic model framework to three distinct policy 
options, the results shown in the policy options analysis section provide a means to address 
the various benefits, shortfalls, and challenges that would emerge from the integration of 
hazard-specific emergency preparedness and response under REPP with an all-hazards 
doctrine. The use of the RSPS provides a common metric that any viable program approach 
would have to find a way to address and review the key elements of objectives, outputs, 
outcomes, and impacts in terms of the specific policy option or program approach. Given 
this basis, the conclusion is that a REPP augmentation policy option provides the best 
balance to preserve program integrity and flexibility to accommodate modern emergency 
management programs. This option includes the ability to accommodate the capability to 
measure program performance against objectives and cost commitments that highlight the 
value of the program and the return on investment for the taxpayer. 
B. PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIATION 
RISKS 
In the eyes of the public, nuclear power plants continue to pose more of a potential 
threat than a potential benefit as part of their individual local communities. Regardless of 
the facts, the perception continues to be that such plants use the same technology that sits 
at the center of ongoing concerns about nuclear weapons and the catastrophic danger to the 
planet and the environment from the threat of nuclear war. For the local jurisdiction with a 
nuclear power plant within the community, the question of safety surrounds the 
management of perception of risk as much as or more so than any actual assessment of 
risk. The level of what is considered to be reasonable and prudent to protect public health 
and safety must strike a careful balance between public perception and the reality of what 
utilities and governments can afford.  
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Any modern community faces a range of threats and hazards that must all be 
addressed in some manner, even if it is the allowance of risk that some adverse event may 
occur, and no specific countermeasure or mitigation strategy exists to protect against it. 
Due to the existence of very few real-world examples to provide a basis from which to 
determine what is needful or appropriate, some threats and hazards are difficult to place 
into an appropriate context. Subsequently, planning for how to respond to the unknown 
places the community into a difficult position to reassure public concerns from a position 
of stewardship and delegated authority in a situation not fully or wholly understood by 
anyone.  
Fortunately, radiation is a hazard that can be detected and measured with significant 
precision and modeled with some degree of scientific rigor. What is less clear concerns the 
accuracy of the relationship between radiation levels and human health impact, especially 
at low levels of chronic exposure across a wide base of the population. The fact that it is 
possible to measure radiation levels has skewed the emergency response strategies towards 
trying to mitigate almost any level of detectable radiation (down to the level of an 
incremental one-in-a-million or 10^-6 level) rather than accounting for an actual public 
health impact. Such a strategy sets a high bar for emergency preparedness and response 
protocols that must, therefore, treat almost any level of detectable radiation release as a 
public emergency. Additional research is needed to focus on addressing the potential 
mismatch between how we measure exposure with precision and how we adjudicate the 
public health impact with accuracy based upon those exposure levels.  
The logic model framework introduced in this thesis presents an approach to help 
focus any potential policy options for nuclear power plant radiological emergency response 
around four key areas that are most significant for public health and safety risk. As with all 
emergency preparedness and response programs, the methodology used to justify the 
expenditure of resources should have some relationship to the threat or hazard context. By 
resetting the scope of the nuclear power plant hazard for offsite communities within this 
framework, jurisdictions can avoid the tendency to evaluate this particular hazard within a 
separate context, as has been the case with REPP. For offsite state and local government 
decision makers, characterizing the scope of program activities to focus on the four RSPS 
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provides a way to set priorities in an environment where resources, personnel, funding, and 
time are all constrained in the face of multiple threats and hazards across a wide spectrum. 
Using the logic model framework and tools, such as MIRA, state and local organizations 
can design measurable programs and policies that provide a means to incorporate data and 
information collection efforts to provide meaningful feedback for program and policy 
performance. 
The domestic public is increasingly become acquainted with leveraging data and 
information analysis techniques, even at a rudimentary level, towards making decisions 
and supporting everyday activities. Government policies and programs will be expected to 
demonstrate their value and compete for support in this environment, where concepts of 
safety and risk are measurable and provide a basis for a more transparent comparison. It 
will no longer be sufficient to make claims that a planning basis for something as high 
profile as a nuclear safety issue simply follows a four-decade-old assumption regarding 
what the public considers to be reasonable and prudent as justification. It will be equally 
difficult to continue to make assumptions that public health impacts from radiation 
exposure should continue to follow from an overriding need to establish a false consensus 
arbitrarily to push forth rulemaking from 50 or 60 years ago. It is simply a matter of time 
before technology, awareness, and modern communications facilitate these kinds of 
discussions within the public discourse, and the risk is high that doing so in the aftermath 
of some kind of incident will further undermine public trust and confidence in a time of 
greatest need. 
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